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19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2020“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 .) “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 754.) Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied; it must be unequivocally expressed by the tribe or Congress. 2020“Once the [tribal] entity demonstrates that it is an arm of the tribe, it is immune from suit unless the opposing party can show that tribal immunity has been abrogated or waived.” (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 236 .) The law is well established that “a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 .) To prove waiver, Rosas relies on the agreement by which Scott Tucker’s former company, CLK, was merged into and acquired by AMG. | 6 | 8 |
Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indiansgreen2 sentences2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment, 2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment, | 3 | 3 |
C & L Enterprises Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahomagreen2 sentences2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally | 2 | 3 |
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washingtongreen2 sentences1985(Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept. (1977) 433 U.S. 165, 172 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 667, 674 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 ].) The Supreme Court has held that, while Congress can authorize suits against Indian Nations, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. 1985(Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept. (1977) 433 U.S. 165, 172 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 667, 674 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 ].) The Supreme Court has held that, while Congress can authorize suits against Indian Nations, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. | 2 | 2 |
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.green2 sentences2020“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 .) “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 754.) Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied; it must be unequivocally expressed by the tribe or Congress. 2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally | 1 | 4 |
Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally 2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Kinggreen2 sentences2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4. 1999“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 [ 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 ] (1976), quoting, United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 [ 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502 , 23 L.Ed.2d 52 ] (1969).” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 [ 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 , 56 L.Ed.2d 106 ]; see also Amer. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Testangreen2 sentences2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4. 1999“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 [ 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 ] (1976), quoting, United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 [ 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502 , 23 L.Ed.2d 52 ] (1969).” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 [ 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 , 56 L.Ed.2d 106 ]; see also Amer. | 1 | 2 |
California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indiansgreen2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument 2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci 2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci | 1 | 1 |
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci | 1 | 1 |
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.green2 sentences2006But ‘without congressional authorization,’ the ‘Indian Nations are exempt from suit.’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 ].) “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. [Citation.] Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation. [Citation.]” (Oklahoma Tax Co 2006But ‘without congressional authorization,’ the ‘Indian Nations are exempt from suit.’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 ].) “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. [Citation.] Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation. [Citation.]” (Oklahoma Tax Co | 1 | 1 |
Ute Distribution Corporation, a Utah Corporation v. Ute Indian Tribegreen1 sentence2002(Also see Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, supra, 149 F.3d 1260, 1269 [remanding a case dealing with water rights to the district court because it had not been determined whether the Ute Tribe as constitutional organization or the Ute Tribe as a federal corporation was the proper defendant here, for purposes of interpreting a waiver of sovereign immunity].) As explained in the American Indian Law Deskbook (2d ed. 2000) Conference of Western Attorneys General, chapter 7, section B, pages 171 through 174 (Deskbook), the issue of a waiver by an Indian tribe of its sovereign immunity fr | 1 | 1 |
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Districtred2 sentences1999Doctrinal Bases for Determining Tort Liability of Appellants Until 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions had no tort liability to private persons. 1999Doctrinal Bases for Determining Tort Liability of Appellants Until 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions had no tort liability to private persons. | 1 | 1 |
| Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian Community Councilgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino
green
2 sentences2020(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411 , 414–420; Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193 .) “In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue, the question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action against an Indian tribe is a question of law subject to our de novo review.” (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369 .) Here, Rosas first raises a novel issue of law: When assessing whether a defendant is entitled to tri 2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally | 2 | 2008–2020 |
People Ex Rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enters.
green
1 sentence2020“Once the [tribal] entity demonstrates that it is an arm of the tribe, it is immune from suit unless the opposing party can show that tribal immunity has been abrogated or waived.” (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 236 .) The law is well established that “a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 .) To prove waiver, Rosas relies on the agreement by which Scott Tucker’s former company, CLK, was merged into and acquired by AMG. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Yavapai-Apache Nation v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel
green
1 sentence2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment, 2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Haddon Township Board of Education v. New Jersey Department of Education
green
1 sentence2011The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States . . . .” ( 5 U.S.C. § 702 , italics added.) It has long been recognized that this waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing the United States to be sued in an action under the federal APA, “applies only to actions brought in federal courts.” (Haddon Township Bd. of Education v. New Jersey Dept, of Education (D.N.J. 1979) 476 F.Supp. 681, 687 .) “Although Congress did not explicitly grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to entertain APA suits, we believe Congres | 1 | 2011–2011 |
cluster 518773
green
1 sentence2011By refusing to waive sovereign immunity for APA actions in the state courts Congress has implicitly vested exclusive jurisdiction over these actions in the federal courts.” (Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. LeCrone (6th Cir. 1989) 868 F.2d 190, 193 .) Because a claimed violation of the conformity provision in the federal Clean Air Act can be adjudicated only under the federal APA, and because actions under the federal APA can be adjudicated only in federal court, it follows that the trial court here has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Air District’s claims based on an alleged violation of | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casino
green
2 sentences2011(See Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183 .) In Danka Funding, supra, 747 A.2d 837 , the finding of immunity was based on a lack of authorization by the tribe’s comptroller, in executing a lease containing a forum selection clause, to additionally waive sovereign immunity. 2011(See Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183 .) In Danka Funding, supra, 747 A.2d 837 , the finding of immunity was based on a lack of authorization by the tribe’s comptroller, in executing a lease containing a forum selection clause, to additionally waive sovereign immunity. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Feres v. United States
green
1 sentence2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
green
2 sentences2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci 2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Wrld Wde Mnrl v. Repub Kazakhstan
green
1 sentence2008Cir. 2002) 353 U.S. App.D.C. 147 [ 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 ] [“waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed ‘in favor of the sovereign’ and are not enlarged ‘beyond what the language requires’ ”].) The Department advances two bases to support a finding of waiver: First, it identifies the “sue or be sued” clause in the resolution establishing MNE as an economic subdivision of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Chayoon v. Chao
green
1 sentence2006This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships’]; [citations.] Any change or limitation of the doctrine . . . must come from Congress. [Citation.]” (See also Chayoon v. Chao (2d Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 141, 142 .) It is worth noting the procedures in this case were at times inconsistent and confusing. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc.
green
1 sentence2002(Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10 , fh. 9; citing Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (11th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 1279, 1294 , fh. 36 (Aquamar).) The proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
cluster 449548
green
1 sentence2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe
green
2 sentences2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question. 2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe
green
2 sentences2001This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships”]; Trudgeon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 637, 644-645 [tort suit against tribal casino barred]; Morgan, supra, 103 Ariz. 425 [ 443 P.2d 421 ].) Any change or limitation of the doctrine (e.g., to exclude off-reservation tort suits) must come from Congress. 2001This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships”]; Trudgeon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 637, 644-645 [tort suit against tribal casino barred]; Morgan, supra, 103 Ariz. 425 [ 443 P.2d 421 ].) Any change or limitation of the doctrine (e.g., to exclude off-reservation tort suits) must come from Congress. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Sackman-Gilliland Corp. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Boone v. United States
green
1 sentence1998(Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian Community Council (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 489, 494-495 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]; Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 853, 857-858, 860, fn. 7 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 733 ], cert. den. 454 U.S. 831 [ 102 S.Ct. 129 , 70 L.Ed.2d 109 ].) It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. {Hydrothermal Energy Corp., supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 , citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 [ 98 S.Ct. at p. 1677 ]; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Indus. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Rauschan v. State Compensation Insurance Fund green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Sharapata v. Town of Islip green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. State Of Oregon green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Loncassion v. Leekity green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.