waiver of sovereign immunity in Missouri

2020Official Immunity & Public-Duty Doctrine (Teacher) However, the record does not support Teacher’s summary judgment based on official immunity or the public-duty doctrine. 3 “A public entity does not waive its sovereign immunity by maintaining an insurance policy where that policy includes a provision stating that the policy is not meant to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Langley v. Curators of Univ. of Missouri, 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo.App. 2002).

2014Like the trial court, we find no merit in these assertions. 2 Under the cited statute, District could purchase liability insurance for tort claims and, thereby, waive sovereign immunity “only to the maximum amount of and only for the purposes covered by such policy of insurance ….” 3 “A public entity does not waive its sovereign immunity by maintaining an insurance policy where that policy includes a provision stating that the policy is not meant to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Langley v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 73 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Mo.App. 2002).

2023Dist., 576 S.W.3d at 269 (in determining whether an insurance policy waives sovereign immunity, “we are guided by the policy language alone”); Topps, 272 S.W.3d at 415 (“the extent of [the waiver of sovereign immunity] is expressly dictated, and limited, by the terms of the insurance policy”).

2023Cox acknowledges that the disclaimer provision in the MOPERM Policy is technically sufficient to retain Callaway County's sovereign immunity for Cox's claims in light of the holding in Topps v. City of Country Club Hills, 272 S.W.3d 409, 417-18 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).6 Notwithstanding her concession, Cox argues that the disclaimer provision is unenforceable because "official minutes of the Callaway County Commission indicate that" the disclaimer provision was not separately approved by the Callaway County 6 Section 537.610.1 "mandates the waiver of sovereign immunity 'only to the maximum amount

2022See Ford Motor Co., 97 S.W.3d at 461 .

2012Ford Motor Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 97 S.W.3d 458, 461 (Mo. banc 2003).

2012Also, we are mindful that regardless of whether the phrase was intended in an ordinary sense or in a sense peculiar to governmental law, we are to "strictly construe" it to the extent that it is a waiver of sovereign immunity. [15] See Sprint *817 Commc'ns Co., L.P. v. Dir. of Revenue, 64 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Mo. banc 2002).

2011Also, we are mindful that regardless of whether the phrase was intended in an ordinary sense or in a sense peculiar to governmental law, we are to “strictly construe” it to the extent that it is a waiver of sovereign immunity. 15 See Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Dir. of Revenue, 64 S.W.3d 832, 834 (Mo. bañe 2002).

2012Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo. banc 1977) (“§ 105.850, RSMo 1969 ... contain[s] [a] disclaimer provision[ ] that [it] shall not be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity”).

1981All suits or proceedings directly or indirectly against the system shall be brought in Cole County.” The equivalent language in Section 226.100 was construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity in Jones v. State Highway Commission, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1977).

2019A nearly identical disclaimer provision was at issue in Topps v. City of Country Club Hills, where it was held that: Because a number of courts have held that "a public entity retains its full sovereign immunity when the insurance policy contains a disclaimer stating that the entity's procurement of the policy was not meant to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity," the disclaimer provision in the City's [insurance] policy acts to retain the City's sovereign immunity. 272 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting Parish v. Novus Equities Co., 231 S.W.3d 236, 246 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)).

2008Parish, 231 S.W.3d at 246; See also State ex rel.

2002“The waiver of sovereign immunity, however, must be by express consent to be sued.” Id., citing Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Mo. banc 1975), and Community Fed.

1989Charles v. Spradling, 524 S.W.2d 820, 823 [4, 5] (Mo. banc 1975); Community Fed.

2021The Western District interpreted section 105.850 as meaning “that, any intimations to the contrary notwithstanding, none of the provisions of the Workers Compensation Law shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity in favor of a state employee.” Id.

2021The effect of section 105.850 on civil liability imposed by section 287.780 was first addressed in Krasney v. Curators of University of Missouri, where we held that section 105.850 applies to require the conclusion "that, any intimations to the contrary notwithstanding, none of the provisions of the Workers['] Compensation Law shall be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity in favor of a state employee." 765 S.W.2d at 650 (emphasis added.) Relying on Krasney, the Eastern District similarly held in King v. Probate Division, Circuit Court of County of St.

2022Accordingly, because “an employee of a private nursing home can sue under the provisions of the Act for retaliation, and as the provisions so permitting are expressly made applicable to nursing home districts, 6 their language provides the express showing of legislative intent required to find a waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 805 .

2008See Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home Dist, 110 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Mo. banc 2003) (finding that sovereign immunity did not shield a nursing home from liability under the Omnibus Nursing Home Act because the “express provision that the Act is applicable to nursing home districts constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity to *57 the extent necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act as to those districts”).

2019(Emphasis added.) By its plain terms, section 537.610.1 provides for the waiver of sovereign immunity if a political subdivision purchases liability insurance for tort claims made against the political subdivision. "[W]hen a public entity purchases liability insurance, [section] 537.610.1 provides that immunity is waived as to torts other than those set out in [section] 537.600 to the extent of and for the specific purposes covered by the insurance purchased." Brennan By & Through Brennan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 942 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997).

