last clear chance doctrine in Washington

1964In Leftridge v. Seattle, supra , it is spelled out as follows (p. 545): "Going no farther back into the decisions than to Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , L.R.A. 1916A 943 , we find that case endeavored to clarify the last clear chance rule and define two separate conditions under which it was applicable, and the rule is announced as (1) that where the defendant actually saw the peril of a traveler on the highway and should have appreciated the danger and failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury, such failure made the defendant liable, although the plaintiff's negl

1964In Leftridge v. Seattle, supra , it is spelled out as follows (p. 545): "Going no farther back into the decisions than to Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , L.R.A. 1916A 943 , we find that case endeavored to clarify the last clear chance rule and define two separate conditions under which it was applicable, and the rule is announced as (1) that where the defendant actually saw the peril of a traveler on the highway and should have appreciated the danger and failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury, such failure made the defendant liable, although the plaintiff's negl

1935The rule is, and should be considered, well established, but should not be misused, for the reason clearly stated in Zettler v. Seattle, 153 Wash. 179 , 279 Pac. 570 , as follows: “The last clear chance doctrine is a very just and salutary rule to be applied in a proper case, but its misapplication is fraught with great danger and often leads to unjust results, because it always invites a jury to disregard or excuse contributory negligence which would otherwise bar the action.” All the conduct of the parties here, of which there is any substantial evidence, is embraced within the issues of neg

1933Appellants also rely largely upon the doctrine of last clear chance, or at least upon the second phase of that rule, to the effect that, when the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the plaintiff and recognized his peril in time to have avoided the injury and when plaintiff’s own negligence had ceased, leaving him in a position of danger from which he could not extricate himself, defendant is liable; citing Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 Pac. 302 , and Settler v. Seattle, 153 Wash. 179 , 279 Pac. 570 .

1924In Hartley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407 , 165 Pac. 106 , was presented a situation where the defendant did not actually know of the plaintiff’s perilous position, and therefore the plaintiff’s negligence must have terminated before the defendant could be liable under the last clear chance doctrine.

1924In Hartley v. Lasater, 96 Wash. 407 , 165 Pac. 106 , was presented a situation where the defendant did not actually know of the plaintiff’s perilous position, and therefore the plaintiff’s negligence must have terminated before the defendant could be liable under the last clear chance doctrine.

1935The rule is, and should be considered, well established, but should not be misused, for the reason clearly stated in Zettler v. Seattle, 153 Wash. 179 , 279 Pac. 570 , as follows: “The last clear chance doctrine is a very just and salutary rule to be applied in a proper case, but its misapplication is fraught with great danger and often leads to unjust results, because it always invites a jury to disregard or excuse contributory negligence which would otherwise bar the action.” All the conduct of the parties here, of which there is any substantial evidence, is embraced within the issues of neg

1933Appellants also rely largely upon the doctrine of last clear chance, or at least upon the second phase of that rule, to the effect that, when the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care should have seen the plaintiff and recognized his peril in time to have avoided the injury and when plaintiff’s own negligence had ceased, leaving him in a position of danger from which he could not extricate himself, defendant is liable; citing Leftridge v. Seattle, 130 Wash. 541 , 228 Pac. 302 , and Settler v. Seattle, 153 Wash. 179 , 279 Pac. 570 .

1964In discussing the applicability of the doctrine of last clear chance in Shiels v. Purfeerst, 39 Wn. (2d) 252, 256, 235 P. (2d) 161 (1951), this court said: “In our consideration of the applicability of the doctrine of last clear chance to the instant situation, we are not concerned with respondent’s contributory negligence as such nor with appellant’s antecedent negligence, if any.

1955As we said in Shiels v. Purfeerst, 39 Wn. (2d) 252, 257, 235 P. (2d) 161 : “ ‘He simply failed in his effort to escape the natural results of the emergency created by respondent’s [appellant’s] negligence.’ ” In the recent case of Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn. (2d) 358, 361, 281 P. (2d) 462 (1955), we said: “We hold that this case falls under the rule announced in Shiels v. Purfeerst, supra. Skidding for ninety feet is inconsistent with a clear opportunity to avoid a collision.” Considering the decisions of this court, texts, and the particular facts of the instant case, we hold that, as a matter o

1928Referring to the doctrine of last clear chance in Johnson v. Seattle, 141 Wash. 385 , 250 Pac. 409 , it was said: “There are two branches to that doctrine.

1928Referring to the doctrine of last clear chance in Johnson v. Seattle, 141 Wash. 385 , 250 Pac. 409 , it was said: “There are two branches to that doctrine.

1924In MacDonald v. Seattle, 126 Wash. 1 , 217 Pac. 39 , a single rule seems to have been substituted for the two rules laid down in the Mosso case, and it is there said that the last clear chance doctrine never applies until “the plaintiff’s negligence must have terminated.” Hartley v. Lasater, supra, is referred to as substantiating that principle.

