dismissed claim in Maryland

2017But this proved to be a 29 hollow victory—the court dismissed the claim because the “plaintiffs [ ] failed to suggest any form of relief that [could] be granted to them in a direct claim.” Id. at 602 .

2017But this proved to be a hollow victory—the court dismissed the claim because the “plaintiffs [ ] failed to suggest any form of relief that [could] be granted to them in a direct claim.” Id. at 602 , In In re J.P.

2020The court dismissed the claim because Maryland does not recognize a “‘universal or omnibus tort for the redress of breach of fiduciary duty,’ at least in a situation where other remedies exist[.]” Id. at 803 (quoting Kann, 344 Md. at 713 ).

2020The court dismissed the claim because Maryland does not recognize a “‘universal or omnibus tort for the redress of breach of fiduciary duty,’ at least in a situation where other remedies exist[.]” Id. at 803 (quoting Kann, 344 Md. at 713 ).

2007We stated that “the purpose of the Act would not be served by restricting arbitration of claims for contribution to those asserted as part of the same litigation that includes the claim by the individual who directly suffered a personal injury.” Adler v. Hyman, supra, 334 Md. at 575 , 640 A.2d at 1103 .

2007We stated that “the purpose of the Act would not be served by restricting arbitration of claims for contribution to those asserted as part of the same litigation that includes the claim by the individual who directly suffered a personal injury.” Adler v. Hyman, supra, 334 Md. at 575 , 640 A.2d at 1103 .

1991The trial court seemed to indicate that, in a negligence action, punitive damages were recoverable where there was implied malice consisting of “extraordinary or outrageous behavior ... or wanton conduct,” but the court held that the defendant’s actions, although negligent, did not meet this standard. 1 The Court of Special Appeals, apparently agreeing with the trial court as to the legal standard, and relying on Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., supra, 267 Md. 149 , 297 A.2d 721 , held that punitive damages were recoverable in a negligence action where the tortious conduct was accompanied eith

1991The trial court seemed to indicate that, in a negligence action, punitive damages were recoverable where there was implied malice consisting of “extraordinary or outrageous behavior ... or wanton conduct,” but the court held that the defendant’s actions, although negligent, did not meet this standard. 1 The Court of Special Appeals, apparently agreeing with the trial court as to the legal standard, and relying on Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., supra, 267 Md. 149 , 297 A.2d 721 , held that punitive damages were recoverable in a negligence action where the tortious conduct was accompanied eith

1990But from the extant Maryland case law, particularly State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463 , 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 598 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 942 , 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987), where the Court dismissed the claim that “the sentencing jury in Tichnell III was collaterally estopped from finding fewer mitigating circumstances than those previously found by the sentencing authority in Tichnell //[,]” we believe that the policy of this State ought to be against the use of collateral estoppel in this particular circumstance.

1990But from the extant Maryland case law, particularly State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463 , 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 598 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 942 , 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987), where the Court dismissed the claim that “the sentencing jury in Tichnell III was collaterally estopped from finding fewer mitigating circumstances than those previously found by the sentencing authority in Tichnell //[,]” we believe that the policy of this State ought to be against the use of collateral estoppel in this particular circumstance.

1990In addition, the Supreme Court’s position in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct. 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), supports our holding that the State is not foreclosed from reproving predicate offenses in subsequent sentencing proceedings.

1990In addition, the Supreme Court’s position in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct. 1749 , 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), supports our holding that the State is not foreclosed from reproving predicate offenses in subsequent sentencing proceedings.

1990But from the extant Maryland case law, particularly State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463 , 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 598 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 942 , 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987), where the Court dismissed the claim that “the sentencing jury in Tichnell III was collaterally estopped from finding fewer mitigating circumstances than those previously found by the sentencing authority in Tichnell //[,]” we believe that the policy of this State ought to be against the use of collateral estoppel in this particular circumstance.