2008Despite differences in language and the fact that section 71.185 applies to municipalities only and section 537.610 applies to all ‘political subdivisions’ of the State, the courts have reasoned that the purchase of liability insurance may function “as a waiver of sovereign immunity under either statute.” Id.

2023The cases relied upon by Respondent merely stand for the general proposition that the purchase of liability insurance may operate as a waiver of sovereign immunity; they do not hold that the act of purchasing an insurance policy constitutes a waiver, regardless of whether the insurance policy is void and unenforceable.11 See generally City of Grandview, 490 S.W.3d at 371 - 72; Russell, 843 S.W.2d at 360 .

2017Board of Trustees of City of North Kansas City Mem'l Hosp. v. Russell, 843 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Mo. banc 1992) (a public entity does not waive its sovereign immunity by maintaining an insurance policy when that policy includes a provision stating that the policy is not meant to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity). .

2021In King v. Probate Division, this Court reaffirmed the result in Krasney. 958 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997).

2021Louis, 21st Judicial Circuit, that under section 105.850, "the state has the duty and obligation to comply with the provisions of Chapter 287, but has not waived tort liability in connection therewith" by virtue of the plain language of section 105.850. 958 S.W.2d at 93 (emphasis added).

2015In Dorlon , the Southern District found a city had waived sovereign immunity for a dangerous condition on a sidewalk it owned, but the board of regents for a university which held a- possible reversion-ary interest in the property had not. 843 S.W.2d at 939 .

2009See also Dorlon v. City of Springfield, 843 S.W.2d 934, 938-39 (Mo.App.1992) (stating that, where the waiver of sovereign immunity is based upon allegations that the public entity failed to take necessary, measures to correct a dangerous condition, the "public entity must control the property in order to take appropriate actions”).

2013Ratepayers now rely on the following statement lifted from Ring’s conclusion: “[W]e hold generally that article X,' section 23, operates as a waiver of sovereign immunity and permits taxpayers to seek a refund of increased taxes previously collected by a political subdivision in violation of article X, section 22(a).” Ring, 969 S.W.2d at 719 .

2011Louis Sewer Dist., 969 S.W.2d 716, 718-19 (Mo. banc 1998), because, as in Ring , this is a case in which the “right to a money judgment is essential to enforce article X, section 22(a)” and where the “Court must infer or imply that article X, section 23 acts as a waiver of sovereign immunity when a political subdivision collects a tax increase in violation of article X, section 22(a).” Id. at 718 .

2013Accordingly, this Court holds that the Hancock Amendment does not expressly authorize Missouri courts to order a political subdivision to refund taxes collected in violation of section 22(a). 16 To order re funds without such express authority is, at best,' to “infer or imply that a waiver of sovereign immunity extends to remedies that are not essential to enforce the right in question.” Fort Zumwalt, 896 S.W.2d at 923 (emphasis added).

1998Fort Zumwalt, 896 S.W.2d at 923 .

1992In Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1985), the Missouri Supreme Court, following the dictates of the statute, established a four-prong test to determine whether the dangerous condition exception was applicable to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.

1991Kanagawa v. State by and through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 834-35 (Mo. banc 1985).

2025See Benoit, 33 S.W.3d at 667-68 (observing that "public entities have a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining public roads in a reasonably safe condition for travelers using the roads in the proper manner and with due care," and "'to protect against all possible injuries . . . that are reasonably foreseeable'") (quoting Williams v. City of Independence, 931 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)); see also MAI Civil 31.16 [2023 Revision] (addressing the waiver of sovereign immunity for dangerous conditions of public property, and which requires in paragraph second that a jury find public

2025See Benoit, 33 S.W.3d at 667-68 (observing that "public entities have a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining public roads in a reasonably safe condition for travelers using the roads in the proper manner and with due care," and "'to protect against all possible injuries . . . that are reasonably foreseeable'") (quoting Williams v. City of Independence, 931 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)); see also MAI Civil 31.16 [2023 Revision] (addressing the waiver of sovereign immunity for dangerous conditions of public property, and which requires in paragraph second that a jury find public

2023The disclaimer provision present in the municipality's insurance policy in Topps v. City of Country Club Hills, 272 S.W.3d 409, 417-18 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008), acted to retain the city's sovereign immunity because it expressly stated "that the policy should not be construed to broaden the liability of the City beyond the sovereign immunity provisions of Sections 537.600 to 537.610, nor 'to abolish or waive any defense at law which might otherwise be available' to the City." The language in Callaway County's disclaimer provision is nearly identical to the municipality's disclaimer provision in Top

2023Dist., 576 S.W.3d at 269 (in determining whether an insurance policy waives sovereign immunity, “we are guided by the policy language alone”); Topps, 272 S.W.3d at 415 (“the extent of [the waiver of sovereign immunity] is expressly dictated, and limited, by the terms of the insurance policy”).

2021Though Wyman questioned Krasney's holding that legislative waiver of sovereign immunity requires an expressly stated consent to be sued, Wyman was not required to abrogate the holding, and instead relied on Krasney's alternative holding that section 105.850 legislatively disclaims a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Workers' Compensation Law in "favor of a state employee." Wyman, 376 S.W.3d at 21 (emphasis added) (quoting Krasney, 765 S.W2d at 650 ).