poisonous tree doctrine in California

1969Yet Miranda has been generally interpreted as being of such paramount significance that it is alone "calculated to raise the standard of law enforcement in this country." [4] When the specified warnings are given by police authorities, the "third party" referred to in Sesslin , there is a clear, distinguishable break in the proceedings. ( People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Cal.2d 595, 600 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 422 P.2d 585 ]; People v. Martin (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 653, 656-657 [ 49 Cal. Rptr. 888 ].) A reviewing court can — and should — analyze what happened before the admonition, and what happened a

1969Yet Miranda has been generally interpreted as being of such paramount significance that it is alone "calculated to raise the standard of law enforcement in this country." [4] When the specified warnings are given by police authorities, the "third party" referred to in Sesslin , there is a clear, distinguishable break in the proceedings. ( People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Cal.2d 595, 600 [ 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 422 P.2d 585 ]; People v. Martin (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 653, 656-657 [ 49 Cal. Rptr. 888 ].) A reviewing court can — and should — analyze what happened before the admonition, and what happened a

1999(See generally, Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ].) The Attorney General responds that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to a noncoerced statement taken in violation of the Miranda rules.

1999(See generally, Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471 [ 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ].) The Attorney General responds that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to a noncoerced statement taken in violation of the Miranda rules.

2022(See, e.g., People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1213 [“Under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine, both direct and indirect products of an unreasonable search are subject to exclusion,” and the rule “ ‘logically ought to bar the use of such evidence to support the issuance of a search warrant’ ”].) 25 granted his motion to suppress all evidence that police obtained pursuant to the search warrants that were issued in reliance on Detective Sidhu’s affidavit.

2020Good Faith Exception "Under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine, both direct and indirect products of an unreasonable search are subject to exclusion." (People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1213 .) Nonetheless, "[t]he United States Supreme Court has 'repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.' [Citations.] 'Indeed, exclusion "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse . . . ." ' [Citation.] [¶] 'Whether the exclusionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case . . . is "an issue separate

2022(People v. Hawkins (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 194 , 199–200.) In that situation, “the superior court’s role is similar to that of an appellate court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a judgment. [Citation.] The superior court merely reviews the evidence; it does not substitute its judgment on the weight of the evidence nor does it resolve factual conflicts.” (People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529 .) If the earlier finding of probable cause is determined to be unfounded, the illegality of the search typically compels dismissal “by reason of the ‘fruit of the poisonou

1978“If illegally obtained evidence would have been discovered in any event, then what was obtained unlawfully may be admitted.” People v. Ramsey (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 302, 313 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 249 ], “The independent source limitation upon the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine normally applies when the evidence derived from the unlawful conduct of the police would have been ultimately revealed by usual and commonplace police investigative procedures.” People v. Chapman (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 149, 167 [ 67 Cal.Rptr. 601 ].

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

2000The court referred to Elstad and Tucker , which appear to except noncoerced statements obtained in violation of Miranda from the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, but also referred to People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 778-779 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 457 P.2d 841 ], which applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to bar the use of “fruits” of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda.

2000The court referred to Elstad and Tucker , which appear to except noncoerced statements obtained in violation of Miranda from the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, but also referred to People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 778-779 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 457 P.2d 841 ], which applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to bar the use of “fruits” of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda.

1998(Harrison v. United States (1968) 392 U.S. 219, 222-224 [ 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010-2011 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 ].) This is because “the ‘essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 222 [ 88 S.Ct. at p. 2010 ], fn. omitted, quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920) 251 U.S. 385, 392 [ 40 S.Ct. 182, 182-183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 24 A.L.R. 1426 ].) But we see no reason to extend the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to test

1998(Harrison v. United States (1968) 392 U.S. 219, 222-224 [ 88 S.Ct. 2008, 2010-2011 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 ].) This is because “the ‘essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.’ [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 222 [ 88 S.Ct. at p. 2010 ], fn. omitted, quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920) 251 U.S. 385, 392 [ 40 S.Ct. 182, 182-183 , 64 L.Ed. 319 , 24 A.L.R. 1426 ].) But we see no reason to extend the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to test

2021“The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as the result of a noncoercive Miranda violation.” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 598 ; People v. Brewer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 442 , 454–455; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947 , 955–957.) Appellant argues that a Miranda violation renders an interrogation inherently coercive, but courts have repeatedly held that a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda does not mean a statement was coerced.

