waiver of sovereign immunity (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

waiver of sovereign immunity in California

19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

CaseFollowedCited
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinezgreen
scotus · 1978 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–2020
2 sentences

2020“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 .) “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 754.) Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied; it must be unequivocally expressed by the tribe or Congress.

2020“Once the [tribal] entity demonstrates that it is an arm of the tribe, it is immune from suit unless the opposing party can show that tribal immunity has been abrogated or waived.” (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 236 .) The law is well established that “a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 .) To prove waiver, Rosas relies on the agreement by which Scott Tucker’s former company, CLK, was merged into and acquired by AMG.

68
Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indiansgreen
calctapp · 2002 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2016
2 sentences

2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment,

2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment,

33
C & L Enterprises Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahomagreen
scotus · 2001 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2020
2 sentences

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

23
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game of Washingtongreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
2 sentences

1985(Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept. (1977) 433 U.S. 165, 172 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 667, 674 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 ].) The Supreme Court has held that, while Congress can authorize suits against Indian Nations, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.

1985(Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept. (1977) 433 U.S. 165, 172 [ 53 L.Ed.2d 667, 674 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 ].) The Supreme Court has held that, while Congress can authorize suits against Indian Nations, a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.

22
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.green
scotus · 1998 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2020
2 sentences

2020“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 .) “As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.” (Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. (1998) 523 U.S. 751 , 754.) Moreover, a waiver of sovereign immunity may not be implied; it must be unequivocally expressed by the tribe or Congress.

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

14
Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2020
2 sentences

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

12
United States v. Kinggreen
scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2016
2 sentences

2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4.

1999“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 [ 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 ] (1976), quoting, United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 [ 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502 , 23 L.Ed.2d 52 ] (1969).” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 [ 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 , 56 L.Ed.2d 106 ]; see also Amer.

12
United States v. Testangreen
scotus · 1976 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–2016
2 sentences

2016Moreover, it is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity “ ‘must be unequivocally expressed.’ ” (United States v. Testan (1976) 424 U.S. 392, 399 , quoting United States v. King (1969) 395 U.S. 1, 4 .) The policy language relied by plaintiffs does not amount to an unequivocal waiver of the immunity expressed in section 850.4.

1999“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399 [ 96 S.Ct. 948, 953 , 47 L.Ed.2d 114 ] (1976), quoting, United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 4 [ 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502 , 23 L.Ed.2d 52 ] (1969).” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 [ 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 , 56 L.Ed.2d 106 ]; see also Amer.

12
California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indiansgreen
calctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument

2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument

11
Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.green
cal · 2002 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

11
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United Statesgreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

11
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Tribe of Okla.green
scotus · 1991 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006But ‘without congressional authorization,’ the ‘Indian Nations are exempt from suit.’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 ].) “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. [Citation.] Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation. [Citation.]” (Oklahoma Tax Co

2006But ‘without congressional authorization,’ the ‘Indian Nations are exempt from suit.’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436 U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 ].) “It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “Indian tribes are ‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their members and territories. [Citation.] Suits against Indian tribes are thus barred by sovereign immunity absent a clear waiver by the tribe or congressional abrogation. [Citation.]” (Oklahoma Tax Co

11
Ute Distribution Corporation, a Utah Corporation v. Ute Indian Tribegreen
ca10 · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002
1 sentence

2002(Also see Ute Distribution Corp. v. Ute Indian Tribe, supra, 149 F.3d 1260, 1269 [remanding a case dealing with water rights to the district court because it had not been determined whether the Ute Tribe as constitutional organization or the Ute Tribe as a federal corporation was the proper defendant here, for purposes of interpreting a waiver of sovereign immunity].) As explained in the American Indian Law Deskbook (2d ed. 2000) Conference of Western Attorneys General, chapter 7, section B, pages 171 through 174 (Deskbook), the issue of a waiver by an Indian tribe of its sovereign immunity fr

11
Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Districtred
cal · 1961 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999Doctrinal Bases for Determining Tort Liability of Appellants Until 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions had no tort liability to private persons.

1999Doctrinal Bases for Determining Tort Liability of Appellants Until 1961, when the Supreme Court decided Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213 [ 11 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 359 P.2d 457 ], absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the state and its political subdivisions had no tort liability to private persons.

