poisonous tree doctrine in New Jersey

2012Judge Stephen Skillman, J.AD., writing for the panel, explained that “extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect ‘an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts.’ ” Id. at 274 , 606 A.2d 1119 (quoting State v. Casimono, 250 N.J.Super. 173, 184 , 593 A.2d 827 (App.Div.1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 558 , 606 A.2d 370 (1992)).

2012Judge Stephen Skillman, J.AD., writing for the panel, explained that “extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect ‘an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts.’ ” Id. at 274 , 606 A.2d 1119 (quoting State v. Casimono, 250 N.J.Super. 173, 184 , 593 A.2d 827 (App.Div.1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 558 , 606 A.2d 370 (1992)).

2012To apply the exclusionary rule in those circumstances, the panel continued, would reach too far and be “‘too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Casimono, supra, 250 N.J.Super. at 184 , 593 A.2d 827 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 691 F.2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 , 103 S.Ct. 2098 , 77 L.Ed.2d 306 (1983))).

1992Our essential rationale was that extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect "an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts," which would be "too far reaching and too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct." Id. at 184, 593 A. 2d 827 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 691 F. 2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 , 103 S.Ct. 2098 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1983)). *275 Defendant concedes that under our decision in

1992Our essential rationale was that extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect "an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts," which would be "too far reaching and too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct." Id. at 184, 593 A. 2d 827 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 691 F. 2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 , 103 S.Ct. 2098 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1983)). *275 Defendant concedes that under our decision in

1992Our essential rationale was that extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect "an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts," which would be "too far reaching and too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct." Id. at 184, 593 A. 2d 827 (quoting United States v. Bailey, 691 F. 2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 , 103 S.Ct. 2098 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1983)). *275 Defendant concedes that under our decision in

2024O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 619 ; see also State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990).

2021If police violated defendant's right against self-incrimination—rendering the first statement "unconstitutionally compelled and, under state law, illegally obtained and hence inadmissible[— ]any 'separately-obtained' second statement must be approached with an eye to determining whether it was the product of a constitutional violation, sometimes 18 A-5289-17 known as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine." Hartley, 103 N.J. at 281-82 .

2019Thus, the plurality's principal conclusion that there is "no reason to A-1521-17T3 18 apply the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine" to "mere failures to warn," see Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 , is inapposite because the axe was obtained in direct response to custodial interrogation.

2018Under that circumstance, the later-derived evidence might be suppressed or excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." [ 176 N.J. 344 , 353, 823 A.2d 38 (2003) (internal citations omitted).] And in State v. Bryant , we specified that "evidence that is seized in a search incident to the original unlawful search is ... excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" to ensure that the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule is realized. 227 N.J. 60 , 71, 148 A.3d 398 (2016).

2018Under that circumstance, the later-derived evidence might be suppressed or excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." [ 176 N.J. 344 , 353, 823 A.2d 38 (2003) (internal citations omitted).] And in State v. Bryant , we specified that "evidence that is seized in a search incident to the original unlawful search is ... excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" to ensure that the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule is realized. 227 N.J. 60 , 71, 148 A.3d 398 (2016).

2018Under that circumstance, the later-derived evidence might be suppressed or excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." [ 176 N.J. 344 , 353, 823 A.2d 38 (2003) (internal citations omitted).] And in State v. Bryant , we specified that "evidence that is seized in a search incident to the original unlawful search is ... excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" to ensure that the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule is realized. 227 N.J. 60 , 71, 148 A.3d 398 (2016).

2018Under that circumstance, the later-derived evidence might be suppressed or excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." [ 176 N.J. 344 , 353, 823 A.2d 38 (2003) (internal citations omitted).] And in State v. Bryant , we specified that "evidence that is seized in a search incident to the original unlawful search is ... excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine" to ensure that the deterrent aim of the exclusionary rule is realized. 227 N.J. 60 , 71, 148 A.3d 398 (2016).

2016State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 298 , 95 A.3d 110 (2014).

2016State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 298 , 95 A.3d 110 (2014).

