waiver of sovereign immunity in Tennessee

2019Courts will not find a waiver of sovereign immunity “‘unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.’” Davidson, 227 S.W.3d at 19 (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274 , 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1954)).

2019Courts will not find a waiver of sovereign immunity “‘unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.’” Davidson, 227 S.W.3d at 19 (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274 , 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1954)).

2019Courts will not find a waiver of sovereign immunity “‘unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.’” Davidson, 227 S.W.3d at 19 (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 196 Tenn. 274 , 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (1954)).

2016Id. at 158 (emphasis added). -5- The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently held that a waiver of sovereign immunity will not be found “unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.” Davidson v. Lewis Brothers Bakery, 227 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954)).

2019Whether sovereign immunity has been waived is a question of statutory interpretation, and the “primary focus must be on the words chosen and enacted by the legislature.” Mullins v. State, 320 S.W.3d 273, 283 (Tenn. 2010).

2015“In determining whether the General Assembly intended to waive sovereign immunity for a claim against the State of Tennessee ..., our primary focus must remain on the actual words chosen and enacted by the legislature.” Mullins, 320 S.W.3d at 283 .

2026In Harakas Construction Inc. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, 561 S.W.3d 910 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018), the Court found that the Metropolitan Charter’s provision allowing Metro Nashville to sue and be sued did not show “an intent to consent to be sued for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel.” Id. at 926 ; see also Austin v. City of Memphis, 684 S.W.2d 624, 638 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that sue and be sued language in the Chickasaw Basin Authority statute was not a waiver of sovereign immunity).

2019See State v. Wells, 62 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Tenn. 2001) (“[i]ssues of statutory interpretation are questions of law.”). - 10 - When construing statutes, our task is to ‘“ascertain and give effect’” to the Tennessee General Assembly’s intent ‘“without unduly restricting or expanding;” the coverage of a statute beyond its intended scope.

2017Acts 110 , 110) (emphasis added). 6 know, that an injury has been sustained.” Wyatt v. A-Best, Co., 910 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tenn. 1995).

2016Id. at 158 (emphasis added). -5- The Tennessee Supreme Court has consistently held that a waiver of sovereign immunity will not be found “unless there is a statute clearly and unmistakably disclosing an intent upon the part of the Legislature to permit such litigation.” Davidson v. Lewis Brothers Bakery, 227 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Scates v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tenn. 1954)).

2010Therefore, for the sake of judicial economy, we will “soldier on without guidance from the trial court.” Church v. Perales, 39 S.W.3d 149, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

2009Id. at 20 ; see also Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tenn.2001) (“[T]he general rule in Tennessee is that savings statutes may not be applied to extend the period within which an action must be filed under the [Tennessee Government Tort Liability Act].”).