11
Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservationgreen
calctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian Community Councilgreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino green
calctapp · 2007
2 sentences

2020(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411 , 414–420; Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Superior Court (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193 .) “In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue, the question of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action against an Indian tribe is a question of law subject to our de novo review.” (Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1369 .) Here, Rosas first raises a novel issue of law: When assessing whether a defendant is entitled to tri

2008(C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla. (2001) 532 U.S. 411, 418 [ 149 L.Ed.2d 623 , 121 S.Ct. 1589 ] (C&L Enterprises); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 754 .) To constitute an effective relinquishment of the right to immunity, the waiver must be “ ‘clear.’ ” (C&L Enterprises, at p. 418; Lawrence v. Barona Valley Ranch Resort & Casino, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 ; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (1978) 436,U.S. 49, 58 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 106 , 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677 ] [“[i]t is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally

22008–2020
People Ex Rel. Owen v. Miami Nation Enters. green
· 2016
1 sentence

2020“Once the [tribal] entity demonstrates that it is an arm of the tribe, it is immune from suit unless the opposing party can show that tribal immunity has been abrogated or waived.” (Miami Nation, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 236 .) The law is well established that “a waiver of sovereign immunity ‘ “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” ’ ” (Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 .) To prove waiver, Rosas relies on the agreement by which Scott Tucker’s former company, CLK, was merged into and acquired by AMG.

12020–2020
Yavapai-Apache Nation v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel green
calctapp · 2011
1 sentence

2016(Id. at p. 1188; see Smith v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, fn. 9 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 455 ]; California Parking Services, Inc. v. Soboba Band of Luiseño Indians (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 814, 820 [ 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 560 ] (California Parking); Kiowa, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 756 [“tribal immunity is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the States”].) “[T]he interpretation and construction of a written instrument . . . may be conducted de novo where ‘(a) the trial court’s contractual interpretation is based solely upon the terms of the written instrument

12016–2016
Warburton/Buttner v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 2002
2 sentences

2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment,

2011(Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 ; Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Always, “[t]he proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.” (Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1186 , citing Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10, fn. 9 .) Nation argues that since it chose to expressly reaffirm its previous waivers of sovereign immunity pertaining to earlier amendments, by enacting separate legislation, it must have been required to do so again in LB-07-08, when authorizing the fourth amendment,

12011–2011
Haddon Township Board of Education v. New Jersey Department of Education green
njd · 1979
1 sentence

2011The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States . . . .” ( 5 U.S.C. § 702 , italics added.) It has long been recognized that this waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing the United States to be sued in an action under the federal APA, “applies only to actions brought in federal courts.” (Haddon Township Bd. of Education v. New Jersey Dept, of Education (D.N.J. 1979) 476 F.Supp. 681, 687 .) “Although Congress did not explicitly grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to entertain APA suits, we believe Congres

12011–2011
cluster 518773 green
ca3 · 1989
1 sentence

2011By refusing to waive sovereign immunity for APA actions in the state courts Congress has implicitly vested exclusive jurisdiction over these actions in the federal courts.” (Federal National Mortgage Assn. v. LeCrone (6th Cir. 1989) 868 F.2d 190, 193 .) Because a claimed violation of the conformity provision in the federal Clean Air Act can be adjudicated only under the federal APA, and because actions under the federal APA can be adjudicated only in federal court, it follows that the trial court here has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the Air District’s claims based on an alleged violation of

12011–2011
Danka Funding Co. v. Sky City Casino green
njsuperctappdiv · 1999
2 sentences

2011(See Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183 .) In Danka Funding, supra, 747 A.2d 837 , the finding of immunity was based on a lack of authorization by the tribe’s comptroller, in executing a lease containing a forum selection clause, to additionally waive sovereign immunity.

2011(See Warburton/ Buttner, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183 .) In Danka Funding, supra, 747 A.2d 837 , the finding of immunity was based on a lack of authorization by the tribe’s comptroller, in executing a lease containing a forum selection clause, to additionally waive sovereign immunity.

12011–2011
Feres v. United States green
scotus · 1950
1 sentence

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

12010–2010
United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense green
scotus · 1984
2 sentences

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

2010(Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40 , 50 P.3d 751 ] (Myers).) 4 Overruled on another ground as noted in United States v. Varig Airlines (1984) 467 U.S. 797, 813 , footnote 10 [ 81 L.Ed.2d 660 , 104 S.Ct. 2755 ]. 5 The Feres doctrine is another exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” (Feres, supra, 340 U.S. at p. 146 ; see Stencel, supra, 431 U.S. 666 .) 6 For the same reason Taylor held there was no need to deci

12010–2010
Wrld Wde Mnrl v. Repub Kazakhstan green
cadc · 2002
1 sentence

2008Cir. 2002) 353 U.S. App.D.C. 147 [ 296 F.3d 1154, 1162 ] [“waivers of sovereign immunity are narrowly construed ‘in favor of the sovereign’ and are not enlarged ‘beyond what the language requires’ ”].) The Department advances two bases to support a finding of waiver: First, it identifies the “sue or be sued” clause in the resolution establishing MNE as an economic subdivision of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma.

