6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1974–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oparaugo v. Wattsgreen2 sentences2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in 2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in | 3 | 3 |
Solers, Inc. v. Doegreen2 sentences2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in 2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in | 2 | 2 |
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE AND RAND SIMBERG v. MICHAEL E. MANN, NATIONAL REVIEW, INC. v. MICHAEL E. MANNgreen2 sentences2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in 2021Comm. v. Inst. for Gulf Affs., 242 A.3d 602 , 607 (D.C. 2020) (citing Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1233 (D.C. 2016), as amended (Dec. 13, 2018)). 15 Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 948 (D.C. 2009) (quoting Oparaugo v. Watts, 884 A.2d 63, 76 (D.C. 2005)). 11 The trial court dismissed this claim by appellant Ewing, concluding that the complaint “fail[ed] to allege any statements made by any of the defendants concerning him in an individual capacity.” Also, the court dismissed the defamation claim by Federal Title, determining that Nadel’s statements, “when read in | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Theron Clarkgreen2 sentences1974See United States v. Clark, supra, wherein the court dismissed a claim of waiver advanced by the government when defense counsel raised no objection to the defendant’s absence from a suppression hearing and none to the government’s motion to exclude him. 8 It is true, of course, as the majority notes, that two types of waiver have developed in the law, and that in many instances (e. g., failure to object to illegal evidence; failure to object to hearsay) the defendant will be precluded from raising issues on appeal that were not raised at trial. 1974See United States v. Clark, supra , wherein the court dismissed a claim of waiver advanced by the government when defense counsel raised no objection to the defendant's absence from a suppression hearing and none to the government's motion to exclude him. [8] It is true, of course, as the majority notes, that two types of waiver have developed in the law, and that in many instances ( e. g., failure to object to illegal evidence; failure to object to hearsay) the defendant will be precluded from raising issues on appeal that were not raised at trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
cluster 771856
green
1 sentence2015Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 , 572-73 (4th Cir.2001) ("[I]if a claim is dismissed without leave to amend, the plaintiff does not forfeit the right to challenge the dismissal on appeal simply by filing an amended complaint that does not re-allege the dismissed claim.”). 4 .After appellants filed their motion to voluntarily dismiss, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment as to the claims in the Second Amended Complaint as well as a motion for sanctions. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
District of Columbia v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1997However, on remand, the trial court dismissed the claim in March of 1993 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on our subsequent decision in District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621 (D.C.1991) ("Thompson II"). 1 As in that case, the trial court here concluded that the claim fell within the scope of the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA” or “the Act”), requiring a first resort to its grievance procedures. 1997However, on remand, the trial court dismissed the claim in March of 1993 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, relying on our subsequent decision in District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621 (D.C.1991) (" Thompson II "). [1] As in that case, the trial court here concluded that the claim fell within the scope of the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act ("CMPA" or "the Act"), requiring a first resort to its grievance procedures. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.