2012Judge Stephen Skillman, J.AD., writing for the panel, explained that “extending the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police misconduct would give a criminal suspect ‘an intolerable carte blanche to commit further criminal acts.’ ” Id. at 274 , 606 A.2d 1119 (quoting State v. Casimono, 250 N.J.Super. 173, 184 , 593 A.2d 827 (App.Div.1991), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 558 , 606 A.2d 370 (1992)).

2010A search without a warrant is presumptively invalid unless it “falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 246 , 927 A.2d 1250 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010A search without a warrant is presumptively invalid unless it “falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Elders, supra, 192 N.J. at 246 , 927 A.2d 1250 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2005In resisting and eluding cases, courts have not extended “the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after” a constitutional violation because to do so would be “too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct.” Id. at 92 , 860 A.2d 962 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2005In resisting and eluding cases, courts have not extended “the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after” a constitutional violation because to do so would be “too high a price for society to pay in order to deter police misconduct.” Id. at 92 , 860 A.2d 962 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2004See also State v. Seymour, 289 N.J.Super. 80, 85 , 672 A.2d 1273, 1276 (App.Div.1996) (holding that the defendant’s intervening act of eluding the police was sufficient to purge the taint of the officer’s prior illegality in pursuing defendant); State v. Chapman, 332 N.J.Super. 452, 470-71 , 753 A.2d 1179, 1189 (App.Div.2000) (holding that defendant’s consent to search was a sufficiently voluntary act to purge the original taint from the illegal detention). [E]xtendmg the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police miscon

2004See also State v. Seymour, 289 N.J.Super. 80, 85 , 672 A.2d 1273, 1276 (App.Div.1996) (holding that the defendant’s intervening act of eluding the police was sufficient to purge the taint of the officer’s prior illegality in pursuing defendant); State v. Chapman, 332 N.J.Super. 452, 470-71 , 753 A.2d 1179, 1189 (App.Div.2000) (holding that defendant’s consent to search was a sufficiently voluntary act to purge the original taint from the illegal detention). [E]xtendmg the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine to immunize a defendant from prosecution for new crimes committed after police miscon

2002In order for the inevitable discovery rule to be applied, the State must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that had the illegality not occurred, it would have pursued established investigatory procedures that would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the controverted evidence, wholly apart from its unlawful acquisition." State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 240 , 495 A. 2d 90 (1985) (Sugar II).

2002In order for the inevitable discovery rule to be applied, the State must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that had the illegality not occurred, it would have pursued established investigatory procedures that would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the controverted evidence, wholly apart from its unlawful acquisition." State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214, 240 , 495 A. 2d 90 (1985) (Sugar II).

1986I am also of the view that this approach, as a matter of state common law, would not unnecessarily extend the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Cf State v. Barry, 86 N.J. 80, 89-90 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 , 102 S.Ct. 553 , 70 L.Ed.2d 415 (1981) (under close factual analysis, intervening independent circumstances were sufficient to purge the taint of defendant’s illegal arrest thereby satisfying the state’s burden of establishing that a subsequent confession was the product of defendants’ free will rather than the result of the exploitation of an illegal arrest); State v. Starling,

1986Super. 127 (Law Div. 1983), aff'd, 207 N.J.

1986I am also of the view that this approach, as a matter of state common law, would not unnecessarily extend the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Cf State v. Barry, 86 N.J. 80, 89-90 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 , 102 S.Ct. 553 , 70 L.Ed.2d 415 (1981) (under close factual analysis, intervening independent circumstances were sufficient to purge the taint of defendant’s illegal arrest thereby satisfying the state’s burden of establishing that a subsequent confession was the product of defendants’ free will rather than the result of the exploitation of an illegal arrest); State v. Starling,

1986I am also of the view that this approach, as a matter of state common law, would not unnecessarily extend the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." Cf. State v. Barry, 86 N.J. 80, 89-90 , cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 , 102 S.Ct. 553 , 70 L.Ed. 2d 415 (1981) (under close factual analysis, intervening independent circumstances were sufficient to purge the taint of defendant's illegal arrest thereby satisfying the state's burden of establishing that a subsequent confession was the product of defendants' free will rather than the result of the exploitation of an illegal arrest); State v. Starling