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9 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be 2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be | 2 | 2 |
State v. Newgreen2 sentences2024Citing State v. New, 276 Mont. 529, 535-36 , 917 P.2d 919, 922-23 (1996), and Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), the District Court reasoned that the violation of Stanley’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable police seizures was not “flagran[t]”; the time between the initial stop and arrest was only a matter of minutes; and the causal link between the unlawful stop and questioning, and the resulting post-arrest discovery of the subject drug evidence, was severed by Stanley’s illegal provision of a false name in response to Officer Ahmann’s p 2024Citing State v. New, 276 Mont. 529, 535-36 , 917 P.2d 919, 922-23 (1996), and Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), the District Court reasoned that the violation of Stanley’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable police seizures was not “flagran[t]”; the time between the initial stop and arrest was only a matter of minutes; and the causal link between the unlawful stop and questioning, and the resulting post-arrest discovery of the subject drug evidence, was severed by Stanley’s illegal provision of a false name in response to Officer Ahmann’s p | 1 | 3 |
State v. Therriaultgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Therriault, 2000 MT 286, ¶ 57 , 302 Mont. 189 , 14 P.3d 444 (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine forbids the use of evidence which comes to light as a result of the exploitation of an initial illegal act of the police.”). 2015See State v. Therriault, 2000 MT 286, ¶ 57 , 302 Mont. 189 , 14 P.3d 444 (“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine forbids the use of evidence which comes to light as a result of the exploitation of an initial illegal act of the police.”). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. LaSota v. Corcorangreen2 sentences2000LaSota v. Corcoran (1978), 119 Ariz. 573 , 583 P.2d 229, 237-38 (given the Supreme Court's reliance on "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," the Harrison rationale cannot be applied to evidence which was not illegally obtained). 2000LaSota v. Corcoran (Ariz. 1978), 583 P.2d 229, 237-38 (given the Supreme Court’s reliance on “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,” the Harrison rationale cannot be applied to evidence which was not illegally obtained). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences2017First, Lacey contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to “challenge the ‘exceptions’ to [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , *208 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963)] and the other legal requirements needed to search and seize under the 4th Amendment.” Lacey argued that, although his trial counsel argued that all evidence should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, she should also have proactively argued against the three exceptions to the doctrine. 2017First, Lacey contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to “challenge the ‘exceptions’ to [Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , *208 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963)] and the other legal requirements needed to search and seize under the 4th Amendment.” Lacey argued that, although his trial counsel argued that all evidence should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, she should also have proactively argued against the three exceptions to the doctrine. | 2 | 1979–2017 |
State v. Pearson
green
2 sentences2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be 2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Notti
green
2 sentences2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be 2009While “independent source” could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that “genuine independence ‘may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police’s possession.’ ” Dasen , ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 , 108 S. Ct. 2529, 2535 (1988)). ¶55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as “inevitable discovery.” Under this exception “evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have be | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States
green
2 sentences1981The information leading to the discovery of the second confession came from an independent source, and thus the confession was cleansed of any “primary taint.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, as part of the exclusionary rule, was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 . 1981The information leading to the discovery of the second confession came from an independent source, and thus the confession was cleansed of any “primary taint.” The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, as part of the exclusionary rule, was first discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S. (1920), 251 U.S. 385 , 40 S.Ct. 182 , 64 L.Ed. 319 . | 2 | 1981–1981 |
Utah v. Strieff
green
2 sentences2024Citing State v. New, 276 Mont. 529, 535-36 , 917 P.2d 919, 922-23 (1996), and Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), the District Court reasoned that the violation of Stanley’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable police seizures was not “flagran[t]”; the time between the initial stop and arrest was only a matter of minutes; and the causal link between the unlawful stop and questioning, and the resulting post-arrest discovery of the subject drug evidence, was severed by Stanley’s illegal provision of a false name in response to Officer Ahmann’s p 2024Citing State v. New, 276 Mont. 529, 535-36 , 917 P.2d 919, 922-23 (1996), and Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 , 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), the District Court reasoned that the violation of Stanley’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable police seizures was not “flagran[t]”; the time between the initial stop and arrest was only a matter of minutes; and the causal link between the unlawful stop and questioning, and the resulting post-arrest discovery of the subject drug evidence, was severed by Stanley’s illegal provision of a false name in response to Officer Ahmann’s p | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.