1990But from the extant Maryland case law, particularly State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463 , 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 598 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 942 , 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987), where the Court dismissed the claim that “the sentencing jury in Tichnell III was collaterally estopped from finding fewer mitigating circumstances than those previously found by the sentencing authority in Tichnell //[,]” we believe that the policy of this State ought to be against the use of collateral estoppel in this particular circumstance.

1990But from the extant Maryland case law, particularly State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 463 , 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 598 , 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), reh’g denied, 479 U.S. 1060 , 107 S.Ct. 942 , 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987), where the Court dismissed the claim that “the sentencing jury in Tichnell III was collaterally estopped from finding fewer mitigating circumstances than those previously found by the sentencing authority in Tichnell //[,]” we believe that the policy of this State ought to be against the use of collateral estoppel in this particular circumstance.

1984Johnson] v. Cook [ 304 U.S. 387 , 58 S.Ct. 954 , 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938)], supra; [and] “[it] must appear that the controversy to be determined is ... *74 not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular individuals,” Louisiana v. Texas [ 176 U.S. 1 , 20 S.Ct. 251 , 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900) ], supra. Thus the state’s parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages on behalf of the state’s individual citizens-claimants.

1984Johnson] v. Cook [ 304 U.S. 387 , 58 S.Ct. 954 , 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938)], supra; [and] “[it] must appear that the controversy to be determined is ... *74 not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular individuals,” Louisiana v. Texas [ 176 U.S. 1 , 20 S.Ct. 251 , 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900) ], supra. Thus the state’s parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages on behalf of the state’s individual citizens-claimants.

1984The trial court dismissed that claim, stating: [I]f a state is to maintain an action in its parens patriae capacity, initially the facts must show that the state has an interest “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,” Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. [ 206 U.S. 230 , 27 S.Ct. 618 , 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907)], supra; “has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected,” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia [ 262 U.S. 553 , 43 S.Ct. 658 , 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ], supra; “must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real

1984The trial court dismissed that claim, stating: [I]f a state is to maintain an action in its parens patriae capacity, initially the facts must show that the state has an interest “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,” Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. [ 206 U.S. 230 , 27 S.Ct. 618 , 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907)], supra; “has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected,” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia [ 262 U.S. 553 , 43 S.Ct. 658 , 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ], supra; “must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real

1984Johnson] v. Cook [ 304 U.S. 387 , 58 S.Ct. 954 , 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938)], supra; [and] “[it] must appear that the controversy to be determined is ... *74 not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular individuals,” Louisiana v. Texas [ 176 U.S. 1 , 20 S.Ct. 251 , 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900) ], supra. Thus the state’s parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages on behalf of the state’s individual citizens-claimants.

1984Johnson] v. Cook [ 304 U.S. 387 , 58 S.Ct. 954 , 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938)], supra; [and] “[it] must appear that the controversy to be determined is ... *74 not a controversy in the vindication of grievances of particular individuals,” Louisiana v. Texas [ 176 U.S. 1 , 20 S.Ct. 251 , 44 L.Ed. 347 (1900) ], supra. Thus the state’s parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages on behalf of the state’s individual citizens-claimants.

1984The trial court dismissed that claim, stating: [I]f a state is to maintain an action in its parens patriae capacity, initially the facts must show that the state has an interest “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,” Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. [ 206 U.S. 230 , 27 S.Ct. 618 , 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907)], supra; “has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected,” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia [ 262 U.S. 553 , 43 S.Ct. 658 , 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ], supra; “must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real

1984The trial court dismissed that claim, stating: [I]f a state is to maintain an action in its parens patriae capacity, initially the facts must show that the state has an interest “independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,” Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. [ 206 U.S. 230 , 27 S.Ct. 618 , 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907)], supra; “has an interest apart from that of the individuals affected,” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia [ 262 U.S. 553 , 43 S.Ct. 658 , 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923) ], supra; “must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for the benefit of individuals who are the real

1961In the case of United States v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F. 2d 105 (7th Cir.), the court dismissed a claim that a Negro inmate of a state prison was denied constitutional rights because the prison management did not allow Negroes to participate in certain radio broadcasts.