poisonous tree doctrine (Pennsylvania) · Go Syfert
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poisonous tree doctrine in Pennsylvania

73 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1975–2025 22 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (47)

CaseFollowedCited
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1963 · cited in 15 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1975–2025
2 sentences

2025The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine “has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

2019The court first spoke to the Commonwealth's blanket assertion that neither a defendant's presence, nor a witness's independent memory of a face, is suppressible, by tracing the history of applicable federal and Pennsylvania case law beginning with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 6 The court observed that, under certain circumstances, eyewitness identifications have been suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

1115
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen
pasuperct · 2013 · cited in 9 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2015–2020
2 sentences

2019The Commonwealth contends that this evidence was not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 946 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.”).

2018(Id. at 19.) Appellant further contends that if the detention was unlawful, then all physical evidence as well as Hill’s out-of-court identification must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.5 (Id. at 21-22.) Preliminarily, we agree with appellant that Officer Crenshaw lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigative 5We note that, “[t]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 946 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

99
Commonwealth v. Santiago, A., Aplt.green
pa · 2019 · cited in 12 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2025
2 sentences

2025As a general matter, where evidence has been obtained by police during an unlawful search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence must be excluded, and “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)).

2024The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[17] extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019).

712
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen
pasuperct · 2017 · cited in 6 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2023
2 sentences

2023Cf. Commonwealth v. Torres, 177 A.3d 263, 276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

2020Furthermore, we conclude that the improper search of Appellant’s bookbag did not invalidate the search warrant as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” We have explained that “[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excluded evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 177 A.3d 263, 276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned - 10 - J-S24014-20 up).

66
Costello v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1961 · cited in 5 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1978–2025
2 sentences

2025“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an independent source.” Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961)) (some formatting altered).

1992“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Arlondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364 , 580 A.2d 341 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 387 Pa. Super. 181, 185 , 536 A.2d 1244 , 1246 (1989); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 , 81 S.Ct. 534, 542 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551, 561 (1961).

45
Commonwealth v. Browngreen
pasuperct · 1997 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2010–2017
2 sentences

2017See Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (noting that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or acquired as a consequence of unlawful official acts). -7- J-S80042-16 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the suppression court denying Appellant’s motion, vacate Appellant’s sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

2017“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997).

44
Commonwealth v. Ariondogreen
pa · 1990 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1992–2010
2 sentences

2010“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts; it does not exclude evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Ariondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364, 377 , 580 A.2d 341, 347 (1990)).

2010“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts; it does not exclude evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Ariondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364, 377 , 580 A.2d 341, 347 (1990)).

34
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Shabezz, S.green
pa · 2017 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2018–2024
2 sentences

2024See Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278 , 290 (Pa. 2017) (evidence constitutes “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and must be suppressed, if it was obtained by exploitation of illegality of seizure), citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 476.

2018Further, applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court concluded the search of the vehicle was an “‘exploitation’ of the constitutional violation[,]” i.e., the vehicle stop, and, the defendant’s brief flight from the scene was “insufficient to purge the taint of the initial illegality.” Id.

24
Commonwealth v. Gibbsgreen
pa · 1989 · cited in 3 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 1990–2018
2 sentences

2018See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 563 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 1989) (holding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence seized as a result of illegal police conduct).

1992“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Arlondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364 , 580 A.2d 341 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 387 Pa. Super. 181, 185 , 536 A.2d 1244 , 1246 (1989); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 , 81 S.Ct. 534, 542 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551, 561 (1961).

23
Com. v. Ani, N.green
pasuperct · 2023 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2025
2 sentences

2025As a general matter, where evidence has been obtained by police during an unlawful search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence must be excluded, and “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)).

2024The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.’” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)).

22
Commonwealth v. Gatlosgreen
pasuperct · 2013 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024
2 sentences

2024“A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement should ordinarily suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” DeJesus, 787 A.2d at 406 (citation omitted). - 15 - J-A14042-24 Finally, we note: “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine generally requires exclusion of evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, illegal searches.” Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

2023See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013).

22
Commonwealth v. Chesneygreen
pasuperct · 2018 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021The United States Supreme Court has stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence ‘obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion’ is inadmissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)).

2020The United States Supreme Court has stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence ‘obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion’ is inadmissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)). -9- J-S16044-20 Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]bsent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.”6 Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. 1994).

22
United States v. Wadegreen
scotus · 1967 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Appellant also points to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Wade , 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Crews which disallowed in-court identification testimony by a government witness unless the government showed by clear and convincing evidence that such identification was untainted, and that it had independent origins based upon observations and memories made at the time of the crime.

2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony.

22
cluster 22484green
· · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Gainesgreen
ca4 · 2012 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Chanthasouxatgreen
ca11 · 2003 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Packgreen
ca5 · 2010 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Kimballgreen
ca1 · 1994 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Joe Davis Twilleygreen
ca9 · 2000 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Martin Guevara-Martinez, Also Known as Jose Dias-Ibarragreen
ca8 · 2001 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Mark A. Reedgreen
ca7 · 2003 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22
United States v. Patanegreen
scotus · 2004 · cited in 4 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2004–2024
2 sentences

2024In Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, while custodial statements should be suppressed, the suppression of a firearm was not warranted under a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis for the “mere failure to give Miranda warnings[.]” Patane, 542 U.S. at 643 .

2024There is therefore no reason to apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[.] Patane, 542 U.S. at 641-42 (quotations, citations, and ellipsis omitted).

14
Gilbert v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1967 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See, e.g. , Gilbert v. California , 388 U.S. 263 , 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967).

