34 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Internatl. Periodical Distrib. v. Bizmart, Inc.green2 sentences2025Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 2002-Ohio-2488, ¶ 7 . {¶10} Here, in granting Rector’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that: This lawsuit was . . . filed outside of the original two year statute of limitations. [Riccelli] also filed it more than one year after the first lawsuit was dismissed. [Riccelli’s] lawsuit is thus barred by the original two year statutes of limitations . . . for wrongful death and . . . bodily injury . . . . 2020International Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452 , 2002-Ohio-2488, ¶ 7 (“Savings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be 6 time-barred.”). | 1 | 8 |
Lakeview Holding, L.L.C. v. Farmergreen1 sentence2025Instead, they waited over eight years. {¶20} “‘Savings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred.’” Farmer, 2020-Ohio-3891, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), citing Deutsche Bank Natl. | 1 | 1 |
Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Cartergreen1 sentence2025Trust Co. v. Carter, 2014-Ohio-5193, ¶ 25 (12th Dist.), quoting Internatl. | 1 | 1 |
McGraw v. Jarvisgreen1 sentence2024A saving statute, such as R.C. 2305.19(A), "affords a plaintiff a limited time period to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred." McGraw v. Jarvis, 2021-Ohio-522, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Elliot v. Durranigreen1 sentence2022He cites Wilson 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020-Ohio-6827 , 173 N.E.3d 448, at ¶ 28 , where the Ohio Supreme Court explained that “[s]avings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred.” (Emphasis added.) And, citing Elliott v. Durrani, 2021- Ohio-3055, 178 N.E.3d 977, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.), appeal allowed in part, 166 Ohio St.3d 1401 , 2022-Ohio-445 , 181 N.E.3d 1184 , citing Wilson at ¶ 35 , she contends that Ohio courts have recognized that a “period of limitation” is broader than a “statute of limitations.” {¶ | 1 | 1 |
Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp.green1 sentence2019Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). {¶ 42} The trial court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment when it found that the parties' claims were governed by an express contract. | 1 | 1 |
Caffie v. Daugherty Med. Groupgreen1 sentence2019Hamilton No. C-120568, 2013-Ohio-5891, ¶ 5 (“R.C. 2305.19, Ohio’s saving statute, provides a plaintiff a limited period of time to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred.”); Wilson v. Durrani, 1st Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Ward v. County of Cuyahogagreen2 sentences2017Piro v. Franklin Twp., 102 Ohio App.3d 130, 143 , 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist.1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept., 881 F.Supp.2d 854, 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the clai 2017Piro v. Franklin Twp. , 102 Ohio App.3d 130 , 143, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist. 1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept. , 881 F.Supp.2d 854 , 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the | 1 | 1 |
Stoll v. Gardnergreen2 sentences2017See Stoll v. Gardner , 182 Ohio App.3d 214 , 2009-Ohio-1865 , 912 N.E.2d 165 , ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) (summary judgment warranted as to claims of defamation, malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent training and supervision, because plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact as to whether one of the exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applied); Piispanen v. Carter , 11th Dist. 2017See Stoll v. Gardner , 182 Ohio App.3d 214 , 2009-Ohio-1865 , 912 N.E.2d 165 , ¶ 14 (9th Dist.) (summary judgment warranted as to claims of defamation, malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent training and supervision, because plaintiff did not submit sufficient evidence to create a material question of fact as to whether one of the exceptions to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) applied); Piispanen v. Carter , 11th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Departmentgreen2 sentences2017Piro v. Franklin Twp., 102 Ohio App.3d 130, 143 , 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist.1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept., 881 F.Supp.2d 854, 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the clai 2017Piro v. Franklin Twp. , 102 Ohio App.3d 130 , 143, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist. 1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept. , 881 F.Supp.2d 854 , 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the | 1 | 1 |
Laurent v. Flood Data Services, Inc.green1 sentence2013See Laurent v. Flood Data Serv., Inc., 146 Ohio App.3d 392, 399 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
International Periodical Distributors v. Bizmart, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2024Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452 , 2002-Ohio-2488, ¶ 7 . {¶ 9} On the face of the complaint, the motorcycle accident at issue took place on June 22, 2018. 2020International Periodical Distribs. v. Bizmart, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 452 , 2002-Ohio-2488, ¶ 7 (“Savings statutes operate to give a plaintiff a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be 6 time-barred.”). | 8 | 2011–2024 |
Wilson v. Durrani (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024Thus, the saving statute “neither operates as a statute of limitations nor operates to toll the statute of limitations,” but instead “provides a plaintiff with a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim by commencing a new action that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.” Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020-Ohio-6827, ¶ 18 . {¶ 83} Under R.C. 4123.512(A), relator had a right to file in the common pleas court a notice of appeal from the commission’s order disallowing the claim. 2024Thus, the saving statute “neither operates as a statute of limitations nor operates to toll the statute of limitations,” but instead “provides a plaintiff with a limited period of time in which to refile a dismissed claim by commencing a new action that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations.” Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020-Ohio-6827, ¶ 18 . {¶ 83} Under R.C. 4123.512(A), relator had a right to file in the common pleas court a notice of appeal from the commission’s order disallowing the claim. | 4 | 2021–2024 |
Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2023Antoon [v. Cleveland Clinic Found.], 148 Ohio St.3d 483 , 2016-Ohio-7432 , 71 N.E.3d 974, at ¶ 24 . 2023Antoon [v. Cleveland Clinic Found.], 148 Ohio St.3d 483 , 2016-Ohio-7432 , 71 N.E.3d 974, at ¶ 24 . | 2 | 2020–2023 |
State ex rel. Sanduskians for Sandusky v. Sandusky
green
1 sentence2025Sanduskians for Sandusky v. Sandusky, 2022-Ohio-3362, ¶ 22 , quoting State ex rel. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Frysinger v. Leech
green
1 sentence2025Second, the Court observed, “our statement in Frysinger about a refiled action relating back was dicta . . . [and] was of no consequence to our determination of those issues, and we are not obligated to give it binding effect.” Id. (rather, Frysinger was about when a medical claim accrues and whether a voluntary dismissal was “a failure otherwise than on the merits”). {¶33} Third, the Wilson Court explained how a saving statute gives a plaintiff time to refile a dismissed claim that would otherwise be time-barred, but the action that was voluntarily dismissed is nevertheless considered to have | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Manor Care Inc. v. Tom Douglas
green
2 sentences2022In Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 234 W.Va. 57 , 763 S.E.2d 73 (2014) the court dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a nursing home resident and explained that a fiduciary relationship can only arise when both parties to the relationship agree to it: It is well established that “[t]he fiduciary duty is ‘[a] duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other person. 2022In Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 234 W.Va. 57 , 763 S.E.2d 73 (2014) the court dismissed a claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a nursing home resident and explained that a fiduciary relationship can only arise when both parties to the relationship agree to it: It is well established that “[t]he fiduciary duty is ‘[a] duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's personal interests to that of the other person. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wick v. Lorain Manor, Inc.