1924In MacDonald v. Seattle, 126 Wash. 1 , 217 Pac. 39 , a single rule seems to have been substituted for the two rules laid down in the Mosso case, and it is there said that the last clear chance doctrine never applies until “the plaintiff’s negligence must have terminated.” Hartley v. Lasater, supra, is referred to as substantiating that principle.

1914Under the rule announced ■ and exemplified in Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 149 , 134 Pac. 934 ; Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , and Johnson v. Washington Water Power Co., 73 Wash. 616 , 132 Pac. 392 , there is no room under the present evidence for the invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1914Under the rule announced ■ and exemplified in Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 149 , 134 Pac. 934 ; Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , and Johnson v. Washington Water Power Co., 73 Wash. 616 , 132 Pac. 392 , there is no room under the present evidence for the invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1972The court states in part at page 518: Where a defendant is confronted by an emergency created by the negligence of the plaintiff, and he does what he can to avoid an injury, he is not liable under the doctrine of last clear chance, even though his course of action is not the wisest choice, and though he is unsuccessful. [Citations omitted.] The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of sufficient time to act effectually upon the impulse to avoid inj ury [. ] [ Citations omitted. ] However, in Ellington v. Freigang, 56 Wn.2d 718 , 355 *898 P.2d 19 (1960), it was

1972The court states in part at page 518: Where a defendant is confronted by an emergency created by the negligence of the plaintiff, and he does what he can to avoid an injury, he is not liable under the doctrine of last clear chance, even though his course of action is not the wisest choice, and though he is unsuccessful. [Citations omitted.] The doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and the lapse of sufficient time to act effectually upon the impulse to avoid inj ury [. ] [ Citations omitted. ] However, in Ellington v. Freigang, 56 Wn.2d 718 , 355 *898 P.2d 19 (1960), it was

1967The plaintiff had been walking at the side of the road, but on it with his back to the traffic and at the time defendant approached and honked his horn plaintiff veered left across the roadway into defendant’s car which defendant swerved to the left in attempting to avoid the plaintiff. *609 These facts are not the same as in the present case where it is established without question that the plaintiff was in the roadway, “they were in the pathway of my car,” and the defendant had proceeded behind the plaintiff and her companion “for quite a long distance.” Neither do we think that Colwell v. N

1967The plaintiff had been walking at the side of the road, but on it with his back to the traffic and at the time defendant approached and honked his horn plaintiff veered left across the roadway into defendant’s car which defendant swerved to the left in attempting to avoid the plaintiff. *609 These facts are not the same as in the present case where it is established without question that the plaintiff was in the roadway, “they were in the pathway of my car,” and the defendant had proceeded behind the plaintiff and her companion “for quite a long distance.” Neither do we think that Colwell v. N

1967In support of her contention that the evidence does not justify the giving of a last clear chance instruction, the defendant cites Steen v. Hedstrom, 189 Wash. 75, 79 , 63 P.2d 507 (1937).

1967In support of her contention that the evidence does not justify the giving of a last clear chance instruction, the defendant cites Steen v. Hedstrom, 189 Wash. 75, 79 , 63 P.2d 507 (1937).

1966McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn.2d 495 , 250 P.2d 546 ; Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn.2d 358 , 281 P.2d 462 ; Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 ; Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wn.2d 575 , 354 P.2d 702 .

1966McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn.2d 495 , 250 P.2d 546 ; Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn.2d 358 , 281 P.2d 462 ; Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 ; Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wn.2d 575 , 354 P.2d 702 .

1966McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn.2d 495 , 250 P.2d 546 ; Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn.2d 358 , 281 P.2d 462 ; Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 ; Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wn.2d 575 , 354 P.2d 702 .

1955As we said in Shiels v. Purfeerst, 39 Wn. (2d) 252, 257, 235 P. (2d) 161 : “ ‘He simply failed in his effort to escape the natural results of the emergency created by respondent’s [appellant’s] negligence.’ ” In the recent case of Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn. (2d) 358, 361, 281 P. (2d) 462 (1955), we said: “We hold that this case falls under the rule announced in Shiels v. Purfeerst, supra. Skidding for ninety feet is inconsistent with a clear opportunity to avoid a collision.” Considering the decisions of this court, texts, and the particular facts of the instant case, we hold that, as a matter o

1966McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn.2d 495 , 250 P.2d 546 ; Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn.2d 358 , 281 P.2d 462 ; Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 ; Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wn.2d 575 , 354 P.2d 702 .

1966McCormick v. Gilbertson, 41 Wn.2d 495 , 250 P.2d 546 ; Roloff v. Bailey, 46 Wn.2d 358 , 281 P.2d 462 ; Stokes v. Johnstone, 47 Wn.2d 323, 287 P.2d 472 ; Kerlik v. Jerke, 56 Wn.2d 575 , 354 P.2d 702 .

