poisonous tree doctrine in Michigan

2026“Additionally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 633-634 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 487-488 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

2026“Additionally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 633-634 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 487-488 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

2026However, “ ‘the Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.’ The . . . ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ doctrine does not control where there is no constitutional violation.” People v Melotik, 221 Mich App 190, 199 ; 561 NW2d 453 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2026However, “ ‘the Miranda presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution’s case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.’ The . . . ‘fruits of the poisonous tree’ doctrine does not control where there is no constitutional violation.” People v Melotik, 221 Mich App 190, 199 ; 561 NW2d 453 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2019The “doctrine seeks to discourage unlawful police practices by depriving the people of advantage flowing from the ‘primary illegality.’ ” People v Walker, 27 Mich App 609, 616 ; 183 NW2d 871 (1970).

2019The “doctrine seeks to discourage unlawful police practices by depriving the people of advantage flowing from the ‘primary illegality.’ ” People v Walker, 27 Mich App 609, 616 ; 183 NW2d 871 (1970).

1991Nix v Williams, 467 US 433 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984).

1991Nix v Williams, 467 US 433 ; 104 S Ct 2501 ; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984).

2026“Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se, subject to several specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 293 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).

2026“Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se, subject to several specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 293 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).

2019Therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine “presupposes an illegal act.” People v Gunn, 48 Mich App 772, 778 ; 211 NW2d 84 (1973).

2019Therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine “presupposes an illegal act.” People v Gunn, 48 Mich App 772, 778 ; 211 NW2d 84 (1973).

2019However, suppression is not required in connection with “otherwise tainted evidence that ultimately would have been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner,” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 436 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000), or where “the causal connection” between the police misconduct and the discovery of the evidence “is remote or when the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 253 ; 733 NW2d 713 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019However, suppression is not required in connection with “otherwise tainted evidence that ultimately would have been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner,” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 436 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000), or where “the causal connection” between the police misconduct and the discovery of the evidence “is remote or when the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 253 ; 733 NW2d 713 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine developed as a means of effectuating fourth amendment guarantees by excluding evidence obtained derivatively as well as that obtained directly through an illegal search or seizure.” People v Robinson, 48 Mich App 253, 256 ; 210 NW2d 372 (1973) (citation omitted).

2019“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine developed as a means of effectuating fourth amendment guarantees by excluding evidence obtained derivatively as well as that obtained directly through an illegal search or seizure.” People v Robinson, 48 Mich App 253, 256 ; 210 NW2d 372 (1973) (citation omitted).

2019People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558 ; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). “[T]he exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 633-634 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 487-488 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

2019People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 557-558 ; 563 NW2d 208 (1997). “[T]he exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction into evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626, 633-634 ; 597 NW2d 53 (1999), citing Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 487-488 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

2019However, suppression is not required in connection with “otherwise tainted evidence that ultimately would have been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner,” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 436 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000), or where “the causal connection” between the police misconduct and the discovery of the evidence “is remote or when the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 253 ; 733 NW2d 713 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2019However, suppression is not required in connection with “otherwise tainted evidence that ultimately would have been obtained in a constitutionally accepted manner,” People v Brzezinski, 243 Mich App 431, 436 ; 622 NW2d 528 (2000), or where “the causal connection” between the police misconduct and the discovery of the evidence “is remote or when the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 253 ; 733 NW2d 713 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015People v Rice, 192 Mich App 240, 244 ; 481 NW2d 10 (1991).

2015People v Rice, 192 Mich App 240, 244 ; 481 NW2d 10 (1991).

2015Application of the exclusionary rule “has been restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” People v Reese, 281 Mich App 290, 295 ; 761 NW2d 405 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2015Application of the exclusionary rule “has been restricted to those instances where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” People v Reese, 281 Mich App 290, 295 ; 761 NW2d 405 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

1997The prosecutor agreed that defendant’s statement had been ruled inadmissible, but argued in reliance on People v Kolniak, 175 Mich App 16 ; 437 NW2d 280 (1989), that the district court could strike the portion of the second affidavit containing defendant’s inadmissible statement and look at the remaining portions of the affidavit to determine whether probable cause existed to support the second warrant.

1997The prosecutor agreed that defendant’s statement had been ruled inadmissible, but argued in reliance on People v Kolniak, 175 Mich App 16 ; 437 NW2d 280 (1989), that the district court could strike the portion of the second affidavit containing defendant’s inadmissible statement and look at the remaining portions of the affidavit to determine whether probable cause existed to support the second warrant.

