waiver of sovereign immunity in New Mexico

2014See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 (“Nothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (“[Wjith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a [sjtate may prescribe the terms and conditions on which its consents to be sued[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {25} Finally, neither NMS A 1978, Section 20-1-2 (1987), nor NMS

2014See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 (“Nothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign 11 immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a [s]tate may prescribe the terms and conditions on which its consents to be sued[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {25} Finally, neither NMSA 1978, Section 20-1-2 (1987), nor N

2020See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {26} Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding that the Compact contains an express and unequivocal waiver of the Pueblo’s sovereign immunity that permits Worker to pursue her claim in the WCA.

2015See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Am.

2014See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 (“Nothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (“[Wjith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a [sjtate may prescribe the terms and conditions on which its consents to be sued[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {25} Finally, neither NMS A 1978, Section 20-1-2 (1987), nor NMS

2014See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28 (“Nothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign 11 immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a [s]tate may prescribe the terms and conditions on which its consents to be sued[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {25} Finally, neither NMSA 1978, Section 20-1-2 (1987), nor N

2022Co. v. Tucker, 1980-NMCA-082 , ¶ 13, 95 N.M. 56 , 618 P.2d 894 (explaining that, where the state had a duty to “construct[] and maintain[] fences when necessary along public highways, the waiver of sovereign immunity for negligence in the maintenance of highways include[d] negligence in the maintenance of those fences” because “[m]aintaining the highway means keeping it safe for public use”); Martinez, 2013-NMSC-005, ¶ 34 (reasoning that, whenever the state has notice of a dangerous condition on one of its roads, it has a “maintenance obligation for which [it] can be held legally responsible u

2020To construe Plaintiff’s cause of action as exempt from Section 37-1-23 merely because it seeks a declaratory judgment would be contrary to both the plain language of Section 37-1-23 and the Legislature’s intent in enacting it. {11} Plaintiff further argues that the statute of limitations is inapplicable with respect to the individual Defendants because Plaintiff could amend his complaint to assert a waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 167 (1908) (allowing injunctions against officials acting on behalf of states des

2004Maynard v. Narragansett Indian Tube, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1993).

2003See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 784 , 877 P.2d at 1087 (“If the [State Highway] Department is found to have breached its duty by negligently failing to erect or maintain fences along the highway, it may be held liable because such negligence falls within the waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Rickerson, 94 N.M. at 476 , 612 P.2d at 706 (department may be held liable for its failure to install traffic signals because such failure may constitute negligence in the maintenance of a highway, roadway, or street).

2003See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 784 , 877 P.2d at 1087 (“If the [State Highway] Department is found to have breached its duty by negligently failing to erect or maintain fences along the highway, it may be held liable because such negligence falls within the waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Rickerson, 94 N.M. at 476 , 612 P.2d at 706 (department may be held liable for its failure to install traffic signals because such failure may constitute negligence in the maintenance of a highway, roadway, or street).

2003See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 784 , 877 P.2d at 1087 (“If the [State Highway] Department is found to have breached its duty by negligently failing to erect or maintain fences along the highway, it may be held liable because such negligence falls within the waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Rickerson, 94 N.M. at 476 , 612 P.2d at 706 (department may be held liable for its failure to install traffic signals because such failure may constitute negligence in the maintenance of a highway, roadway, or street).

2003See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 784 , 877 P.2d at 1087 (“If the [State Highway] Department is found to have breached its duty by negligently failing to erect or maintain fences along the highway, it may be held liable because such negligence falls within the waiver of sovereign immunity.”); Rickerson, 94 N.M. at 476 , 612 P.2d at 706 (department may be held liable for its failure to install traffic signals because such failure may constitute negligence in the maintenance of a highway, roadway, or street).

2002See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999, 1006 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State ‘may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued ....’”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 , 15 L.Ed. 991 (1858)); Alston v. State, 97 N.Y.2d 159 , 737 N.Y.S.2d 45 , 762 N.E.2d 923, 926 (2001) (“[NJothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.”).

2002See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999, 1006 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State ‘may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued ....’”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 , 15 L.Ed. 991 (1858)); Alston v. State, 97 N.Y.2d 159 , 737 N.Y.S.2d 45 , 762 N.E.2d 923, 926 (2001) (“[NJothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.”).

2002See Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 167-70 (Alaska 1977) (recognizing that maintenance of insurance policy would not support conclusion that tribe had waived its immunity as tribe purchased insurance policy to protect tribal resources).

2002See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999, 1006 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State ‘may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued ....’”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 , 15 L.Ed. 991 (1858)); Alston v. State, 97 N.Y.2d 159 , 737 N.Y.S.2d 45 , 762 N.E.2d 923, 926 (2001) (“[NJothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.”).

2002See Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 , 122 S.Ct. 999, 1006 , 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (“[W]ith respect to suits against a state sovereign in its own courts, we have explained that a State ‘may prescribe the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued ....’”) (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 , 15 L.Ed. 991 (1858)); Alston v. State, 97 N.Y.2d 159 , 737 N.Y.S.2d 45 , 762 N.E.2d 923, 926 (2001) (“[NJothing in Alden suggests that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations.”).

1995This requirement advances the “ ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 , 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1092 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 510 , 111 S.Ct. at 910 ; see also American Indian Agric.

1995This requirement advances the “ ‘overriding goal’ of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.” California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 , 107 S.Ct. 1083, 1092 , 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987); see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 498 U.S. at 510 , 111 S.Ct. at 910 ; see also American Indian Agric.