26 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1916–1994 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Menke v. Peterschmidtgreen2 sentences1957Although Menke v. Peterschmidt, supra, 246 Iowa 722, 733 , 69 N.W.2d 65, 72 , involved a collision between two motor vehicles at an intersection, it is clear a holding the last clear chance doctrine applies here would conflict with the cited decision. 1957Although Menke v. Peterschmidt, supra, 246 Iowa 722, 733 , 69 N.W.2d 65, 72 , involved a collision between two motor vehicles at an intersection, it is clear a holding the last clear chance doctrine applies here would conflict with the cited decision. | 1 | 4 |
Vreugdenhil v. Kunkelgreen2 sentences1991Id. 1972He argues that if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Vruegdenhil v. Kunkel, 256 Iowa 460, 462 , 127 N.W.2d 630, 632 (1964), a jury question on this issue has been generated. | 1 | 2 |
Ackerman Ex Rel. Ackerman v. Jamesgreen2 sentences1991Ackerman v. James, 200 N.W.2d 818, 829 (Iowa 1972). 1979In any event, the railroad, which prevailed on that issue, was not prejudiced by it. *293 Clarification of our position should be made with regard to the doctrine of last clear chance, following our decision in Ackerman v. James, 200 N.W.2d 818 (Iowa 1972). | 1 | 2 |
Rosenau Ex Rel. Rosenau v. City of Esthervillegreen1 sentence1994In Rosenau v. City of Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Iowa 1972), we stated: We have recognized that instructions should not give undue emphasis to any phase of the case favorable to either side, and even correct statements of the law, if repeated to the point of undue emphasis, may constitute reversible error. | 1 | 1 |
Bokhoven v. Klinkergreen2 sentences1994In Bokhoven v. Klinker, 474 N.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Iowa 1991), we held “the doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery.” The doctrine’s chief *50 purpose was to ameliorate the harsh effects of the doctrine of contributory negligence. 1994Id. at 556 ; see also W. | 1 | 1 |
Schwennen v. Abellgreen1 sentence1994They refer to our decision in Schwennen v. Abell, 430 N.W.2d 98, 101-03 (Iowa 1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Reynolds v. Allergreen | 1 | 1 |
| James v. Winifred Coal Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Clemens v. Chicaco, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Steele v. Brada
neutral
2 sentences1934Under specific allegations of negligence in the original petition, the doctrine of the last clear chance could not have been relied upon unless the pleader had alleged “the facts giving rise to such doctrine.” Phelan v. Foutz, 200 Iowa 267 , 204 *468 N. W. 240; Steele v. Brada, 213 Iowa 708 , 239 N. W. 538 . 1934Under specific allegations of negligence in the original petition, the doctrine of the last clear chance could not have been relied upon unless the pleader had alleged “the facts giving rise to such doctrine.” Phelan v. Foutz, 200 Iowa 267 , 204 *468 N. W. 240; Steele v. Brada, 213 Iowa 708 , 239 N. W. 538 . | 4 | 1933–1934 |
Phelan v. Foutz
green
2 sentences1935However, we do find in Phelan v. Foutz, 200 Iowa 267 , 204 N. W, 240, the following principle reaffirmed, that the last clear chance doctrine has no applicability until the party who is accused of coming within the doctrine actually discovers the danger to the other party. 1934Under specific allegations of negligence in the original petition, the doctrine of the last clear chance could not have been relied upon unless the pleader had alleged “the facts giving rise to such doctrine.” Phelan v. Foutz, 200 Iowa 267 , 204 *468 N. W. 240; Steele v. Brada, 213 Iowa 708 , 239 N. W. 538 . | 3 | 1931–1935 |
Nagel v. Bretthauer
neutral
2 sentences1966Nagel v. Bretthauer, 230 Iowa 707, 712 , 298 N.W. 852, 854 ; Menke v. Peterschmidt and Olson v. Truax, both supra; rule 344(f)5, Rules of Civil Procedure. 1966Nagel v. Bretthauer, 230 Iowa 707, 712 , 298 N.W. 852, 854 ; Menke v. Peterschmidt and Olson v. Truax, both supra; rule 344(f)5, Rules of Civil Procedure. | 2 | 1959–1966 |
Hogan v. Nesbit
green
2 sentences1958Ryan v. Trenkle, 199 Iowa 636, 643 , 200 N.W. 318 ; Hogan v. Nesbit, 216 Iowa 75, 81 , 246 N.W. 270 ; Nagel v. Bretthauer; Menke v. Peterschmidt; Strom v. Des Moines & Central Iowa Ry. 1958Ryan v. Trenkle, 199 Iowa 636, 643 , 200 N.W. 318 ; Hogan v. Nesbit, 216 Iowa 75, 81 , 246 N.W. 270 ; Nagel v. Bretthauer; Menke v. Peterschmidt; Strom v. Des Moines & Central Iowa Ry. | 2 | 1936–1958 |
Pettijohn v. Weede
green
2 sentences1955He asserts this court has incorporated the “pursuit” theory into the doctrine of last clear chance, by its holding in Pettijohn v. *734 Weede, supra, 219 Iowa 465 , 258 N.W. 72 . 1955He asserts this court has incorporated the “pursuit” theory into the doctrine of last clear chance, by its holding in Pettijohn v. *734 Weede, supra, 219 Iowa 465 , 258 N.W. 72 . | 2 | 1935–1955 |
