poisonous tree doctrine in Connecticut

2001He claims that (1) the search warrant application and subsequent warrant were neither presented to, nor issued by, a detached and neutral magistrate, (2) the search warrant did not include sufficiently particular descriptions of items to be seized under article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut, (3) the police search was beyond the scope of the search warrant and (4) the evidence obtained from further police investigation was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Were we to assume, without deciding, that the warrant was invalid along with all of the evidence seized therefrom, we would co

2001He claims that (1) the search warrant application and subsequent warrant were neither presented to, nor issued by, a detached and neutral magistrate, (2) the search warrant did not include sufficiently particular descriptions of items to be seized under article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut, (3) the police search was beyond the scope of the search warrant and (4) the evidence obtained from further police investigation was “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Were we to assume, without deciding, that the warrant was invalid along with all of the evidence seized therefrom, we would co

2024Ed. 2d 377 (1984). 6 In addition to his state constitutional claim, which presents an issue of first impression, the defendant also contends that the Appellate Court improperly relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Patane, supra, 542 U.S. 630 , in concluding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not require suppression of the contents of the defendant’s cell phone under the fifth amendment to the United States constitution.

2024Ed. 2d 377 (1984). 6 In addition to his state constitutional claim, which presents an issue of first impression, the defendant also contends that the Appellate Court improperly relied on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Patane, supra, 542 U.S. 630 , in concluding that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did not require suppression of the contents of the defendant’s cell phone under the fifth amendment to the United States constitution.

2000"It is well settled [law] that [i]f the police obtain physical evidence "or statements as the result of the seizure of a person without probable cause in violation of the constitution of Connecticut, article first , §§ 7 and 9 , [or the fourth amendment to the United States constitution] the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the evidence be suppressed as a product of the unlawful seizure. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James , 237 Conn. 390 , 404 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Greenfield , 228 Conn. 62 , 67 , 634 A.2d 879 (1993) Before addr

2000"It is well settled [law] that [i]f the police obtain physical evidence "or statements as the result of the seizure of a person without probable cause in violation of the constitution of Connecticut, article first , §§ 7 and 9 , [or the fourth amendment to the United States constitution] the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the evidence be suppressed as a product of the unlawful seizure. . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James , 237 Conn. 390 , 404 , 678 A.2d 1338 (1996); State v. Greenfield , 228 Conn. 62 , 67 , 634 A.2d 879 (1993) Before addr

2003Our Supreme Court has explained that “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine . . . requires courts to exclude evidence that is the product or fruit of police conduct in violation of the fourth amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 545 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).

2003Our Supreme Court has explained that “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine . . . requires courts to exclude evidence that is the product or fruit of police conduct in violation of the fourth amendment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ostroski, 201 Conn. 534, 545 , 518 A.2d 915 (1986).

2024Id. 4 Testimony at trial established that ‘‘sheema’’ referred to the defendant’s girlfriend, Tysheema Barker. 5 Upon the determination that a constitutional violation has occurred, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the exclusion ‘‘not only [of] the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also . . . other incriminating evi- dence derived from the primary evidence.’’ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.

2024Id. 4 Testimony at trial established that ‘‘sheema’’ referred to the defendant’s girlfriend, Tysheema Barker. 5 Upon the determination that a constitutional violation has occurred, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the exclusion ‘‘not only [of] the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also . . . other incriminating evi- dence derived from the primary evidence.’’ Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 , 104 S. Ct. 2501 , 81 L.

2024Specifically, he argues that this case did not involve a simple failure to give the Miranda warnings because, by continuing the interroga- tion, the detectives ‘‘deliberate[ly] flout[ed]’’ the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. 477 .

2012At the suppression hearing it was referred to as an “alcove,” a “foyer” and a “little cubic area.” The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine states that “evidence otherwise admissible but discovered as a result of an earlier violation is excluded as tainted, lest the law encourage future violations.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 612 n.4, 124 S. Ct. 2601 , 159 L.

2012At the suppression hearing it was referred to as an “alcove,” a “foyer” and a “little cubic area.” The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine states that “evidence otherwise admissible but discovered as a result of an earlier violation is excluded as tainted, lest the law encourage future violations.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 612 n.4, 124 S. Ct. 2601 , 159 L.

2007Thus, a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made. . . .

2007Thus, a stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "that is justified at its inception can become constitutionally infirm if it lasts longer or becomes more intrusive than necessary to complete the investigation for which that stop was made. . . .

2007Thus, although the defendant, within the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis in his main appellate brief, argues that his consent to search the car was the product of the illegal search of his person, he neither limited his tainted consent claim to that sole issue nor abandoned his claim that the detention was unreasonably prolonged. [10] *289 It is axiomatic that "[t]he scope of [an investigative] detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification [and the] investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

2007Thus, although the defendant, within the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis in his main appellate brief, argues that his consent to search the car was the product of the illegal search of his person, he neither limited his tainted consent claim to that sole issue nor abandoned his claim that the detention was unreasonably prolonged. [10] *289 It is axiomatic that "[t]he scope of [an investigative] detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification [and the] investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."

1999“Evidence is not to be excluded, however, if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colvin, 241 Conn. 650, 662 , 697 A.2d 1122 (1997) (Katz, J, dissenting).

1999“Evidence is not to be excluded, however, if the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colvin, 241 Conn. 650, 662 , 697 A.2d 1122 (1997) (Katz, J, dissenting).

1998Implicit in this position is the contention that the revocation of his probation involved the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine . . . and that raises a fundamental constitutional question which we may review although it was not explicitly articulated below or on the briefs.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 163 .

1998In Smith , both parties addressed the issue of mootness, but not on the grounds of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.” Id. and n.ll.

1988Ed. 2d 441 (1963), and that raises a fundamental constitutional question which we may review although it was not explicitly articulated below or on the briefs. 11 See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 373 , 521 A.2d 547 (1987); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 315 , 464 A.2d 771 (1983).

1988Ed. 2d 441 (1963), and that raises a fundamental constitutional question which we may review although it was not explicitly articulated below or on the briefs. 11 See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 373 , 521 A.2d 547 (1987); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 315 , 464 A.2d 771 (1983).

1988Ed. 2d 441 (1963), and that raises a fundamental constitutional question which we may review although it was not explicitly articulated below or on the briefs. 11 See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 373 , 521 A.2d 547 (1987); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 315 , 464 A.2d 771 (1983).

1988Ed. 2d 441 (1963), and that raises a fundamental constitutional question which we may review although it was not explicitly articulated below or on the briefs. 11 See State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 373 , 521 A.2d 547 (1987); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 191 Conn. 309, 315 , 464 A.2d 771 (1983).