poisonous tree doctrine in Ohio

2025Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). “[E]vidence obtained in a warrantless search is generally inadmissible, and under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, such evidence cannot serve as probable cause to support a subsequent warrant.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 (1988), citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , (1984), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

2023This is because “evidence obtained in a warrantless search is generally inadmissible, and under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, such evidence cannot serve as probable cause to support a subsequent warrant.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988), citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 , 104 S.Ct. 3380 , 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2023“Consequently, evidence obtained in a warrantless search is generally inadmissible, and under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, such evidence cannot serve as probable cause to support a subsequent warrant.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). {¶12} “A search based on consent is one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement.” State v. Ferrell, 2017-Ohio-9341 , 91 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St.3d 720, 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d 790 (1991).

2023“Consequently, evidence obtained in a warrantless search is generally inadmissible, and under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, such evidence cannot serve as probable cause to support a subsequent warrant.” State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420, 427 , 534 N.E.2d 61 (1988). {¶12} “A search based on consent is one exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement.” State v. Ferrell, 2017-Ohio-9341 , 91 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.); State v. Penn, 61 Ohio St.3d 720, 723-724 , 576 N.E.2d 790 (1991).

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2023“In order to waive his Fourth Amendment privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures, the accused must give a consent which is voluntary under the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Childress, 4 Ohio St.3d 217 , 448 N.E.2d 155 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody,” the State must “demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.” State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 242-243 , 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.

2021Luther’s claim fails for the following reasons. {¶ 20} A motion to suppress must “state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made.” Crim.R. 47; State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 , 636 N.E.2d 319 (1994); State v. Tyner, 2d Dist.

2021Luther’s claim fails for the following reasons. {¶ 20} A motion to suppress must “state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made.” Crim.R. 47; State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 , 636 N.E.2d 319 (1994); State v. Tyner, 2d Dist.

2016State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 262 , 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986), citing Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980). {¶ 27} “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, also known as the derivative evidence rule, does not require the exclusion of all evidence that might not have been discovered ‘but for’ the illegal actions of the police.” State v. Pearson, 130 Ohio App.3d 577, 584 , 720 N.E.2d 924 (3d Dist.1998), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2016State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 262 , 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986), citing Kettering v. Hollen, 64 Ohio St.2d 232, 234-235 , 416 N.E.2d 598 (1980). {¶ 27} “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, also known as the derivative evidence rule, does not require the exclusion of all evidence that might not have been discovered ‘but for’ the illegal actions of the police.” State v. Pearson, 130 Ohio App.3d 577, 584 , 720 N.E.2d 924 (3d Dist.1998), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

2013Specifically, Engle argues that Miranda warnings were required because he was in custody and undergoing interrogation when the officer asked if he had anything on him. {¶ 23} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. * * * It is well established, however, that the police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every individual they question.” State v. Strozier, 172 Ohio App.3d 780 , 2007-Ohio-4575 , 876 N.E.2d 1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410

2013Specifically, Engle argues that Miranda warnings were required because he was in custody and undergoing interrogation when the officer asked if he had anything on him. {¶ 23} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. * * * It is well established, however, that the police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every individual they question.” State v. Strozier, 172 Ohio App.3d 780 , 2007-Ohio-4575 , 876 N.E.2d 1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410

2013Additionally, the Appellant argues that the evidence should be suppressed on grounds that it was obtained during a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings. –5– {¶ 12} Generally, when reviewing a decision regarding a motion to suppress “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 , citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

2013Additionally, the Appellant argues that the evidence should be suppressed on grounds that it was obtained during a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings. –5– {¶ 12} Generally, when reviewing a decision regarding a motion to suppress “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 , citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

2013Specifically, Engle argues that Miranda warnings were required because he was in custody and undergoing interrogation when the officer asked if he had anything on him. {¶ 23} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. * * * It is well established, however, that the police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every individual they question.” State v. Strozier, 172 Ohio App.3d 780 , 2007-Ohio-4575 , 876 N.E.2d 1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410

2013Specifically, Engle argues that Miranda warnings were required because he was in custody and undergoing interrogation when the officer asked if he had anything on him. {¶ 23} “The right to Miranda warnings is grounded in the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination. * * * It is well established, however, that the police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every individual they question.” State v. Strozier, 172 Ohio App.3d 780 , 2007-Ohio-4575 , 876 N.E.2d 1304, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 , 106 S.Ct. 1135 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410

2013Additionally, the Appellant argues that the evidence should be suppressed on grounds that it was obtained during a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings. –5– {¶ 12} Generally, when reviewing a decision regarding a motion to suppress “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 , citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

2013Additionally, the Appellant argues that the evidence should be suppressed on grounds that it was obtained during a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings. –5– {¶ 12} Generally, when reviewing a decision regarding a motion to suppress “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8 , citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 , 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982).

2006And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements * * * is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda violation.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 , 542 U.S. 630 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , quoting Chavez v. Martinez (2003), 538 U.S. 760, 790 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 . {¶43} The court rejected the argument that physical evidence seized as a result of an unwarned statement is the practical equivalent of a statement: {¶ 44} “[W]e have held that ‘[t]he word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial e

2006And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements * * * is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda violation.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 , 542 U.S. 630 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , quoting Chavez v. Martinez (2003), 538 U.S. 760, 790 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 . {¶43} The court rejected the argument that physical evidence seized as a result of an unwarned statement is the practical equivalent of a statement: {¶ 44} “[W]e have held that ‘[t]he word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial e

2006For this reason, the exclusionary rule articulated in such cases as Wong Sun [v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , which established the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine] does not apply.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 637 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 . {¶ 41} The court held that violations of Miranda occur only at trial and only as to statements: {¶ 42} “Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.

2006For this reason, the exclusionary rule articulated in such cases as Wong Sun [v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , which established the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine] does not apply.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 637 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 . {¶ 41} The court held that violations of Miranda occur only at trial and only as to statements: {¶ 42} “Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.

2006And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements * * * is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda violation.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 , 542 U.S. 630 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , quoting Chavez v. Martinez (2003), 538 U.S. 760, 790 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 . {¶43} The court rejected the argument that physical evidence seized as a result of an unwarned statement is the practical equivalent of a statement: {¶ 44} “[W]e have held that ‘[t]he word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial e

2006And, at that point, ‘[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements * * * is a complete and sufficient remedy’ for any perceived Miranda violation.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 642 , 542 U.S. 630 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 , 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , quoting Chavez v. Martinez (2003), 538 U.S. 760, 790 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 . {¶43} The court rejected the argument that physical evidence seized as a result of an unwarned statement is the practical equivalent of a statement: {¶ 44} “[W]e have held that ‘[t]he word “witness” in the constitutional text limits the’ scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause to testimonial e

2005Id.

2005Because the continued detention was legal and the search justified, exclusion of the cocaine evidence is not warranted. {¶ 15} Due to the fact that the detention in this case was lawful, we need not determine the applicability or nonapplicability of the inevitable discovery doctrine, State v. Perkins (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 193 , nor the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

2004State v. Long (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 238 , 713 N.E.2d 1 . "[A] reviewing court must defer to the trial court's findings of fact if competent, credible evidence exists to support the trial court's findings." State v. Hapney, 4 th Dist.

2004Id.

2001Id.

1969Defendant’s second assignment of error is that his arrest was illegal; that, therefore, any evidence obtained as the result of such illegal arrest is inadmissable under the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” citing United States v. Paroutian, 299 F. 2d 486 , and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 .