Stewart v. Madison
green
1 sentence1991In Stewart , we abolished last clear chance as a separate doctrine but provided “the elements previously applied as part of the last clear chance doctrine shall, in all cases where they are applicable, be submitted as issues of proximate cause.” Id. at 298 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Goetzman v. Wichern
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 753 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Lambrecht v. Archibald green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Major v. Grieg
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Yarbrough v. Hovis
neutral
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Spencer v. Fondry
neutral
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Kuhn v. Dell green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Nehring v. Connecticut Co.
green
2 sentences1972The court in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. at 101 , 112 A.2d at 714 , quoted at length from Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109 , 84 A. 301, 303 , 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 896, 898-899 (Sup.Ct.Err.1912), in articulating its analysis of the last clear chance doctrine. 1972The court in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. at 101 , 112 A.2d at 714 , quoted at length from Nehring v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 109 , 84 A. 301, 303 , 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 896, 898-899 (Sup.Ct.Err.1912), in articulating its analysis of the last clear chance doctrine. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Rohr Ex Rel. Rohr v. Henderson
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Odekirk v. Austin
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Dunn v. City of Detroit
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Borzea v. Anselmi
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Oddis v. Greene
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Silva v. Oishi green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Albrecht v. Rausch
green
2 sentences1972Albrecht v. Rausch, 193 N.W.2d 492, 496-497 , decided after defendant’s brief and argument was filed in this matter, is adverse to the first aspect of defendant’s argument. 1972Albrecht v. Rausch, 193 N.W.2d 492, 496-497 , decided after defendant's brief and argument was filed in this matter, is adverse to the first aspect of defendant's argument. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Gustafson v. Northern Pacific Railway Company
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Holman v. Viko
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Vlach v. Wyman
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Niday v. Tomasini green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Exum v. Boyles
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Russell v. Pitts
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Couture v. Lewis green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Malcom v. Dox neutral | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of NJ
green
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Jones v. Knutson
neutral
2 sentences1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik 1972Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, said in Pangborn v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 18 N.J. 84, 101 , 112 A.2d 705 , 713: “The best considered decisions properly catalogue the alleged last clear chance doctrine as simply an application of the principle of proximate cause.” Among jurisdictions which have continued to apply the doctrine of last clear chance but construe the doctrine as merely an application of the law of proximate cause are: Yarbrough v. Hovis, 277 Ala. 516 , 172 So.2d 782, 783 ; Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97 , 366 P.2d 80, 81 ; Holman v. Vik | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Dorcas v. Aikman green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Strom v. Des Moines & Central Iowa Railway Co. green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Ryan v. Trenkle green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Wilson v. Illinois Central Railroad green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Bridenstine v. Iowa City Electric Railway Co. green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Groves v. City of Webster City green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Sheridan v. Limbrecht green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Rutherford v. Gilchrist green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Jarvis v. Stone green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Welsh v. Tri-City Railway Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.