Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lord v. Pooregreen2 sentences1974Ill Invoking the last clear chance doctrine, McGraw v. Corrin, Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Lord v. Poore, Del.Supr., 9 Terry 595 , 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Island Express v. Frederick, Del.Supr., 5 W.W.Harr. 569 , 171 A. 181 (1934), plaintiff argues also that any negligence on decedent’s part was a remote and not a proximate cause of his death. 1974Ill Invoking the last clear chance doctrine, McGraw v. Corrin, Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Lord v. Poore, Del.Supr., 9 Terry 595 , 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Island Express v. Frederick, Del.Supr., 5 W.W.Harr. 569 , 171 A. 181 (1934), plaintiff argues also that any negligence on decedent’s part was a remote and not a proximate cause of his death. | 1 | 4 |
Island Express, Inc. v. Frederickgreen2 sentences1974Ill Invoking the last clear chance doctrine, McGraw v. Corrin, Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Lord v. Poore, Del.Supr., 9 Terry 595 , 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Island Express v. Frederick, Del.Supr., 5 W.W.Harr. 569 , 171 A. 181 (1934), plaintiff argues also that any negligence on decedent’s part was a remote and not a proximate cause of his death. 1974Ill Invoking the last clear chance doctrine, McGraw v. Corrin, Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Lord v. Poore, Del.Supr., 9 Terry 595 , 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Island Express v. Frederick, Del.Supr., 5 W.W.Harr. 569 , 171 A. 181 (1934), plaintiff argues also that any negligence on decedent’s part was a remote and not a proximate cause of his death. | 1 | 3 |
Dykeman v. Engelbrechtgreen2 sentences1995See Dykeman v. Engelbrecht, Ct.App., 166 Ariz. 398 , 803 P.2d 119, 122 (1990). 1995See Dykeman v. Engelbrecht, Ct.App., 166 Ariz. 398 , 803 P.2d 119, 122 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Danculovich v. Browngreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
Bokhoven v. Klinkergreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
Chudnofsky v. Edwardsgreen1 sentence1995Culver, 588 A.2d at 1097 (citing Chudnofsky v. Edwards, Del.Supr., 208 A.2d 516, 518 (1965)). | 1 | 1 |
Cushman v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
Ratlief v. Yokumgreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
Davies v. Butlergreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Vlach v. Wymangreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c 1995See, e.g., Bokhoven v. Klinker, Iowa Supr., 474 N.W.2d 553, 556 (1991) (“[T]he doctrine of last clear chance, even when considered a part of proximate cause, has no further function to perform where contributory negligence is no longer a complete bar to plaintiffs recovery”); Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584, 589 (1981) (“[B]e-cause of the doctrine’s interrelationship with the issue of proximate cause ... the better course would be to abolish the use of the last clear chance for the plaintiff’); Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763 , 602 P.2d 605, 613 (1979) (holding that last clear c | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Company
green
1 sentence2018Ch. 2014) (noting that the General Assembly enacted the Delaware Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in order to abolish "the common law ban on contribution" among joint tortfeasors). 172 A.2d 252 (Del. 1961). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lagola v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2018Francis de Sales , 15 A.3d 1247 , 1257 (Del. 2011) (noting that the General Assembly "made a policy decision to set gross negligence as the floor-not the ceiling-for invoking [the Child Victim's Act's] applicability"); Laws v. Webb , 658 A.2d 1000 , 1006 (Del. 1995) (noting that the General Assembly adopted comparative negligence to abolish the " 'all or nothing' common law rule of contributory negligence," and, thus, the Court "perceive[ed] no logical basis to retain the 'all or nothing' doctrine of last clear chance"), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas , 867 A.2d 891 , 892 (Del. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Laws v. Webb
green
1 sentence2018Francis de Sales , 15 A.3d 1247 , 1257 (Del. 2011) (noting that the General Assembly "made a policy decision to set gross negligence as the floor-not the ceiling-for invoking [the Child Victim's Act's] applicability"); Laws v. Webb , 658 A.2d 1000 , 1006 (Del. 1995) (noting that the General Assembly adopted comparative negligence to abolish the " 'all or nothing' common law rule of contributory negligence," and, thus, the Court "perceive[ed] no logical basis to retain the 'all or nothing' doctrine of last clear chance"), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas , 867 A.2d 891 , 892 (Del. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales
green
