73 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1975–2025 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine “has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963). 2019The court first spoke to the Commonwealth's blanket assertion that neither a defendant's presence, nor a witness's independent memory of a face, is suppressible, by tracing the history of applicable federal and Pennsylvania case law beginning with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 6 The court observed that, under certain circumstances, eyewitness identifications have been suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. | 11 | 15 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2019The Commonwealth contends that this evidence was not “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 946 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.”). 2018(Id. at 19.) Appellant further contends that if the detention was unlawful, then all physical evidence as well as Hill’s out-of-court identification must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.5 (Id. at 21-22.) Preliminarily, we agree with appellant that Officer Crenshaw lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigative 5We note that, “[t]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 946 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted). | 9 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Santiago, A., Aplt.green2 sentences2025As a general matter, where evidence has been obtained by police during an unlawful search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence must be excluded, and “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)). 2024The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[17] extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019). | 7 | 12 |
Commonwealth v. Torresgreen2 sentences2023Cf. Commonwealth v. Torres, 177 A.3d 263, 276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). 2020Furthermore, we conclude that the improper search of Appellant’s bookbag did not invalidate the search warrant as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” We have explained that “[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excluded evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 177 A.3d 263, 276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned - 10 - J-S24014-20 up). | 6 | 6 |
Costello v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an independent source.” Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961)) (some formatting altered). 1992“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Arlondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364 , 580 A.2d 341 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 387 Pa. Super. 181, 185 , 536 A.2d 1244 , 1246 (1989); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 , 81 S.Ct. 534, 542 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551, 561 (1961). | 4 | 5 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (noting that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or acquired as a consequence of unlawful official acts). -7- J-S80042-16 Therefore, we reverse the decision of the suppression court denying Appellant’s motion, vacate Appellant’s sentence, and remand for further proceedings. 2017“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Ariondogreen2 sentences2010“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts; it does not exclude evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Ariondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364, 377 , 580 A.2d 341, 347 (1990)). 2010“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, lawless official acts; it does not exclude evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Brown, 700 A.2d 1310, 1318 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Ariondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364, 377 , 580 A.2d 341, 347 (1990)). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Shabezz, S.green2 sentences2024See Commonwealth v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278 , 290 (Pa. 2017) (evidence constitutes “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and must be suppressed, if it was obtained by exploitation of illegality of seizure), citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 476. 2018Further, applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the Court concluded the search of the vehicle was an “‘exploitation’ of the constitutional violation[,]” i.e., the vehicle stop, and, the defendant’s brief flight from the scene was “insufficient to purge the taint of the initial illegality.” Id. | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Gibbsgreen2 sentences2018See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 563 A.2d 1244, 1246 (Pa. Super. 1989) (holding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence seized as a result of illegal police conduct). 1992“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an ‘independent source.’” Commonwealth v. Arlondo, 397 Pa. Super. 364 , 580 A.2d 341 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 387 Pa. Super. 181, 185 , 536 A.2d 1244 , 1246 (1989); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 , 81 S.Ct. 534, 542 , 5 L.Ed.2d 551, 561 (1961). | 2 | 3 |
Com. v. Ani, N.green2 sentences2025As a general matter, where evidence has been obtained by police during an unlawful search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the evidence must be excluded, and “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)). 2024The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to render evidence inadmissible which was derived from the initially illegally obtained evidence.’” Commonwealth v. Ani, 293 A.3d 704, 731 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912 , 916 n.4 (Pa. 2019)). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Gatlosgreen2 sentences2024“A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement should ordinarily suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” DeJesus, 787 A.2d at 406 (citation omitted). - 15 - J-A14042-24 Finally, we note: “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine generally requires exclusion of evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, illegal searches.” Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 2023See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 237 (2016); Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Chesneygreen2 sentences2021The United States Supreme Court has stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence ‘obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion’ is inadmissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)). 2020The United States Supreme Court has stated that any material, tangible, or verbal evidence ‘obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion’ is inadmissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 258 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)). -9- J-S16044-20 Our Supreme Court has explained that “[a]bsent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.”6 Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, 270 (Pa. 1994). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wadegreen2 sentences2019Appellant also points to the United States Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Wade , 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Crews which disallowed in-court identification testimony by a government witness unless the government showed by clear and convincing evidence that such identification was untainted, and that it had independent origins based upon observations and memories made at the time of the crime. 2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony. | 2 | 2 |
