7 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1919–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Briere v. Lathrop Co.green2 sentences1983The third issue presented is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the risk. 1 This court has defined assumption of the risk as follows: “Assumption of the risk requires three elements: One must have full knowledge of a condition; such condition must be patently dangerous to him; and he must voluntarily expose himself to the hazard created.” Briere v. Lathrop Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 166, 174-175 [ 51 O.O.2d 232 ]. 1983The third issue presented is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the risk. 1 This court has defined assumption of the risk as follows: “Assumption of the risk requires three elements: One must have full knowledge of a condition; such condition must be patently dangerous to him; and he must voluntarily expose himself to the hazard created.” Briere v. Lathrop Co. (1970), 22 Ohio St. 2d 166, 174-175 [ 51 O.O.2d 232 ]. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.green2 sentences1919Ry. 95 Neb. 358, 359 [ 145 N. W., 842, 843 ], the Supreme Court of Nebraska says: “The doctrine of the last clear chance has no application to the ease where a section foreman in a railroad company’s yards suddenly goes upon the track in front of a moving train of cars, at a point so near the engine that it was impossible to stop and avoid injuring him. ’ ’ We think this case is that case — exactly, in that it involves, as the determining consideration, the impossibility of avoiding, injury to one in the first instance himself, negligent, and that in this view — the impossibility appearing cle 1919Ry. 95 Neb. 358, 359 [ 145 N. W., 842, 843 ], the Supreme Court of Nebraska says: “The doctrine of the last clear chance has no application to the ease where a section foreman in a railroad company’s yards suddenly goes upon the track in front of a moving train of cars, at a point so near the engine that it was impossible to stop and avoid injuring him. ’ ’ We think this case is that case — exactly, in that it involves, as the determining consideration, the impossibility of avoiding, injury to one in the first instance himself, negligent, and that in this view — the impossibility appearing cle | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mitchell v. Ross
green
2 sentences2011Mitchell v. Ross (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 75, 76-77 , 470 N.E.2d 245 . 2011Mitchell v. Ross (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 75, 76-77 , 470 N.E.2d 245 . | 2 | 2000–2011 |
Schell v. DuBois
green
2 sentences1933When we consider that under the decision in the case of Schell v De Bois, Admr., 94 Oh St, 93, 113 NE 664 , L.R.A. 1917A, 710 , the violation of an ordinance is negligence per se, it follows that the deceased was continuously negligent per se until struck by the defendants’ machine, and, therefore, continuously guilty of contributory negligence. 1930When we consider that under the decision in the case of Schell v. DuBois, Admr., 94 Ohio St., 93 , that the violation of an ordinance is negligence per se, it follows that the deceased was continuously negligent per se until struck by the defendants’ machine, and, therefore, continuously guilty of contributory negligence. | 2 | 1930–1933 |
Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Masterson
green
2 sentences2011The phrase “last clear chance” has been explained by the Supreme Court as follows: “Where a plaintiff, by his own fault, has caused himself to be placed in a perilous situation, he may recover under the rule of the 'last clear chance,' notwithstanding his negligence, if the defendant did not, after becoming aware of plaintiff's perilous situation, exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him.” Cleveland Railroad Co. v. Masterson (1932), 126 Ohio St. 42 , 183 N.E. 873 , at paragraph one of the syllabus. 2011The phrase “last clear chance” has been explained by the Supreme Court as follows: “Where a plaintiff, by his own fault, has caused himself to be placed in a perilous situation, he may recover under the rule of the 'last clear chance,' notwithstanding his negligence, if the defendant did not, after becoming aware of plaintiff's perilous situation, exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him.” Cleveland Railroad Co. v. Masterson (1932), 126 Ohio St. 42 , 183 N.E. 873 , at paragraph one of the syllabus. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Peters v. B. & F. Transfer Co.
green
2 sentences1983Our court has held in the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the syllabus in Peters v. B. & F. Transfer Co. (1966), 7 Ohio St. 2d 143 [ 36 O.O.2d 180 ]: “Where a plaintiff, by his own fault, caused himself to be placed in a perilous situation, he may recover under the rule of the ‘last clear chance’ notwithstanding his negligence, if the defendant did not, after becoming aware of plaintiff’s perilous situation, exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him. 1983Our court has held in the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the syllabus in Peters v. B. & F. Transfer Co. (1966), 7 Ohio St. 2d 143 [ 36 O.O.2d 180 ]: “Where a plaintiff, by his own fault, caused himself to be placed in a perilous situation, he may recover under the rule of the ‘last clear chance’ notwithstanding his negligence, if the defendant did not, after becoming aware of plaintiff’s perilous situation, exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
J.C. Penny Co. v. Robinson
green
1 sentence1966Penney Co., Inc., v. Robison, 128 Ohio St. 626 : “Under our law it is just as pernicious to submit a case to a jury and permit the jury to speculate with the right of citizens when no question for the jury is involved, as to deny to a citizen his trial by jury when he has the right.” The questions raised by this appeal may be stated as follows: (1) Could reasonable minds come to any conclusion other than that plaintiff was negligent per se for crossing over the center line of the highway upon which she was traveling; and (2), assuming that plaintiff was negligent per se, can reasonable minds c | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.