1 sentence2018Francis de Sales , 15 A.3d 1247 , 1257 (Del. 2011) (noting that the General Assembly "made a policy decision to set gross negligence as the floor-not the ceiling-for invoking [the Child Victim's Act's] applicability"); Laws v. Webb , 658 A.2d 1000 , 1006 (Del. 1995) (noting that the General Assembly adopted comparative negligence to abolish the " 'all or nothing' common law rule of contributory negligence," and, thus, the Court "perceive[ed] no logical basis to retain the 'all or nothing' doctrine of last clear chance"), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas , 867 A.2d 891 , 892 (Del. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In re Rural/Metro Corporation Stockholders Litigation
green
1 sentence2018Francis de Sales , 15 A.3d 1247 , 1257 (Del. 2011) (noting that the General Assembly "made a policy decision to set gross negligence as the floor-not the ceiling-for invoking [the Child Victim's Act's] applicability"); Laws v. Webb , 658 A.2d 1000 , 1006 (Del. 1995) (noting that the General Assembly adopted comparative negligence to abolish the " 'all or nothing' common law rule of contributory negligence," and, thus, the Court "perceive[ed] no logical basis to retain the 'all or nothing' doctrine of last clear chance"), overruled on other grounds by Lagola v. Thomas , 867 A.2d 891 , 892 (Del. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Koutoufaris v. Dick
green
1 sentence1995Id. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Baker v. Reid
green
1 sentence1995Frederick, 171 A. at 187 ; Poore, 108 A.2d at 369 ; Baker, 57 A.2d at 108 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Culver v. Bennett
green
1 sentence1995Culver, 588 A.2d at 1097 (citing Chudnofsky v. Edwards, Del.Supr., 208 A.2d 516, 518 (1965)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
McGraw v. Corrin
green
1 sentence1974Ill Invoking the last clear chance doctrine, McGraw v. Corrin, Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 641 (1973); Lord v. Poore, Del.Supr., 9 Terry 595 , 108 A.2d 366 (1954); Island Express v. Frederick, Del.Supr., 5 W.W.Harr. 569 , 171 A. 181 (1934), plaintiff argues also that any negligence on decedent’s part was a remote and not a proximate cause of his death. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Rumble v. Lingo
green
1 sentence1961The Rumble case then lays down the following principle ( 147 A. 2d at page 513 ): “The fact that a plaintiff operator does enter an intersection and is involved in a collision within the danger area thereof with a motor vehicle travelling in the favored traffic pattern raises a conclusive presumption of contributory negligence on his part except (1) where the evidence discloses the occurrence of an unforseeable circumstance which is beyond the control of the operator, or (2) where the plaintiff has pleaded the last clear chance doctrine and the evidence is sufficient to admit the same.” Now, t | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Kinderavich v. Palmer
green
2 sentences1952Facts must, of course, be alleged to bring a plaintiff within the protection of the doctrine. * * ""; and where the last chance doctrine is invoked, the facts alleged must show that the plaintiff’s negligence was merely a remote condition. * * This rule was in accord with the requirement generally prevailing elsewhere to the effect that, in order to make the last clear chance doctrine an issue in the case, facts must be stated in the complaint which “fairly apprise the trial court and defendant that it will be invoked and afford a basis for a conclusion of liability based upon it.” Kinderavich 1952Facts must, of course, be alleged to bring a plaintiff within the protection of the doctrine. * * ""; and where the last chance doctrine is invoked, the facts alleged must show that the plaintiff’s negligence was merely a remote condition. * * This rule was in accord with the requirement generally prevailing elsewhere to the effect that, in order to make the last clear chance doctrine an issue in the case, facts must be stated in the complaint which “fairly apprise the trial court and defendant that it will be invoked and afford a basis for a conclusion of liability based upon it.” Kinderavich | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Buck, Admr. v. Rutland R.R. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1952Co., 101 Vt. 282 , 143 A. 297 ; 65 C. 1952Co., 101 Vt. 282 , 143 A. 297 ; 65 C. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Leftridge v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1947Harr. 569, 171 A. 181 ; Leftridge v. City of Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 P. 302 ; 2 Restatement of Torts, §§ 479, 480; Comment Note. — Doctrine of last clear chance, 92 A.L.R. 47 ; Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: a Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L. 1947Harr. 569, 171 A. 181 ; Leftridge v. City of Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 P. 302 ; 2 Restatement of Torts, §§ 479, 480; Comment Note. — Doctrine of last clear chance, 92 A.L.R. 47 ; Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: a Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Le Gates v. Ennis
neutral
1 sentence1938Harr. (37 Del.) 31, 180 A. 325 ; or that the basis of the plaintiff’s claim is the last clear chance doctrine. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.