last clear chance doctrine in Utah

1971The last clear chance doctrine is applicable to a situation where plaintiff’s position of extricable peril has arisen from his own negligence only if the defendant actually knew of plaintiff’s extricable peril, Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174 , 350 P.2d 154 , and cases cited therein.

1971The last clear chance doctrine is applicable to a situation where plaintiff’s position of extricable peril has arisen from his own negligence only if the defendant actually knew of plaintiff’s extricable peril, Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah 2d 174 , 350 P.2d 154 , and cases cited therein.

1951Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 114 Utah 262 , 198 P. 2d 459 ; Anderson v. Bingham & Garfield Railway Co., 117 Utah 197 , 214 P. 2d 607 .

1951Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 114 Utah 262 , 198 P. 2d 459 ; Anderson v. Bingham & Garfield Railway Co., 117 Utah 197 , 214 P. 2d 607 .

1948Each driver is charged with using due care to avoid the collision, and’ one cannot say when his own negligence continues to the point of impact, “we were both negligent, but you alone are chargeable because I got there first and you should have missed me.” See Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346 , 166 P. 2d 230, 237 . *9 The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, the respondent to have his costs.

1947In support of the next assignment of error, namely, that the court erred in failing to submit to the jury the doctrine of last clear chance, appellants rely in part on the case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346 , 166 P. 2d *205 230, 235.

1965But it should not be extended beyond such circumstances to obliterate the defense of contributory negligence, Marcellin v. Osguthorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1 , 336 P.2d 779 .

1965But it should not be extended beyond such circumstances to obliterate the defense of contributory negligence, Marcellin v. Osguthorpe, 9 Utah 2d 1 , 336 P.2d 779 .

1965“The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse to save another from injury,” Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25 , 361 P.2d 516 ; Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210 , 282 P.2d 309 ; Holmgren v. Union Pac.

1965“The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse to save another from injury,” Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25 , 361 P.2d 516 ; Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210 , 282 P.2d 309 ; Holmgren v. Union Pac.

1965“The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse to save another from injury,” Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25 , 361 P.2d 516 ; Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210 , 282 P.2d 309 ; Holmgren v. Union Pac.

1965“The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time to effectually act upon the impulse to save another from injury,” Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25 , 361 P.2d 516 ; Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210 , 282 P.2d 309 ; Holmgren v. Union Pac.

1953It would not be sufficient that it appear from hindsight that by some possible safety measure, or even by reasonable care, the defendant by "the skin of his teeth" could have avoided the collision. *550 This court has heretofore approved the treatment of the last clear chance doctrine as set out in Secs. 479 and 480, Restatement of Torts, see Compton v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Company, 120 Utah 453 , 235 P.2d 515 , for a discussion of those sections.

1953It would not be sufficient that it appear from hindsight that by some possible safety measure, or even by reasonable care, the defendant by "the skin of his teeth" could have avoided the collision. *550 This court has heretofore approved the treatment of the last clear chance doctrine as set out in Secs. 479 and 480, Restatement of Torts, see Compton v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Company, 120 Utah 453 , 235 P.2d 515 , for a discussion of those sections.

1951Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 114 Utah 262 , 198 P. 2d 459 ; Anderson v. Bingham & Garfield Railway Co., 117 Utah 197 , 214 P. 2d 607 .

1951Holmgren v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 114 Utah 262 , 198 P. 2d 459 ; Anderson v. Bingham & Garfield Railway Co., 117 Utah 197 , 214 P. 2d 607 .

1949We believe the following language from Hickok v. Skinner, supra, is apropos [ 113 Utah 1 , 190 P. 2d 517 ] : “The last clear chance doctrine, relied on by plaintiff, is inapplicable in the present instance.

1948Said the court [ 54 Cal. App. 2d 528 , 129 P. 2d 505 ]: “It is only in exceptional circumstances that the doctrine may be applied to cases involving collisions between two moving vehicles or at least in cases where the injured party is driving a rapidly moving vehicle for in such cases the act creating the peril ordinarily occurs practically simultaneously with the happening of the accident and the party sought to he charged cannot be said to have had a last clear chance to avoid the accident after the discovery of the injured party’s peril.

1948As this court said in Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal. App. 223 , at page 227, 28 P. 2d 932 , at page *272 934, ‘In other words, it is not enough to relieve a plaintiff of his own negligence that the defendant may have had a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had the last chance and also had a clea/r chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary care.

1948As this court said in Poncino v. Reid-Murdock & Co., 136 Cal. App. 223 , at page 227, 28 P. 2d 932 , at page *272 934, ‘In other words, it is not enough to relieve a plaintiff of his own negligence that the defendant may have had a chance to avoid the accident, but defendant must have had the last chance and also had a clea/r chance to do so by the exercise of ordinary care.

1946The case of Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 398 , 100 A. 760, 761 , has some bearing on this phase of the case.

1946The case of Dervin v. Frenier, 91 Vt. 398 , 100 A. 760, 761 , has some bearing on this phase of the case.

1919While it is true that in case of a trespasser it must be shown that the person who it is alleged caused the injury actually saw the trespasser in his perilous condition in time to have' avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care (Teakle v. Railroad, 32 Utah, 276 , 90 Pac. 402 , 10 L.

1919While it is true that in case of a trespasser it must be shown that the person who it is alleged caused the injury actually saw the trespasser in his perilous condition in time to have' avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care (Teakle v. Railroad, 32 Utah, 276 , 90 Pac. 402 , 10 L.