7 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harris v. McDavidgreen1 sentence2026See Harris v. McDavid, 553 So. 2d 567, 570 (Ala. 1989) (explaining that, in order to succeed on a tort-of-outrage claim, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's actions caused the 34 CL-2025-0041 Furthermore, Horton makes no argument in his brief relating to his request for an injunction, precluding our review of that issue. | 1 | 1 |
Lighting Fair, Inc. v. Rosenberggreen1 sentence2017See Lighting Fair , 63 So.3d at 1265 . | 1 | 1 |
Luther Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corporationgreen2 sentences2011See also Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1967).” Barron v. Werner Enters., Inc., 462 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1219 (M.D.Ala.2006). 4 Federal courts have recognized that, without the voluntary-involuntary rule, the circumstance that in fact presents itself here — a dismissed claim being subject to reconsideration and appeal in a state court while the remainder of the action is being litigated in federal court—could occur. 2011As the United States Court of Appeals for the former Fifth Circuit explained in Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir.1967): “[The voluntary-involuntary rule] prevents removal of those cases in which the issue of the resident defendant’s dismissal has not been finally determined in the state courts. | 1 | 1 |
Barron v. WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.green1 sentence2011See also Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1967).” Barron v. Werner Enters., Inc., 462 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1219 (M.D.Ala.2006). 4 Federal courts have recognized that, without the voluntary-involuntary rule, the circumstance that in fact presents itself here — a dismissed claim being subject to reconsideration and appeal in a state court while the remainder of the action is being litigated in federal court—could occur. | 1 | 1 |
CC & J., INC. v. Hagoodgreen2 sentences2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala.2003) (“This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: ‘ “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice.” ’ ” (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). 2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala. 2003) ("This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: `"(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice."'" (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). | 1 | 1 |
Preskitt v. Lyonsgreen2 sentences2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala.2003) (“This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: ‘ “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice.” ’ ” (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). 2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala. 2003) ("This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: `"(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice."'" (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Parkergreen2 sentences2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala.2003) (“This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: ‘ “(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice.” ’ ” (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). 2010See Preskitt v. Lyons, 865 So.2d 424, 430 (Ala. 2003) ("This Court has held that in order to prove the tort of abuse of process, a plaintiff must prove: `"(1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice."'" (quoting Willis v. Parker, 814 So.2d 857, 865 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998))). | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Lucasgreen1 sentence2004The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Lucas, 865 So.2d 418, 421 (Ala.2002), and this Court in Borden v. State, 891 So.2d 393 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), have previously held that a postconviction petitioner's only burden at the initial pleading stage is to plead sufficient facts. | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Although the trial court dismissed this claim as insufficiently pleaded, the majority here adopts the trial court's findings but additionally stated that "the appellant has not established, " 957 So.2d at 523, that he is entitled to relief on the claims. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2011Although I agree with the majority that the petition is due to be denied as to the other issues raised, I believe that Huffman has raised an issue of probable merit with respect to the application of the principles set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to the enhancement of his sentence upon application of § 13A-12-231(13). 2011Although I agree with the majority that the petition is due to be denied as to the other issues raised, I believe that Huffman has raised an issue of probable merit with respect to the application of the principles set out in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to the enhancement of his sentence upon application of § 13A-12-231(13). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Borden v. State
green
1 sentence2004The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Lucas, 865 So.2d 418, 421 (Ala.2002), and this Court in Borden v. State, 891 So.2d 393 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), have previously held that a postconviction petitioner's only burden at the initial pleading stage is to plead sufficient facts. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Hare v. Federal Compress and Warehouse Company
green
1 sentence1976The court dismissed this claim because `the act does not "enlarge or diminish or affect any . . . liabilities of employers . . . under any law . . . .' 29 U.S.C. § 653 (b)(4)." 359 F. Supp. at 218 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.