last clear chance doctrine in Michigan

1991Willoughby [v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 336 ; 388 NW2d 688 (1986).] [ 174 Mich App 711 .] In Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 437 Mich 31 ; 464 NW2d 711 (1991), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to the last clear chance doctrine.

1991Willoughby [v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 336 ; 388 NW2d 688 (1986).] [ 174 Mich App 711 .] In Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 437 Mich 31 ; 464 NW2d 711 (1991), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to the last clear chance doctrine.

1991Willoughby [v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 336 ; 388 NW2d 688 (1986).] [ 174 Mich App 711 .] In Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 437 Mich 31 ; 464 NW2d 711 (1991), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to the last clear chance doctrine.

1991Willoughby [v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 336 ; 388 NW2d 688 (1986).] [ 174 Mich App 711 .] In Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 437 Mich 31 ; 464 NW2d 711 (1991), the Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with regard to the last clear chance doctrine.

1994Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many. [4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 20.2, pp 89-91.] [3] See also Sedorchuk v Weeder, 311 Mich 6, 10-11 ; 18 NW2d 397 (1945); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599-600 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960). [4] The Legislature itself uses "the" cause and effect language to describe a category of cases in which liability will attach, "resulting from the negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) illustrates that one function of the word is simply to denote the relationshi

1994Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many. [4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 20.2, pp 89-91.] [3] See also Sedorchuk v Weeder, 311 Mich 6, 10-11 ; 18 NW2d 397 (1945); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599-600 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960). [4] The Legislature itself uses "the" cause and effect language to describe a category of cases in which liability will attach, "resulting from the negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) illustrates that one function of the word is simply to denote the relationshi

1994Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many. [4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 20.2, pp 89-91.] [3] See also Sedorchuk v Weeder, 311 Mich 6, 10-11 ; 18 NW2d 397 (1945); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599-600 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960). [4] The Legislature itself uses "the" cause and effect language to describe a category of cases in which liability will attach, "resulting from the negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) illustrates that one function of the word is simply to denote the relationshi

1994Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many. [4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 20.2, pp 89-91.] [3] See also Sedorchuk v Weeder, 311 Mich 6, 10-11 ; 18 NW2d 397 (1945); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599-600 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960). [4] The Legislature itself uses "the" cause and effect language to describe a category of cases in which liability will attach, "resulting from the negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) illustrates that one function of the word is simply to denote the relationshi

1994Probably it cannot be said of any event that it has a single causal antecedent; usually there are many. [4 Harper, James & Gray, Torts (2d ed), § 20.2, pp 89-91.] [3] See also Sedorchuk v Weeder, 311 Mich 6, 10-11 ; 18 NW2d 397 (1945); Barringer v Arnold, 358 Mich 594, 599-600 ; 101 NW2d 365 (1960). [4] The Legislature itself uses "the" cause and effect language to describe a category of cases in which liability will attach, "resulting from the negligent operation ... of a motor vehicle." MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105) illustrates that one function of the word is simply to denote the relationshi

1994Malcolm noted that Michigan’s definition of gross negligence appears to be identical to "the last clear chance doctrine.” Id. at 147 .

1994Our discussion of Gibbard , like the discussion in Jennings and Boroditsch, is simply an aid in determining what the Legislature intended when it drafted the government tort liability act and is not meant as an endorsement of the continued validity of Gibbard at common law. [7] The issue of a second defendant's concurrent negligence does not present itself in the old gross negligence cases because of the existence of joint and several liability. [8] See Fike, supra at 205 where this Court noted: See ...

1991Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 174 Mich App 705, 710-711 ; 436 NW2d 733 (1989).

1991Petrove v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 174 Mich App 705, 710-711 ; 436 NW2d 733 (1989).

1989The Zeni formulation of the last clear chance doctrine preceded our Supreme Court’s adoption of a pure comparative negligence system in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).

1989The Zeni formulation of the last clear chance doctrine preceded our Supreme Court’s adoption of a pure comparative negligence system in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638 ; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).

1989What the role of the last clear chance doctrine ought to be under the pure comparative negligence system adopted in Placek has not yet been resolved in Michigan, although the Court in Wilson, supra, 129-130 , did hold in dictum that the doctrine has a place as a form of jury instruction if *260 factually supported.

1989See for example Bradley v Appalachian Power Co, 163 W Va 332; 256 SE2d 879 (1979).

1989Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 152-153 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); Sells v Monroe Co, 158 Mich App 637, 650 ; 405 NW2d 387 (1987).

1989Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 152-153 ; 243 NW2d 270 (1976); Sells v Monroe Co, 158 Mich App 637, 650 ; 405 NW2d 387 (1987).

1983Lucchesi v Kent County Road Comm, 109 Mich App 254, 268 ; 312 NW2d 86 (1981), lv den 414 Mich 852 (1982). 3 As noted in the late Justice Moody’s concurring opinion in Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 461-462 ; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), the gross negligence standard has been essentially restated in the form of the last clear chance doctrine.

1983Lucchesi v Kent County Road Comm, 109 Mich App 254, 268 ; 312 NW2d 86 (1981), lv den 414 Mich 852 (1982). 3 As noted in the late Justice Moody’s concurring opinion in Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 461-462 ; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), the gross negligence standard has been essentially restated in the form of the last clear chance doctrine.