2019See, e.g. , Gilbert v. California , 388 U.S. 263 , 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967).

12
United States v. Crewsgreen
scotus · 1980 · cited in 2 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony.

2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony.

12
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen
pasuperct · 2010 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025See id. 3 We note that Marsicano is an unpublished decision by this Court that was filed prior to May 1, 2019.

11
Collins v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parolegreen
pa · 2018 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
11
Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen
pasuperct · 2009 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
11
Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen
pa · 2001 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
11
Com. v. Rohrbach, J.green
pasuperct · 2021 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
11
Utah v. Strieffgreen
scotus · 2016 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
11
Commonwealth v. Melendezgreen
pa · 1996 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen
pasuperct · 2018 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scottgreen
scotus · 1998 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Commonwealth v. Rolandgreen
pa · 1994 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
11
Maryland v. MacOngreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendozagreen
scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
11
Commonwealth v. Forbesgreen
pasuperct · 2005 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
11
In the Interest of T.P.green
pasuperct · 2013 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
11
Commonwealth v. Diggsgreen
pa · 1986 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11
Commonwealth v. Chmielgreen
pa · 2005 · cited in 1 Pennsylvania opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (19)

CaseCitedYears
Commonwealth v. Garvin green
pa · 1972
2 sentences

2019We granted allocatur on the following question: Is not the Superior Court's published opinion applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony inconsistent with controlling Fourth Amendment United States Supreme Court precedent and Article I, § 8, and does not its reliance on overly broad language in Commonwealth v. Garvin , 448 Pa. 258 , 293 A.2d 33 (1972), necessitate this Court's guidance and explicit rejection of Garvin and its progeny?

2019We granted allocatur on the following question: Is not the Superior Court's published opinion applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony inconsistent with controlling Fourth Amendment United States Supreme Court precedent and Article I, § 8, and does not its reliance on overly broad language in Commonwealth v. Garvin , 448 Pa. 258 , 293 A.2d 33 (1972), necessitate this Court's guidance and explicit rejection of Garvin and its progeny?

42018–2019
In re Condemnation by Sunuco Pipeline L.P. green
pa · 2018
2 sentences

2019Commonwealth v. Santiago , 645 Pa. 262 , 179 A.3d 455 (2018) (order). 8 As this issue implicates constitutional requirements and raises a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary.

2019Commonwealth v. Santiago , 179 A.3d 455 , 179 A.3d 455 (2018).

32018–2019
Weeks v. United States red
· 1914
2 sentences

2017We discuss the circumstances that purge the taint of an illegality, and whether any of those are present in this case, in more detail later in this opinion. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 9 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that violations of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution required suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule newly announced in that case.

2017We discuss the circumstances that purge the taint of an illegality, and whether any of those are present in this case, in more detail later in this opinion. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 9 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that violations of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution required suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule newly announced in that case.

22017–2017
United States v. Robert Mosley green
ca3 · 2006
2 sentences

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill

22017–2017
Brown v. Illinois green
scotus · 1975
1 sentence

2025“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an independent source.” Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961)) (some formatting altered).

12025–2025
Com. v. Jefferson, T. green
pasuperct · 2021
12024–2024
Com. v. Singletary, W. green
pasuperct · 2021
12024–2024
Nix v. Williams green
scotus · 1984
12019–2019
Commonwealth v. Millner green
pa · 2005
12019–2019
Nardone v. United States green
scotus · 1939
12019–2019
Commonwealth v. Fulton, I., Aplt. green
pa · 2018
12019–2019
Commonwealth v. Abbas green
pasuperct · 2004
12018–2018
Brady v. Maryland green
scotus · 1963
12016–2016
Commonwealth v. Lark green
pasuperct · 2014
12014–2014
Commonwealth v. Cole green
pa · 2005
12013–2013
Com. v. Washington green
pa · 1997
12004–2004
Segura v. United States green
scotus · 1984
11990–1990
Commonwealth v. Thomas green
pa · 1971
11983–1983
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States green
scotus · 1920
11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105 (4) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502 (3) PA § 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6106 (3) PA § 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6308 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

PA 73 (1975–2025) TX 57 (1977–2026) IN 55 (1987–2025) IL 46 (1970–2026) CA 45 (1967–2022) WA 43 (1971–2025) NM 41 (1977–2020) NY 37 (1967–2025) MD 36 (1969–2025) FL 34 (1969–2025) MA 33 (1981–2025) MI 31 (1973–2026) KS 30 (1975–2026) CO 27 (1980–2025) HI 23 (1964–2026) OH 22 (1969–2025) SC 20 (1981–2026) NJ 18 (1977–2024) WI 16 (1994–2025) NC 16 (1979–2021) CT 16 (1988–2025) VA 16 (1986–2026) MS 15 (1978–2026) TN 15 (1998–2020) SD 14 (1977–2024) IA 14 (1965–2022) GA 13 (1982–2026) MO 13 (1974–2009) OR 13 (1975–2015) NH 13 (1991–2025) WV 12 (1983–2015) LA 10 (1977–2025) AZ 10 (1972–2023) ID 9 (2000–2023) MT 9 (1979–2024) AL 7 (1973–2008) AR 6 (1979–2009) WY 5 (1976–2011) RI 4 (2014–2024) DE 4 (1990–2025) KY 4 (2011–2024) ND 3 (1979–2021) VT 3 (2007–2019) MN 3 (1986–1999) OK 3 (1973–2015) DC 3 (1977–2021) AK 2 (1973–1983) NV 2 (1976–2025) ME 2 (2000–2010) NE 2 (2008–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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