cluster 22484green2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Chanthasouxatgreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Packgreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Kimballgreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Joe Davis Twilleygreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Martin Guevara-Martinez, Also Known as Jose Dias-Ibarragreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Mark A. Reedgreen2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Patanegreen2 sentences2024In Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, while custodial statements should be suppressed, the suppression of a firearm was not warranted under a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis for the “mere failure to give Miranda warnings[.]” Patane, 542 U.S. at 643 . 2024There is therefore no reason to apply the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine[.] Patane, 542 U.S. at 641-42 (quotations, citations, and ellipsis omitted). | 1 | 4 |
Gilbert v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019See, e.g. , Gilbert v. California , 388 U.S. 263 , 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). 2019See, e.g. , Gilbert v. California , 388 U.S. 263 , 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Crewsgreen2 sentences2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony. 2019The Court rejected a per se exclusionary rule, but emphasized that a "rule limited solely to exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to the admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one." Id. 1 In United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), the Court expounded further upon the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2025See id. 3 We note that Marsicano is an unpublished decision by this Court that was filed prior to May 1, 2019. | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parolegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Santiagogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Com. v. Rohrbach, J.green | 1 | 1 |
| Utah v. Strieffgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Melendezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Rolandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. MacOngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendozagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Forbesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of T.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Diggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Chmielgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Garvin
green
2 sentences2019We granted allocatur on the following question: Is not the Superior Court's published opinion applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony inconsistent with controlling Fourth Amendment United States Supreme Court precedent and Article I, § 8, and does not its reliance on overly broad language in Commonwealth v. Garvin , 448 Pa. 258 , 293 A.2d 33 (1972), necessitate this Court's guidance and explicit rejection of Garvin and its progeny? 2019We granted allocatur on the following question: Is not the Superior Court's published opinion applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to in-court identification testimony inconsistent with controlling Fourth Amendment United States Supreme Court precedent and Article I, § 8, and does not its reliance on overly broad language in Commonwealth v. Garvin , 448 Pa. 258 , 293 A.2d 33 (1972), necessitate this Court's guidance and explicit rejection of Garvin and its progeny? | 4 | 2018–2019 |
In re Condemnation by Sunuco Pipeline L.P.
green
2 sentences2019Commonwealth v. Santiago , 645 Pa. 262 , 179 A.3d 455 (2018) (order). 8 As this issue implicates constitutional requirements and raises a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. 2019Commonwealth v. Santiago , 179 A.3d 455 , 179 A.3d 455 (2018). | 3 | 2018–2019 |
Weeks v. United States
red
2 sentences2017We discuss the circumstances that purge the taint of an illegality, and whether any of those are present in this case, in more detail later in this opinion. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 9 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that violations of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution required suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule newly announced in that case. 2017We discuss the circumstances that purge the taint of an illegality, and whether any of those are present in this case, in more detail later in this opinion. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 9 In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that violations of the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution required suppression pursuant to the exclusionary rule newly announced in that case. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Robert Mosley
green
2 sentences2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill 2017Our holding is consistent with the substantial weight of federal appellate precedent addressing the application of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in cases where a passenger in a vehicle seeks suppression following an unconstitutional stop. [J-16A-2017 and J-16B-2017] - 16 See United States v. Gaines, 668 F.3d 170, 171-76 (4th Cir. 2012); Mosley, 454 F.3d at 269 ; United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Reed, 349 F.3d 457, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Guevara- Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twill | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2025“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence obtained from or as a consequence of lawless official acts, not evidence obtained from an independent source.” Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961)) (some formatting altered). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Com. v. Jefferson, T. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Com. v. Singletary, W. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Nix v. Williams green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Millner green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Nardone v. United States green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Fulton, I., Aplt. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Abbas green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Commonwealth v. Lark green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Commonwealth v. Cole green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Com. v. Washington green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Segura v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Commonwealth v. Thomas green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.