Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1915–1980 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lachance, Admr. v. Myersgreen2 sentences1970A statement of the last clear chance doctrine appears in Lachance, Admr. v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 505 , 129 A. 172, 174 (1925), where it is said that “it presupposes a perilous situation, created or existing through negligence of both plaintiff and defendant, but assumes that there was a time after such negligence has occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of the means available, avert the accident. 1970A statement of the last clear chance doctrine appears in Lachance, Admr. v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 505 , 129 A. 172, 174 (1925), where it is said that “it presupposes a perilous situation, created or existing through negligence of both plaintiff and defendant, but assumes that there was a time after such negligence has occurred when the defendant could, and the plaintiff could not, by the use of the means available, avert the accident. | 2 | 3 |
Wright v. Nasalgreen2 sentences1971In such case, the negligence of the parties creating the situation is regarded as remote and that of the defendant in not averting the accident, after the peril is or should have been discovered, becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury.” Lachance, Admr. v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 505 , 129 A. 172 (1925), quoted with approval in Wright v. Nasal, 129 Vt. 66 , 271 A.2d 833, 834 (1970). 1971In such case, the negligence of the parties creating the situation is regarded as remote and that of the defendant in not averting the accident, after the peril is or should have been discovered, becomes the sole proximate cause of the injury.” Lachance, Admr. v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 505 , 129 A. 172 (1925), quoted with approval in Wright v. Nasal, 129 Vt. 66 , 271 A.2d 833, 834 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Wellman v. Meadgreen2 sentences1937Barre Trust Co. v. Ladd, 103 Vt. 392, 402 , 154 Atl. 680 ; Wellman, Admr. v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 337, 338 , 107 Atl. 396 . 1937Barre Trust Co. v. Ladd, 103 Vt. 392, 402 , 154 Atl. 680 ; Wellman, Admr. v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 337, 338 , 107 Atl. 396 . | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin, Admx. v. Gastongreen2 sentences1934Goodwin, Admx. v. Gaston et al., 103 Vt. 357, 366, 367 , 154 Atl. 772 . *492 All the testimony as to the speed of the train came from defendant’s trainmen called as witnesses by the plaintiff. 1934Goodwin, Admx. v. Gaston et al., 103 Vt. 357, 366, 367 , 154 Atl. 772 . *492 All the testimony as to the speed of the train came from defendant’s trainmen called as witnesses by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1975Sargent v. International Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Starr's Transportation, Inc. v. St. Johnsbury & Lamoille County Railroad
green
2 sentences1971Johnsbury and Lamoille County Railroad, 123 Vt. 376, 381 , 189 A.2d 525 (1963). 1971Johnsbury and Lamoille County Railroad, 123 Vt. 376, 381 , 189 A.2d 525 (1963). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Bunnell v. McGregor
neutral
2 sentences1971Bunnell v. McGregor, 101 Vt. 379, 380-81 , 143 A. 643 (1928). 1971Bunnell v. McGregor, 101 Vt. 379, 380-81 , 143 A. 643 (1928). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Spencer v. Fondry
neutral
2 sentences1970The plaintiff places substantial reliance on Spencer v. Fondry, 122 Vt. 149 , 167 A.2d 372 (1960), in support of his claim that the jury should have been allowed to decide whether the last clear chance doctrine was applicable on the facts in the case. 1970The plaintiff places substantial reliance on Spencer v. Fondry, 122 Vt. 149 , 167 A.2d 372 (1960), in support of his claim that the jury should have been allowed to decide whether the last clear chance doctrine was applicable on the facts in the case. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Fabian v. Barrett Insurance Agency, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1970Fabian v. Barrett, 118 Vt. 267, 269 , 108 A.2d 256 (1954). 1970Fabian v. Barrett, 118 Vt. 267, 269 , 108 A.2d 256 (1954). | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Watterlund v. Billings
green
1 sentence1944This test is to be applied to the first count in the declaration based on negligence on the part of the defendant and due care by the plaintiff, Waterlund v. Billings, 112 Vt 256, 264, 23 A2d 540 , and to the second count predicated on the last clear chance doctrine. | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Barre Trust Co. v. Ladd Et Ux.
green
2 sentences1937Barre Trust Co. v. Ladd, 103 Vt. 392, 402 , 154 Atl. 680 ; Wellman, Admr. v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 337, 338 , 107 Atl. 396 . 1937Barre Trust Co. v. Ladd, 103 Vt. 392, 402 , 154 Atl. 680 ; Wellman, Admr. v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 337, 338 , 107 Atl. 396 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Trow v. Vermont Central Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1921Co., 24 Vt. 487 , 58 A. D. 191. [2, 3] The doctrine of the last clear chance may be stated thus: When the negligence of the defendant is proximate, and that of the plaintiff is remote, an action can be sustained. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Harrington v. Rutland Railroad
green
2 sentences1921Harrington v. Rutland Railroad co., 89 Vt. 112 , 94 Atl. 431 ; Flint’s Admr. v. Central Vermont Ry. 1921Harrington v. Rutland Railroad co., 89 Vt. 112 , 94 Atl. 431 ; Flint’s Admr. v. Central Vermont Ry. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Seviour's Admr. v. Rutland Railroad
green
2 sentences1915Co., 88 Vt. 107 , 91 Atl. 1039 , it was held that there was no evidence calling for a consideration of the doctrine of the last clear chance. 1915Co., 88 Vt. 107 , 91 Atl. 1039 , it was held that there was no evidence calling for a consideration of the doctrine of the last clear chance. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.