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8 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brumfield v. Caingreen2 sentences2020On appeal, the Supreme Court found the 75 IQ score, the only score in evidence, and accounting for the SEM, put the defendant "squarely in the range of potential intellectual disability." Id. 135 S.Ct. at 2278 . 2020On appeal, the Supreme Court found the 75 IQ score, the only score in evidence, and accounting for the SEM, put the defendant "squarely in the range of potential intellectual disability." Id. 135 S.Ct. at 2278. | 1 | 1 |
Morvay v. Hanover Insurance Companiesgreen1 sentence2002The court reasoned that the investigators “were fully aware that the plaintiffs could be harmed financially if they performed their investigation in a negligent manner and rendered a report to Hanover that would cause the company to refuse payment to the plaintiffs,” and that they also knew that there was “a mutual duty of fair dealing between Hanover and the plaintiffs.” Id. at 335. | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Hinesgreen2 sentences1995Goins, 332 P.2d at 221 ; see Wood v. Hines, 117 Okla. 86 , 245 P. 846, 847 (1926). 1995Goins, 332 P.2d at 221 ; see Wood v. Hines, 117 Okla. 86 , 245 P. 846, 847 (1926). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Magness v. Pledger
green
1 sentence2023The plaintiff sued the defendants for libel, but the trial court dismissed his claim, finding that the petition fell within the absolute privilege created by 12 O.S.1951 § 1443. 3 Id . ¶ 1, 334 P.2d at 793 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Barr
neutral
2 sentences2009Consequently, the dismissal of Patmon's last remaining claim converted the previously unappealable judgment in favor of Dr. Block into an appealable order. 112 Patmon was recently cited with approval in Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Barr, 2008 OK 46 , 187 P.3d 718 , for the proposition that the time to appeal begins to run from an appealable order or event even though the order under review was not appealable at the time it was entered. 9 Unlike the majority of the federal cireuits discussed in section LB. of this Opinion, it is clear from Patmon that Oklahoma does not consider the p 2009Consequently, the dismissal of Patmon's last remaining claim converted the previously unappealable judgment in favor of Dr. Block into an appealable order. 112 Patmon was recently cited with approval in Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Barr, 2008 OK 46 , 187 P.3d 718 , for the proposition that the time to appeal begins to run from an appealable order or event even though the order under review was not appealable at the time it was entered. 9 Unlike the majority of the federal cireuits discussed in section LB. of this Opinion, it is clear from Patmon that Oklahoma does not consider the p | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Clifford M. Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., Rainbow Baking Company of Oklahoma City, Rainbow Baking Company of Tulsa and Mead Foods, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . 2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Colorado v. New Mexico
green
1 sentence2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Maryland v. United States Tandy Corporation v. United States North American Telephone Association v. United States Illinois v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . 2001Curtis v. Campbelt-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336 (10th Cir.1982), cert. den. 459 U.S. 1090 , 103 S.Ct. 576 , 74 L.Ed.2d 937 ; reh. den. 459 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 1240 , 75 L.Ed.2d 472 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Goins v. Fox
green
1 sentence1995Goins, 332 P.2d at 221 ; see Wood v. Hines, 117 Okla. 86 , 245 P. 846, 847 (1926). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Narrell v. State
neutral
2 sentences1992Cr. 438, 13 P.2d 597 (1932). 1992Cr. 438, 13 P.2d 597 (1932). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Flynn v. New York, New Haven, & Hartford Railroad
green
1 sentence1931Co., 51 S. Ct. 357 , (March 23, 1931), based upon a right of action conferred by statute being limited “unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.” And despite the rule in Keser v. U. S. Lead Refinery, Inc. (Ind.) 188 N. E. 621 , wherein despite the broken promises of the employer, the claim was not filed within the statutory period and the court dismissed the claim “for want of jurisdiction,” and the rule in Ohio, Omin v. B. & O. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Thomas v. Haines
green
1 sentence1931Co., 51 S. Ct. 357 , (March 23, 1931), based upon a right of action conferred by statute being limited “unless commenced within two years from the day the cause of action accrued.” And despite the rule in Keser v. U. S. Lead Refinery, Inc. (Ind.) 188 N. E. 621 , wherein despite the broken promises of the employer, the claim was not filed within the statutory period and the court dismissed the claim “for want of jurisdiction,” and the rule in Ohio, Omin v. B. & O. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.