waiver of sovereign immunity in New York

1980Although the waiver of sovereign immunity by the State removed the bar to actions against the State and every political subdivision for the wrongs of its officers and employees (Steitz v City of Beacon, 295 NY 51 ; Bernardine v City of New York, 294 NY 361 ) thus making the State and every political subdivision liable in accordance with the same general principles applicable to individuals and corporations (Steitz v City of Beacon, supra), it appears that municipalities are "more equal” than private citizens.

1980Although the waiver of sovereign immunity by the State removed the bar to actions against the State and every political subdivision for the wrongs of its officers and employees (Steitz v City of Beacon, 295 NY 51 ; Bernardine v City of New York, 294 NY 361 ) thus making the State and every political subdivision liable in accordance with the same general principles applicable to individuals and corporations (Steitz v City of Beacon, supra), it appears that municipalities are "more equal” than private citizens.

2005Trans-Hudson Corp. ( 93 NY2d 375 [1999]), the City maintains that the year-and-90-day limitation in section 50-i constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.

2005Trans-Hudson Corp. ( 93 NY2d 375 [1999]), the City maintains that the year-and-90-day limitation in section 50-i constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity.

1980Although the waiver of sovereign immunity by the State removed the bar to actions against the State and every political subdivision for the wrongs of its officers and employees (Steitz v City of Beacon, 295 NY 51 ; Bernardine v City of New York, 294 NY 361 ) thus making the State and every political subdivision liable in accordance with the same general principles applicable to individuals and corporations (Steitz v City of Beacon, supra), it appears that municipalities are "more equal” than private citizens.

1972Despite the waiver of sovereign immunity by section 8 of the Court of Claims Act, which made municipalities answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for the wrongs of its officers and employees ( Bernardine v. City of New York , 294 N.Y. 361, 365 ), the "rule is that, independent of sovereign immunity, a municipality is not liable for failure to supply general police or fire protection" *412 ( Motyka v. City of Amsterdam , 15 N Y 2d 134, 138).

1975The point was also considered in Nephew v. State of New York ( 178 Misc. 824, 826 ) where it was stated that section 8 of the Court of Claims Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity only to the extent of compensatory damage, but the authority of that holding is materially weakened by the fact that the court had already concluded that the facts of the ease did not justify punitive damages.

1966The point was also considered in Nephew v. State of New York ( 178 Misc. 824, 826 ) where it was stated that section 8 of the Court of Claims Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity only to the extent of compensatory damage, but the authority of that holding is materially weakened by the fact that the court had already concluded that the facts of the case did not justify punitive damages.

2021However, "a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot, on its own, extend a court's subject matter jurisdiction" ( Oneida Indian Nation v Phillips , 981 F3d at 171 ), and "[w]aivers of [sovereignty] are to be strictly construed in favor of the Tribe" ( Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Chukchansi Economic Dev.

2021Auth. , 118 AD3d 550 , 551 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v Seneca Gaming Corp. , 99 AD3d 1203, 1204 ).

2021Contrary to the defendants' contention, in merely apprising the Supreme Court of the 2019 undesirability determination, the Nation did not seek either validation or enforcement of that determination, nor did its claim that the 2019 undesirability determination rendered review and enforcement of the 2018 determination academic constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the 2019 undesirability determination ( see Matter of Spota v Jackson , 10 NY3d at 53 ; Matter of Jimerson v Halftown Estate , 22 AD2d 417, 419 ).

2021Contrary to the defendants' contention, in merely apprising the Supreme Court of the 2019 undesirability determination, the Nation did not seek either validation or enforcement of that determination, nor did its claim that the 2019 undesirability determination rendered review and enforcement of the 2018 determination academic constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the 2019 undesirability determination ( see Matter of Spota v Jackson , 10 NY3d at 53 ; Matter of Jimerson v Halftown Estate , 22 AD2d 417, 419 ).

2009Even assuming, arguendo, that the contract is ambiguous, we conclude that any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of plaintiff (see generally Ransom, 86 NY2d at 561 ).

2000It must be remembered that section 11 deals with the waiver of sovereign immunity, not with circumstances like those in Matter of Giambra v Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of State of N. Y. ( 46 NY2d 743 ), where in a CPLR article 78 proceeding the Court held that the failure to promptly object to service of an unverified pleading would be deemed a waiver.

1995Auth. , ( 517 F.2d 508 [8th Cir 1975], supra ), a waiver of sovereign immunity was effectuated by the tribal council's inclusion of a "sue and be sued" provision within a tribal ordinance creating the Housing Authority.

1987In its decision, the Third Department noted the degree of discretion given by the Legislature to the Department of Correctional Services "with regard to the disciplining of inmates” and stated that "[i]f the acts complained of involve the exercise of discretion or judgment of a quasi-judicial nature, the waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply” (Arteaga v State of New York, 125 AD2d 916, 917 , supra).

1987Thus, Arteaga (supra) stands for the proposition that discretionary acts in the area of prison discipline, just as discretionary acts in other areas, are protected by sovereign immunity.

1986Admin., 507 F2d 1300, 1307 [2d Cir 1974], affd 425 US 820 [1976]).

1983Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 ) held that the immunity long enjoyed by the State and its subdivisions with respect to the exercise of their discretionary planning functions (see Urquhart v City of Ogdensburg, 91 NY 67 ) was distinct from the immunity based on the sovereign character of the State or municipality and thus was unaffected by the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 8 of the Court of Claims Act.

1983Weiss v Fote ( 7 NY2d 579 ) held that the immunity long enjoyed by the State and its subdivisions with respect to the exercise of their discretionary planning functions (see Urquhart v City of Ogdensburg, 91 NY 67 ) was distinct from the immunity based on the sovereign character of the State or municipality and thus was unaffected by the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 8 of the Court of Claims Act.

1980Fund , 352 F Supp 177, 179 , affd 486 F.2d 1393 ; People v Branham , 53 Misc 2d 346 -348.) In our case the detail of our forum restriction incorporated in the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the State University is slightly different — i.e., actions against the units of our State University may be maintained only in the Court of Claims — but the concept of a categorical limitation of the court in which claims against the university may be instituted is precisely the same.

1980Fund, 352 F Supp 177, 179 , affd 486 F2d 1393; People v Branham, 53 Misc 2d 346-348.) In our case the detail of our forum restriction incorporated in the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the State University is slightly different — i.e., actions against the units of our State University may be maintained only in the Court of Claims — but the concept of a categorical limitation of the court in which claims against the university may be instituted is precisely the same.

1980Fund , 352 F Supp 177, 179 , affd 486 F.2d 1393 ; People v Branham , 53 Misc 2d 346 -348.) In our case the detail of our forum restriction incorporated in the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the State University is slightly different — i.e., actions against the units of our State University may be maintained only in the Court of Claims — but the concept of a categorical limitation of the court in which claims against the university may be instituted is precisely the same.

1980Fund, 352 F Supp 177, 179 , affd 486 F2d 1393; People v Branham, 53 Misc 2d 346-348.) In our case the detail of our forum restriction incorporated in the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the State University is slightly different — i.e., actions against the units of our State University may be maintained only in the Court of Claims — but the concept of a categorical limitation of the court in which claims against the university may be instituted is precisely the same.

1980Fund , 352 F Supp 177, 179 , affd 486 F.2d 1393 ; People v Branham , 53 Misc 2d 346 -348.) In our case the detail of our forum restriction incorporated in the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the State University is slightly different — i.e., actions against the units of our State University may be maintained only in the Court of Claims — but the concept of a categorical limitation of the court in which claims against the university may be instituted is precisely the same.