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5 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1909–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCoy v. Louisianagreen1 sentence2024The Court reasoned that, in such situations, “the precise effect of the violation cannot be ascertained,” and “[b]ecause the government will, as a result, find it almost impossible to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the efficiency costs of letting the government try to make the showing are unjustified.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord McCoy, 138 S.Ct. at 1511 . [J-83-2022] - 31 Finally, the Court specified that an error would be “deemed structural if the error always results in fundamental unfairness. | 1 | 1 |
Haines v. Raven Arms, Donn's Inc.green2 sentences2013See Haines v. Raven Arms, 539 Pa. 401, 402-03 , 652 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1995) (stating that to insure that the correct standard for remittitur is being applied, a trial court must articulate both the conclusion and the reasons supporting a reduction of the verdict when finding that a verdict shocks its conscience). 2013See Haines v. Raven Arms, 539 Pa. 401, 402-03 , 652 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1995) (stating that to insure that the correct standard for remittitur is being applied, a trial court must articulate both the conclusion and the reasons supporting a reduction of the verdict when finding that a verdict shocks its conscience). | 1 | 1 |
Cost v. Costgreen2 sentences2005See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47 , 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1988) (plurality); Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685 , 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996). 2005See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47 , 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1988) (plurality); Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685 , 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Guy v. Liederbachgreen2 sentences2005See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47 , 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1988) (plurality); Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685 , 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996). 2005See Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47 , 459 A.2d 744, 748 (1988) (plurality); Cost v. Cost, 450 Pa.Super. 685 , 677 A.2d 1250, 1253-54 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2024The Court reasoned that, in such situations, “the precise effect of the violation cannot be ascertained,” and “[b]ecause the government will, as a result, find it almost impossible to show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the efficiency costs of letting the government try to make the showing are unjustified.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord McCoy, 138 S.Ct. at 1511 . [J-83-2022] - 31 Finally, the Court specified that an error would be “deemed structural if the error always results in fundamental unfairness. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tranter v. Alleghency County Co. Authority
green
2 sentences1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C 1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Sugar Notch Borough
green
2 sentences1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C 1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Rose v. Beaver County
neutral
2 sentences1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C 1937For these reasons we think it could reasonably be held that section 10 of the act of 1901 is neither clearly “divergent from, [nor] an advance upon, the law as it stood prior to the Constitution of 1874.” At least we are not convinced that the provision of the act of 1901 now attacked violates the constitution so clearly, palpably, and plainly, that it is our duty to declare it void after the lapse of more than thirty-six years: Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority et al., 316 Pa. 65, 75 , 173 A. 289 , and cases there cited; Sugar Notch Borough, 192 Pa. 349, 358 , 43 A. 985 ; Rose v. Beaver C | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Freedman v. Fire Ass'n
neutral
1 sentence1909They may refuse to pay without specifying any ground, and insist upon any available ground; but, if they plant themselves upon a specified defense, and so notify the assured, they should not be permitted to retract after the latter has acted upon their position as announced, and incurred expenses in consequence of it.” In Freedman v. Fire Association, 168 Pa. 249 , this court, in an opinion by our Brother Fell, said (p. 254): “The trend of our decisions has been to hold insurance companies to good faith and frankness in not concealing the ground of defense and thus misleading the insured to hi | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.