poisonous tree doctrine in Massachusetts

2019As in DeJesus, 439 Mass. at 627 n.11, the police were "committed" to this 12 investigation and would have sought a search warrant with or without the initial observations.10 The independent source doctrine is an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as set forth in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 (1963).

2016See e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 258 , 532-33 (2010) (“application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate where it is ‘inherent in the purpose of a statute which the government has violated,’ and that such a puipose is inherent in ‘statutes closely associated with constitutional rights’ ”); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine determines the scope of the exclusionary rule).

2005“Evidence need not be excluded under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), even if the government misconduct was a cause ‘in fact’ of the discovery of the evidence, ‘if the government obtained the evidence through an independent source, if the connection between the improper conduct and the derivative evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, or if the government can demonstrate that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 459 (1985)

2003Fredette, 396 Mass. at 459 .

2025See Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453 (2005) (in determining whether evidence obtained following unconstitutional search or seizure must be suppressed, the issue for the court is "whether . . . the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation of [that] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint" [citation omitted]).

2024See Commonwealth v. Damiano, 444 Mass. 444, 453-454 (2005).

2021Because we find the error was harmless, we need not address that argument. 17 "Under what has become known as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure." Tavares, 482 Mass. at 706 , quoting Commonwealth v. Fredericq, 482 Mass. 70, 78 (2019).

2019See Commonwealth v. Fredericq , 482 Mass. 70 , 78-79, 121 N.E.3d 166 (2019). *995 "Under what has become known as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence derived from an unconstitutional search or seizure." Fredericq , 482 Mass. at 78 , 121 N.E.3d 166 .

2005See Commonwealth v. DiMarzio, 436 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2002) (marijuana located as result of unwarned statement made after defendant placed in custody properly suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 675, 678-679 (2002) (evidence found in defendant’s bedroom as result of unwarned custodial questioning suppressed).

2005“Evidence need not be excluded under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963), even if the government misconduct was a cause ‘in fact’ of the discovery of the evidence, ‘if the government obtained the evidence through an independent source, if the connection between the improper conduct and the derivative evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, or if the government can demonstrate that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.’ Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 459 (1985)

1995“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, which forbids putting illegally seized evidence to any use, applies to verbal statements as well as to tangible evidence.” Commonwealth v. Conway, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 553 (1974), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

1986“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine which forbids putting illegally seized evidence to any use applies to verbal statements as well as to tangible evidence.” Commonwealth v. Conway, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 547, 553 (1974), citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).

1985United States v. Crews, supra. The United States Supreme Court has determined that evidence need not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, supra, if the government obtained the evidence through an independent source, Silverthorne v. United States, supra, if the connection between the improper conduct and the derivative evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), or if the government can demonstrate that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful

1981Evidence is not excluded under the doctrine if (1) the government obtained it through an independent source, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920), or (2) the “connection [between the improper conduct and the derivative evidence has] become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).

2004“In determining whether the connection between the evidence and the improper conduct has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, the facts of each case must be examined in light of three factors: the temporal proximity of the arrest to the obtaining of the evidence; the presence of intervening circumstances; and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct.” Id. at 460, citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 603-04 .

1986See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 597-604 (1975); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-219 (1979).

2002See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 756, 762 (1996) (defendant’s confession suppressed as fruit of unlawful police search); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 458-463 (1985) (although police unlawfully arrested defendant, fruit of poisonous tree analysis did not lead to suppression of fingerprint evidence because connection between unlawful arrest and acquisition, of fingerprints was too attenu ated); Commonwealth v. Glavin, 354 Mass. 69, 71-72 (1968) (fruit of poisonous tree analysis applied to alleged illegal police wiretap).

1985See also Commonwealth v. Frodyma, supra at 440 (applying the independent source exception); Commonwealth v. Glavin, 354 Mass. 69 , *460 72 (1968) (applying the “connection so attenuated as to dissipate the taint” exception).

1995United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980).

1985United States v. Crews, supra. The United States Supreme Court has determined that evidence need not be excluded under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, supra, if the government obtained the evidence through an independent source, Silverthorne v. United States, supra, if the connection between the improper conduct and the derivative evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), or if the government can demonstrate that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered by lawful

2025Cf. Commonwealth v. Lunden, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 826 (2015) (“Under the “‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine . . ., evidence must be suppressed in circumstances in which it is deemed to have been tainted by a prior search or seizure that was unlawful.”).

2024"The Supreme Court has recognized two exceptions to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine." Commonwealth v. Benoit, 382 Mass. 210, 215-216 (1981).

2019See United States v. Olivares-Rangel , 458 F.3d 1104 , 1117 (10th Cir. 2006) ("While the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies only when the defendant has standing regarding the Fourth Amendment violation which constitutes the poisonous tree, ... the law imposes no separate standing requirement regarding the evidence which constitutes the fruit of that poisonous tree"); United States v. Green , 275 F.3d 694 , 699 (8th Cir. 2001).

2016See Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 518 (2012), quoting Wong Sun, supra at 488 (evidence from search without probable cause, including “cellular telephone” and “all text messages” on telephone, “must be suppressed under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”); Upton, 394 Mass. at 364 (“exclusionary rule requir[es] the exclusion of evidence seized without a showing of probable cause”).

2016See Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 518 (2012), quoting Wong Sun, supra at 488 (evidence from search without probable cause, including “cellular telephone” and “all text messages” on telephone, “must be suppressed under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”); Upton, 394 Mass. at 364 (“exclusionary rule requir[es] the exclusion of evidence seized without a showing of probable cause”).

2005See Commonwealth v. DiMarzio, 436 Mass. 1012, 1013 (2002) (marijuana located as result of unwarned statement made after defendant placed in custody properly suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree”); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 675, 678-679 (2002) (evidence found in defendant’s bedroom as result of unwarned custodial questioning suppressed).

2005While a close case, on this point we agree. 12 In using the language “no evidence derived therefrom” in § 2515, “Congress expressly adopted a ‘the fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine for wiretap evidence,” Chandler v. United States Army, supra at 1304, and with it the correlative attenuation rule.

2004Patane, 124 S.Ct. at 2631 (Souter, J., dissenting).

2004Under the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court, “(t]he pen-ally for an unlawful arrest in a defendant’s dwelling is the suppression of anything seized at the time of the arrest, either from the defendant or in the dwelling, and any statements made at the time of the arrest.” Commonwealth v. Marquez, 434 Mass. 370, 378 (2001).

2004See Commonwealth v. Pietrass, 392 Mass. 892, 902 (1984).

2002See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 756, 762 (1996) (defendant’s confession suppressed as fruit of unlawful police search); Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455, 458-463 (1985) (although police unlawfully arrested defendant, fruit of poisonous tree analysis did not lead to suppression of fingerprint evidence because connection between unlawful arrest and acquisition, of fingerprints was too attenu ated); Commonwealth v. Glavin, 354 Mass. 69, 71-72 (1968) (fruit of poisonous tree analysis applied to alleged illegal police wiretap).

2002Commonwealth v. Holmes, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 916, 918 (1993).

2002See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484, 486 (1976) (purpose of exclusionary rule is to “deter future unlawful police conduct,” not to “redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure”).

2002That a private party may have breached some obligation of confidentiality in volunteering information to the police does not require the police to ignore that information. 9 The defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a private party’s breach of some obligation, unconnected with any form of police misconduct, can serve to launch a fruit of the poisonous tree analysis. 10 Rather, the “target” of the exclusionary rule “is official misconduct,” and the rule is not intended “to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.” Coolidge