1983Lucchesi v Kent County Road Comm, 109 Mich App 254, 268 ; 312 NW2d 86 (1981), lv den 414 Mich 852 (1982). 3 As noted in the late Justice Moody’s concurring opinion in Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 461-462 ; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), the gross negligence standard has been essentially restated in the form of the last clear chance doctrine.

1983Lucchesi v Kent County Road Comm, 109 Mich App 254, 268 ; 312 NW2d 86 (1981), lv den 414 Mich 852 (1982). 3 As noted in the late Justice Moody’s concurring opinion in Burnett v City of Adrian, 414 Mich 448, 461-462 ; 326 NW2d 810 (1982), the gross negligence standard has been essentially restated in the form of the last clear chance doctrine.

1982As the Court of Appeals so aptly stated in a subsequent case: "A legal term with this number of aliases, each of which is given a precise meaning by case law and legal definition was destined for confusion." Papajesk v Chesapeake & O R Co, 14 Mich App 550, 555 ; 166 NW2d 46 (1968). [8] In Zeni , 152-153, this Court adopted two sections of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, to define the last clear chance doctrine: "`§ 479.

1982As the Court of Appeals so aptly stated in a subsequent case: "A legal term with this number of aliases, each of which is given a precise meaning by case law and legal definition was destined for confusion." Papajesk v Chesapeake & O R Co, 14 Mich App 550, 555 ; 166 NW2d 46 (1968). [8] In Zeni , 152-153, this Court adopted two sections of the Restatement of Torts, 2d, to define the last clear chance doctrine: "`§ 479.

1982Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 95 Mich App 62; 289 NW2d 879 (1980).

1982Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co, 95 Mich App 62; 289 NW2d 879 (1980).

1976The court distinguished the situation from one where an individual attempted to cross in front of a car, observing that the motorman had seen the situation, had apprehended the danger, and yet, if plaintiff were to be believed, had done nothing to avoid the accident. 103 Mich 46, 54 ; 61 NW 543 . [40] *155 The Restatement position in § 480 is limited enough, permitting plaintiff to receive the benefit of a last clear chance instruction only if defendant had actual knowledge of the situation and realized the danger, with knowledge to be construed from all the circumstances.

1976The court distinguished the situation from one where an individual attempted to cross in front of a car, observing that the motorman had seen the situation, had apprehended the danger, and yet, if plaintiff were to be believed, had done nothing to avoid the accident. 103 Mich 46, 54 ; 61 NW 543 . [40] *155 The Restatement position in § 480 is limited enough, permitting plaintiff to receive the benefit of a last clear chance instruction only if defendant had actual knowledge of the situation and realized the danger, with knowledge to be construed from all the circumstances.

1972Boerema v Cook, 256 Mich 266 (1931).

1966The Comstock Case, supra, stated on p 179, quoting from Parks v. Starks (1955), 342 Mich 443, 447 , which in turn quoted from Solomon v. Continental Baking Co., 172 Miss 388, 393 (160 So 732): “ ‘Where an act of negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, it does not cease to be a legal and proximate cause thereof because of the intervention of a subsequent act of negligence of another which contributed to the injury, if the prior act of negligence is still operating, and the injury inflicted is not different in kind from that which would have resulted from the prior act.’

1961The situation in such respect is comparable to that presented in the recent case of Churukian v. LaGest, 357 Mich 173 , where it was said: “Plaintiff-appellant also asserts that she was entitled to have a jury consider her case under a gross-negligence or last-clear-chance doctrine.

1961The situation in such respect is comparable to that presented in the recent case of Churukian v. LaGest, 357 Mich 173 , where it was said: "Plaintiff-appellant also asserts that she was entitled to have a jury consider her case under a gross-negligence or last-clear-chance doctrine.

1949Ackerman v. Advance Petroleum Transport, Inc., supra. A like conclusion follows with reference to possible liability on the ground of subsequent negligence and the application of the last clear chance doctrine. *184 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs to defendant.

1932If a plaintiff’s negligence contributes to cause an injury, recovery is precluded.’ But where plaintiff’s negligence is antecedent, and defendant’s negligence is subsequent, it is proper to excuse plaintiff’s negligence as remote, and to hold defendant’s subsequently intervening negligence as proximate, in *341 other words, to invoke the doctrine of last clear chance, and it will be noted that under this rule the defendant is guilty of negligence — nothing else, and nothing more. • If a defendant be guilty of more than negligence, we pass to wilfulness or,wantonness, and find ourselves entirel

1932In Bouwmeester v. Railroad Co., 63 Mich. 557 , the defendant was held liable, on the last clear chance doctrine, and it was held that plaintiff’s contributory negligence did not preclude his recovery where the action of defendant is wanton, wilful, or reckless, and injury results therefrom.

1932Accord: Matta v. Railway Co., 69 Mich. 109 ( 12 Am.

1929Co. v. Ellzey, 275 U. S. 236 (48 Sup. Ct. 80): ‘ ‘ That doctrine, rightly applied, * * * amounts to no more than this, that a negligent defendant will be held liable to a negligent plaintiff if the defendant, aware of the plaintiff’s peril or unaware of it only through carelessness, had in fact a later opportunity than the plaintiff to avert an accident.” Defendant had a right to go to the jury upon the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence unexcused by the doctrine of last clear chance.