green
1 sentence2021Lorain No. 12CA010324, 2014-Ohio-4329, ¶ 8 , quoting Internatl. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hinkle v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 303 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Perrysburg Township v. City of Rossford
green
1 sentence2017Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford , 103 Ohio St.3d 79 , 2004-Ohio-4362 , 814 N.E.2d 44 , ¶ 5. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hamrick v. Ramalia
green
1 sentence2017Cuyahoga No. 97385, 2012-Ohio-1953, ¶ 21 ; citing Internatl. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Piro v. Franklin Township
green
2 sentences2017Piro v. Franklin Twp. , 102 Ohio App.3d 130 , 143, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist. 1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept. , 881 F.Supp.2d 854 , 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the 2017Piro v. Franklin Twp. , 102 Ohio App.3d 130 , 143, 656 N.E.2d 1035 (9th Dist. 1995) (negligent infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed even though a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant acted maliciously, recklessly, or in bad faith); Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dept. , 881 F.Supp.2d 854 , 885-886 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (while the allegations of negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct were unclear, the court dismissed the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress because Ohio law does not allow a negligence claim against a governmental employee and dismissed the | 1 | 2017–2017 |
King v. Zamiara
green
1 sentence2016Such a claim requires the plaintiff to establish that “(1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by his protected conduct.” Id. {¶31} The trial court dismissed this claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because it concluded that Mr. Salim had failed to properly plead a First Amendment retaliation claim in that he alleged a one-time incident that was not directed at him and did not deter him. {¶32} However, this Court | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati
green
2 sentences2015Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 11 , citing O’Brien v. Univ. 2015Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St.3d 491 , 2006-Ohio-2625 , 849 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 11 , citing O’Brien v. Univ. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. Kelly
green
1 sentence2014Clark No. 2011 CA 77, 2012-Ohio-2547, ¶ 19 . “[A] plaintiff may make a prima facie showing of discrimination by 1 In its order awarding summary judgment to Appellees, the trial court determined that, although Mr. Dukes also had alleged retaliation in his complaint, he failed to set forth the necessary elements of the claim, and the trial court dismissed the claim on that basis. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Gallimore v. Children's Hospital Medical Center
green
1 sentence2012Loss of Parent-Child Consortium {¶22} In regard to Ms. Jacobson’s claim for loss of parent-child consortium, the trial court dismissed this claim because the claim was derivative of a claimed tort against her daughter, which was not alleged in the complaint. {¶23} In Gallimore v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, 67 Ohio St.3d 244 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that “a parent may recover damages, in a derivative action against a third-party tortfeasor who intentionally or negligently causes physical injury to the parent’s minor child, for loss of fil | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co.
green
2 sentences2010Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190 , 532 N.E.2d 753 . 2010Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190 , 532 N.E.2d 753 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pattison v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 88556 (6-21-2007)
neutral
1 sentence2008The defendant in that situation is vulnerable to an increased overall burden due to the Civ.R. 41 dismissal. {¶ 21} The Eighth District gave little weight to this possibility, stating that “it has been our experience that plaintiffs who voluntarily dismiss a cause of action in order to create a final order rarely, if ever, refile those dismissed claims.” 2007-Ohio-3081 , 2007 WL 1776468 , at ¶ 9. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Toney v. Berkemer
green
2 sentences2006In Toney v. Berkemer (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 455 , 458 , 453 N.E.2d 700 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that, in order to impose the sanction of dismissal for a party's failure to respond to discovery requests, a court must find that failure to respond is due to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party. 2006In Toney v. Berkemer (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 455 , 458 , 453 N.E.2d 700 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that, in order to impose the sanction of dismissal for a party's failure to respond to discovery requests, a court must find that failure to respond is due to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of the party. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Williams v. Saxbe green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
H. E. Culbertson Co. v. Warden
green
1 sentence2000It is well-settled that sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimination under Title VII, see Williams v. Saxbe (D.D.C. 1976), 413 F. Supp. 654 . 8 This rule is generally stated as follows: "where there are two causes of action, or two defenses, thereby raising separate and distinct issues, and a general verdict has been returned, and the mental processes of the jury have not been tested by special interrogatories to indicate which of the issues was resolved in favor of the successful party, it will be presumed that all issues were so determined; and that, where a single determinative issue | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Atkins v. Humes green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Bruni v. Tatsumi green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.