1987People v Essa, 146 Mich App 315, 319-320 ; 380 NW2d 96 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 892 (1986), cert den, — US —; 106 S Ct 3313 ; 92 L Ed 2d 726 (1986).

1987People v Essa, 146 Mich App 315, 319-320 ; 380 NW2d 96 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 892 (1986), cert den, — US —; 106 S Ct 3313 ; 92 L Ed 2d 726 (1986).

1987People v Essa, 146 Mich App 315, 319-320 ; 380 NW2d 96 (1985), lv den 424 Mich 892 (1986), cert den, — US —; 106 S Ct 3313 ; 92 L Ed 2d 726 (1986).

1986People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

1986People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42 ; 378 NW2d 451 (1985).

1978After reviewing the United States Supreme Court’s decisions 10 on the exclusionary rule the court found: "In line with this reasoning, the courts have held that evidence obtained as a result of information derived from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct is not inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine where the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence. [Citations omitted.] In other words, as one commentator put it, the inevitable discovery factor 'permits the government to r

1976Neither Harris v New York [supra] nor Oregon v Hass [ 420 US 714 ; 95 S Ct 1215 ; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975)] has eroded it in any sense. * * * *365 "It is now undisputed that a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination can trigger the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. [Citations omitted.] It is also undisputed that once the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine comes into play, the use of a tainted 'fruit’ would be barred for all purposes, for impeachment purposes in rebuttal just as surely as for more directly inculpatory purposes in the case in chief.” A

1976Neither Harris v New York [supra] nor Oregon v Hass [ 420 US 714 ; 95 S Ct 1215 ; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975)] has eroded it in any sense. * * * *365 "It is now undisputed that a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination can trigger the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. [Citations omitted.] It is also undisputed that once the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine comes into play, the use of a tainted 'fruit’ would be barred for all purposes, for impeachment purposes in rebuttal just as surely as for more directly inculpatory purposes in the case in chief.” A

1976Neither Harris v New York [supra] nor Oregon v Hass [ 420 US 714 ; 95 S Ct 1215 ; 43 L Ed 2d 570 (1975)] has eroded it in any sense. * * * *365 "It is now undisputed that a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination can trigger the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. [Citations omitted.] It is also undisputed that once the 'fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine comes into play, the use of a tainted 'fruit’ would be barred for all purposes, for impeachment purposes in rebuttal just as surely as for more directly inculpatory purposes in the case in chief.” A

1975We see no reason why any such theory could not have been presented contemporaneously with the motion to suppress the other evidence, as required by People v Childers, 20 Mich App 639 [ 174 NW2d 565 ] (1969); People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619 [ 178 NW2d 94 ] (1970).

1975We see no reason why any such theory could not have been presented contemporaneously with the motion to suppress the other evidence, as required by People v Childers, 20 Mich App 639 [ 174 NW2d 565 ] (1969); People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619 [ 178 NW2d 94 ] (1970).

1975We see no reason why any such theory could not have been presented contemporaneously with the motion to suppress the other evidence, as required by People v Childers, 20 Mich App 639 [ 174 NW2d 565 ] (1969); People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619 [ 178 NW2d 94 ] (1970).

1975We see no reason why any such theory could not have been presented contemporaneously with the motion to suppress the other evidence, as required by People v Childers, 20 Mich App 639 [ 174 NW2d 565 ] (1969); People v Matthews, 22 Mich App 619 [ 178 NW2d 94 ] (1970).

1973Defendant phrases his first argument, that evidence derived by the police from his involuntary statements is inadmissible, in terms of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”, relying on Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), and Silverthorne Lumber Co v *255 United States, 251 US 385 ; 40 S Ct 182 ; 64 L Ed 319 ; 24 ALR 1426 (1920).

1973Defendant phrases his first argument, that evidence derived by the police from his involuntary statements is inadmissible, in terms of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”, relying on Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 ; 83 S Ct 407 ; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), and Silverthorne Lumber Co v *255 United States, 251 US 385 ; 40 S Ct 182 ; 64 L Ed 319 ; 24 ALR 1426 (1920).

1973In Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 ; 84 ALR 2d 933 (1961), Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, traced the history of this exclusionary rule.

1973In Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 ; 81 S Ct 1684 ; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 ; 84 ALR 2d 933 (1961), Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, traced the history of this exclusionary rule.