1965Co., 50 Wn. (2d) 432, 312 P. (2d) 647 (1957), and cases cited therein.” In Browning v. Bremerton-Charleston Transit Co., 28 Wn. (2d) 713, 721, 183 P. (2d) 1005 , the court said: “We are of the opinion that, before a jury would be warranted in concluding that a defendant was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of an accident, under the first phase of the last clear chance doctrine, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom must show (1) that defendant actually saw the situation then existing; (2) that he failed to use reasonable care to avoid the accident,

1960Co., 50 Wn. (2d) 432, 312 P. (2d) 647 ; Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 P. (2d) 548 ; Shultes v. Halpin, supra. As a matter of law, the facts of this case do not justify application of the last clear chance doctrine.

1963Plaintiffs sought recovery under the deception rule of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563 , 289 Pac. 533 , and the application of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1963Plaintiffs sought recovery under the deception rule of Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563 , 289 Pac. 533 , and the application of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1960Co., 50 Wn. (2d) 432, 312 P. (2d) 647 ; Bergstrom v. Ove, 39 Wn. (2d) 78, 234 P. (2d) 548 ; Shultes v. Halpin, supra. As a matter of law, the facts of this case do not justify application of the last clear chance doctrine.

1951NOTES [1] Reported in 234 P. (2d) 548 .

1940The appellant cites the following cases as supporting her contention that the doctrine should have been applied in this case: Flagg v. Vander Yacht, 174 Wash. 521 , 24 P. (2d) 1063 , where a motorist overtook and killed a man who was walking on the wrong side of the road and paid no attention to the repeated blasts of her horn; Johnson v. Burnham, 198 Wash. 500 , 88 P. (2d) 833 , a straight contributory negligence case in which the doctrine of last clear chance was not applied or even mentioned; Smith v. Bratnober, 188 Wash. 244 , 62 P. (2d) 455 , in which the defendant ran into a disabled car

1940The appellant cites the following cases as supporting her contention that the doctrine should have been applied in this case: Flagg v. Vander Yacht, 174 Wash. 521 , 24 P. (2d) 1063 , where a motorist overtook and killed a man who was walking on the wrong side of the road and paid no attention to the repeated blasts of her horn; Johnson v. Burnham, 198 Wash. 500 , 88 P. (2d) 833 , a straight contributory negligence case in which the doctrine of last clear chance was not applied or even mentioned; Smith v. Bratnober, 188 Wash. 244 , 62 P. (2d) 455 , in which the defendant ran into a disabled car

1939Co., 254 N. Y. 206 , 172 N. E. 471 , in which the court said: “ ‘The doctrine of the last clear chance, however, is never wakened into action unless and until there is brought home to the defendant to be charged with liability a knowledge that another is in a state of present peril, . . . ’ “The remainder of the paragraph from which the *140 quotation is taken should be quoted.

1939Co., 254 N. Y. 206 , 172 N. E. 471 , in which the court said: “ ‘The doctrine of the last clear chance, however, is never wakened into action unless and until there is brought home to the defendant to be charged with liability a knowledge that another is in a state of present peril, . . . ’ “The remainder of the paragraph from which the *140 quotation is taken should be quoted.

1914Under the rule announced ■ and exemplified in Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 149 , 134 Pac. 934 ; Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , and Johnson v. Washington Water Power Co., 73 Wash. 616 , 132 Pac. 392 , there is no room under the present evidence for the invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1914Under the rule announced ■ and exemplified in Herrick v. Washington Water Power Co., 75 Wash. 149 , 134 Pac. 934 ; Mosso v. Stanton Co., 75 Wash. 220 , 134 Pac. 941 , and Johnson v. Washington Water Power Co., 73 Wash. 616 , 132 Pac. 392 , there is no room under the present evidence for the invocation of the doctrine of last clear chance.

1975Co., 1 Wn.

1975Sonnenberg v. Remsing, 65 Wn.2d 553 , 398 P.2d 728 (1965); Nichols v. Spokane Sand & Gravel Co., 64 Wn.2d 219 , 391 P.2d 183 (1964); Lee v. Cotten Bros.

1975Sonnenberg v. Remsing, 65 Wn.2d 553 , 398 P.2d 728 (1965); Nichols v. Spokane Sand & Gravel Co., 64 Wn.2d 219 , 391 P.2d 183 (1964); Lee v. Cotten Bros.

1974Radecki v. Adams, 63 Wn.2d 535, 536 , 387 P.2d 974 (1964); Chapman v. State, 6 Wn.

1974Radecki v. Adams, 63 Wn.2d 535, 536 , 387 P.2d 974 (1964); Chapman v. State, 6 Wn.

1974Radecki v. Adams, 63 Wn.2d 535, 536 , 387 P.2d 974 (1964); Chapman v. State, 6 Wn.