poisonous tree doctrine in Colorado

2025People v. Bradshaw, 156 P.3d 452, 459-60 (Colo. 2007) (explaining that although the 14 fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine doesn’t apply to Miranda violations, it does applies apply to coerced statements).4 1.

2019People v. Bradshaw, 156 P.3d 452, 459 (Colo. 2007) (“[B]ecause Miranda violations do not rise to actual coercion in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply.”).

2011People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1363 (Colo.1997) (citing Wong Sun v. United *811 States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (articulation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine")).

2011People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1363 (Colo.1997) (citing Wong Sun v. United *811 States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (articulation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine")).

2005People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534 (Colo.1983).

2003“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence discovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.” People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 537 (Colo.1983).

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2017See Brown v. Illinois , 422 U.S. 590 , 602, 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; see also New York v. Harris , 495 U.S. 14 , 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990) (Before going on to consider whether an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies, "as a threshold matter, courts [must] determine that 'the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal government activity.' " (quoting United States v. Crews , 445 U.S. 463 , 471, 100 S.Ct. 1244 , 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980) )). 1 D.

2025See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); People v. Gosselin, 205 P.3d 456, 461 (Colo. App. 2008). 15 (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the defendant was free to leave; (3) whether the defendant was aware of the situation; (4) whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant; (5) whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; (6) whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before or during the interrogation; (7) whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; (8) whether the police

2025See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); People v. Gosselin, 205 P.3d 456, 461 (Colo. App. 2008). 15 (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the defendant was free to leave; (3) whether the defendant was aware of the situation; (4) whether the police read Miranda rights to the defendant; (5) whether the defendant understood and waived Miranda rights; (6) whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else before or during the interrogation; (7) whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; (8) whether the police

2022See People v. Hagos , 250 P.3d 596, 619 (Colo. App. 2009). ¶ 52 But that raises the question whether, if the police did not have probable cause to conduct the dog sniff in the first place, the K- 9’s alert provided Daly with enough additional information to sup ply probable cause for the hand search.

2021We disagree. ¶ 69 “Evidence of a crime that is deriv ed from evidence discovered through illegal police activity may be suppressed under the fruit-of- the-poisonous-tree doctrine.” Pere z v. People , 231 P.3d 957, 962 (Colo. 2010).

2016See, e.g. , Schrader , 898 P.2d at 37 (holding that because the search of the defendant's property was legal, the later statements to a detective based on that search were not inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). ¶ 56 Because we conclude that the search of Triplett's clothing hanging in the facility's bathroom was not illegal under the Fourth Amendment, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not applicable here, and we reject Triplett's argument based on that doctrine.

2014See, e.g., People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 838 (Colo.2009) ("Suppression of evidence is generally reserved to remedy violations of constitutional rights, and is not used to remedy statutory violations."); People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 31 (Colo.1995) ("We have often held that a statutory or criminal rule violation by itself does not mandate invocation of the exclusionary rule.").

2014See, e.g., People v. Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 838 (Colo.2009) ("Suppression of evidence is generally reserved to remedy violations of constitutional rights, and is not used to remedy statutory violations."); People v. Martinez, 898 P.2d 28, 31 (Colo.1995) ("We have often held that a statutory or criminal rule violation by itself does not mandate invocation of the exclusionary rule.").

2012See People v. Aarness, 150 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Colo.2006) (appellate courts have discretion to affirm the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court). 131 It is well established that police may request identification without reasonable suspicion.

2011People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1363 (Colo.1997) (citing Wong Sun v. United *811 States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (articulation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine")).

2005See, e.g., People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216 (Colo.2001).

2001Lewis, 975 P.2d at 170 ; Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1180 ; People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 590-91 (Colo. 1981).

2001Lewis, 975 P.2d at 170 ; Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1180 ; People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 590-91 (Colo.1981).

1997Aside from Miranda , O’Hearn’s statements must also be suppressed because a warrantless entry into a home “lead[s] to the suppression of any evidence found, or statements taken, inside the home.” New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 , 110 S.Ct. 1640, 1644 , 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990); see People v. Taube, 864 P.2d 123, 129 (Colo.1993) (“Application of the exclusionary rule and the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine requires us to affirm the court of appeals’ decision to suppress the evidence unless the original search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement.”).