12008–2008
Chayoon v. Chao green
ca2 · 2004
1 sentence

2006This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships’]; [citations.] Any change or limitation of the doctrine . . . must come from Congress. [Citation.]” (See also Chayoon v. Chao (2d Cir. 2004) 355 F.3d 141, 142 .) It is worth noting the procedures in this case were at times inconsistent and confusing.

12006–2006
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. green
ca11 · 1999
1 sentence

2002(Smith, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 10 , fh. 9; citing Aquamar v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (11th Cir. 1999) 179 F.3d 1279, 1294 , fh. 36 (Aquamar).) The proper inquiry is whether a waiver of sovereign immunity was effected by one with the authority to do so.

12002–2002
cluster 449548 green
ca9 · 1985
1 sentence

2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question.

12002–2002
California State Board of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe green
scotus · 1986
2 sentences

2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question.

2002Bd. of Equal. (9th Cir. 1985) 757 F.2d 1047 , 1052-1053, fn. 6, revd. in other part in Cal. Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe (1985) 474 U.S. 9 [ 106 S.Ct. 289 , 88 L.Ed.2d 9 ].) Rather, it presents a pure jurisdictional question.

12002–2002
Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe green
· 1968
2 sentences

2001This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships”]; Trudgeon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 637, 644-645 [tort suit against tribal casino barred]; Morgan, supra, 103 Ariz. 425 [ 443 P.2d 421 ].) Any change or limitation of the doctrine (e.g., to exclude off-reservation tort suits) must come from Congress.

2001This is especially so with respect to tort victims who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver of sovereign immunity; yet nothing in the Court’s reasoning limits the rule to lawsuits arising out of voluntary contractual relationships”]; Trudgeon, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at pp. 637, 644-645 [tort suit against tribal casino barred]; Morgan, supra, 103 Ariz. 425 [ 443 P.2d 421 ].) Any change or limitation of the doctrine (e.g., to exclude off-reservation tort suits) must come from Congress.

12001–2001
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Industrial Commission green
arizctapp · 1985
11998–1998
Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation green
scotus · 1981
11998–1998
Sackman-Gilliland Corp. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co. green
scotus · 1981
11998–1998
Boone v. United States green
scotus · 1981
1 sentence

1998(Hydrothermal Energy Corp. v. Fort Bidwell Indian Community Council (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 489, 494-495 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 59 ]; Long v. Chemehuevi Indian Reservation (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 853, 857-858, 860, fn. 7 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 733 ], cert. den. 454 U.S. 831 [ 102 S.Ct. 129 , 70 L.Ed.2d 109 ].) It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed. {Hydrothermal Energy Corp., supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 494 , citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 58 [ 98 S.Ct. at p. 1677 ]; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Indus.

11998–1998
People v. Superior Court green
cal · 1947
11993–1993
Rauschan v. State Compensation Insurance Fund green
calctapp · 1927
11993–1993
Sharapata v. Town of Islip green
ny · 1982
11986–1986
United States v. State Of Oregon green
ca9 · 1982
11985–1985
People Ex Rel. Department of Transportation v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. green
cal · 1985
11985–1985
Loncassion v. Leekity green
nmd · 1971
11981–1981
Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community green
akd · 1978
11981–1981

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 25u.s.c.2701 (4) USC § 28u.s.c.1360 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 468 (1977–2026) GA 238 (1975–2026) FL 104 (1975–2026) MO 68 (1981–2025) NE 40 (1985–2024) CT 34 (1981–2024) NC 33 (1979–2026) NY 31 (1952–2025) MD 26 (1976–2026) NJ 26 (1961–2026) VA 24 (2001–2026) KY 24 (1989–2025) HI 24 (1964–2025) PA 20 (1946–2024) CA 19 (1981–2020) OK 19 (1979–2020) MA 17 (1981–2025) CO 16 (1992–2025) WA 16 (1979–2025) NM 16 (1994–2022) MS 15 (1993–2016) TN 14 (1998–2026) IL 14 (1992–2025) LA 13 (1990–2023) IA 13 (1986–2024) AK 10 (1972–2009) DE 10 (1972–2025) VT 10 (1987–2025) RI 9 (1992–2017) MT 9 (1979–2023) MN 9 (1994–2024) AR 9 (1997–2017) NH 8 (1977–2025) WI 8 (1985–2021) OH 7 (1974–2015) SC 7 (1959–2021) ID 6 (1992–2019) ME 6 (2005–2017) IN 5 (2006–2020) DC 4 (1986–2010) NV 3 (1950–1988) AZ 3 (1985–2020) SD 3 (1990–1998) KS 2 (1975–1994) AL 2 (2014–2017) UT 2 (2005–2014) VI 2 (2004–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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