2009The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation (United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 637-638, 645 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 ]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 552 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ]; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ]), and a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda/Edwards does not automatically mean that any ensuing confession was coerced.

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

1972“The ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine—distilled from a number of decisions of the high court and articulated in Wong Sun [v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 ( 9 L.Ed.2d 441 , 83 S.Ct. 407 )]—rests upon the fundamental thesis that the ‘exclusionary rule had traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Casebeer), 71 Cal.2d 265, 271 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 210 , 455 P.2d 146 ]; italics added.) The “apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, t

2021In Patane, the United States Supreme Court held in a plurality opinion that “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self- Incrimination Clause,” and “is not implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.” (Patane, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 636 .) In Davis, the California Supreme Court held that “[t]he fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation.” (Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 598 .) Because we determine the gun inevitably would ha

2009The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to physical evidence seized as a result of a noncoercive Miranda violation (United States v. Patane (2004) 542 U.S. 630, 637-638, 645 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 667 , 124 S.Ct. 2620 ]; People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 552 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96 , 115 P.3d 417 ]; People v. Whitfield (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 957 [ 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 ]), and a violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda/Edwards does not automatically mean that any ensuing confession was coerced.

2021(E.g., Davis at p. 598; People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 1039–1040.) Even if we assume the photograph and text message should have been excluded, their admission was patently harmless.

2009(See People v. *599 Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1039-1040 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ] [continued interrogation after a Miranda/Edwards violation does not “inherently constitute coercion” without evidence of actual coercion or other circumstances bearing on the suspect’s free will].) Under the totality of the circumstances here, defendant’s December 4, 1993, confession to Petaluma Police Sergeant Meese over the telephone was not the product of coercion.

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606, 612 [“Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, ‘as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence 4 should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity’ ”]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1, 5-6 [“Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606, 612 [“Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, ‘as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence 4 should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity’ ”]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1, 5-6 [“Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606, 612 [“Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, ‘as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence 4 should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity’ ”]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1, 5-6 [“Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606, 612 [“Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, ‘as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence 4 should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity’ ”]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1, 5-6 [“Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine”]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2017(See U.S. v. Ellis (6th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3d 606 , 612 ["Although a passenger does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle, 'as a passenger [a defendant] may still challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity' "]; U.S. v. Kimball (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3d 1 , 5-6 ["Thus, if the initial stop of the vehicle was illegal, evidence seized by virtue of that stop, such as the tools in this instance, may be subject to exclusion under the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine"]; U.S. v. McKneely (10th Cir. 199

2001Our decision in that case—refusing to apply the traditional ‘fruits’ doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases—does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable *1409 searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.” (Dickerson v. United States, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 441 [120 S.Ct. at pp. 2334-2335].) Dickerson makes it clear that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply in the Miranda context when the subsequent statement follows a proper warning and waiver and

2000The transcript of the preliminary hearing was used because, as defense counsel explained to the court, “I was going to activate it today and do it again, but the batteries have died.” 7 As noted previously, the trial court did not find defendant to be a credible witness. 8 In Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428 [ 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 ], the Supreme Court made clear that Miranda warnings are constitutionally based, and also reaffirmed the validity of the ruling in Elstad that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases does not apply in ca

2022“Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citation.]” (Smith, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) “[A]n officer effecting a traffic stop of a vehicle could constitutionally search portions of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, without a warrant, in certain circumstances.” (People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1051 (Bush), citing Long, supra, 463 U.S. 1032 .) In Long, the United States Supreme Court held: “Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others