waiver of sovereign immunity in Maryland

2026We therefore recognize an exception to our holding in Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Department, 376 Md. 53 (2003), for orders denying claims of complete sovereign immunity made by the State and its agencies and instrumentalities.

2026App. 589, 612 (2008). 23 The second requirement for a waiver of sovereign immunity is the appropriation of funds or the provision of independent authority to raise funds to pay a judgment resulting from the waiver. “[A] legislative waiver of sovereign immunity is ineffective unless . . . there are funds available for the satisfaction of the judgment[.]” Katz, 284 Md. at 513 . “[W]hen the General Assembly expressly authorizes suits to be brought against one of the State’s agencies, it is the giving of a positive consent and has the effect of waiving sovereign immunity[.]” Bd. of Trs. of Howard

2011In Stem , we concluded that the General Assembly enacted S.G. § 12-203 upon an acknowledgment of our reasoning in Maas, 173 Md. at 558-60 , 197 A. at 125 -26 and Ruff, 278 Md. at 590-91, 366 A.2d at 366, that sovereign immunity is a valid defense unless funds have been appropriated to pay a judgment or funds may be raised for that purpose, stating: The General Assembly is cognizant of how to specifically authorize the power to raise funds in satisfaction of the second prong of the Maas and Ruff test, as it has enacted a power to appropriate funds for the purpose of paying judgments arising fro

2011In Stem , we concluded that the General Assembly enacted S.G. § 12-203 upon an acknowledgment of our reasoning in Maas, 173 Md. at 558-60 , 197 A. at 125 -26 and Ruff, 278 Md. at 590-91, 366 A.2d at 366, that sovereign immunity is a valid defense unless funds have been appropriated to pay a judgment or funds may be raised for that purpose, stating: The General Assembly is cognizant of how to specifically authorize the power to raise funds in satisfaction of the second prong of the Maas and Ruff test, as it has enacted a power to appropriate funds for the purpose of paying judgments arising fro

2011Citing the just-quoted language from O’Toole warning against the danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA, Tinsley contends that the discretionary function exception “should be read narrowly.” This argument, in effect, urges us to ignore the well-settled rule that “ ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” Lizzi v. WMATA, 156 Md.App. 1, 9 , 845 A.2d 60 (2003) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 , 119 S.Ct. 687 , 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999)).

2011Citing the just-quoted language from O’Toole warning against the danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA, Tinsley contends that the discretionary function exception “should be read narrowly.” This argument, in effect, urges us to ignore the well-settled rule that “ ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” Lizzi v. WMATA, 156 Md.App. 1, 9 , 845 A.2d 60 (2003) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 , 119 S.Ct. 687 , 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999)).

2011Citing the just-quoted language from O’Toole warning against the danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA, Tinsley contends that the discretionary function exception “should be read narrowly.” This argument, in effect, urges us to ignore the well-settled rule that “ ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” Lizzi v. WMATA, 156 Md.App. 1, 9 , 845 A.2d 60 (2003) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 , 119 S.Ct. 687 , 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999)).

2011Citing the just-quoted language from O’Toole warning against the danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA, Tinsley contends that the discretionary function exception “should be read narrowly.” This argument, in effect, urges us to ignore the well-settled rule that “ ‘a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.’ ” Lizzi v. WMATA, 156 Md.App. 1, 9 , 845 A.2d 60 (2003) (quoting Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 , 119 S.Ct. 687 , 142 L.Ed.2d 718 (1999)).

2011In Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 493 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993), the Court of Appeals discussed the procedural restrictions of the MTCA as originally enacted, viz: As originally enacted, the MTCA provided certain procedural restrictions on filing suit against the State.

2011In Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 493 , 632 A.2d 753 (1993), the Court of Appeals discussed the procedural restrictions of the MTCA as originally enacted, viz: As originally enacted, the MTCA provided certain procedural restrictions on filing suit against the State.

2010In making this contention, WMATA further relies on the holding of the Court of Special Appeals in Maxwell, 98 Md.App. at 516 , 683 A.2d at 930, that WMATA is entitled to the same broad immunity in State courts as any other State agency.

2009A waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found “where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [would] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 , 94 S.Ct. at 1361 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171 , 29 S.Ct. at 464 , 53 L.Ed. at 751 ).

2009A waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found “where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [would] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 , 94 S.Ct. at 1361 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171 , 29 S.Ct. at 464 , 53 L.Ed. at 751 ).

2009The opinion also noted that the waiver of sovereign immunity existed for only one year under Section 12-202 of the State Government Article and further that the Mooneys “needed to file the suit within one year of the termination of the contract.” Id. at 646 , 943 A.2d at 113 .

2009The opinion also noted that the waiver of sovereign immunity existed for only one year under Section 12-202 of the State Government Article and further that the Mooneys “needed to file the suit within one year of the termination of the contract.” Id. at 646 , 943 A.2d at 113 .

2009A waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found “where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [would] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 , 94 S.Ct. at 1361 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171 , 29 S.Ct. at 464 , 53 L.Ed. at 751 ).

2009A waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity will be found “where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [would] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’ ” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 , 94 S.Ct. at 1361 , 39 L.Ed.2d at 678 (quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171 , 29 S.Ct. at 464 , 53 L.Ed. at 751 ).

2009We granted certiorari to answer “the sole question presented by the appellants[,]” which was whether the General Assembly, by enacting Article 44A, had effected “a waiver of sovereign immunity, either express or implied.” Jackson, 289 Md. at 120 , 422 A.2d at 377 .

2009We granted certiorari to answer “the sole question presented by the appellants[,]” which was whether the General Assembly, by enacting Article 44A, had effected “a waiver of sovereign immunity, either express or implied.” Jackson, 289 Md. at 120 , 422 A.2d at 377 .

2000Moreover, a change in a statute as part of code revision is not deemed to modify the law unless the Legislature's intention to do so is "unmistakable." Blevins v. Baltimore County , 352 Md. 620 , 642 , 724 A.2d 22 (1999).

2000Moreover, a change in a statute as part of code revision is not deemed to modify the law unless the Legislature's intention to do so is "unmistakable." Blevins v. Baltimore County , 352 Md. 620 , 642 , 724 A.2d 22 (1999).

2000Appellant *542 filed his complaint on February 28, 1996, more than one year after appellant knew of the allegedly wrongful termination, and more than a year after the effective date of that termination. “[Hjaving failed to bring an action within the time requirement of [S.G.] § 12-202,” appellant “may not take advantage of the waiver of sovereign immunity of [S.G.] § 12-201.” Tschechtelin I, 124 Md.App. at 400, 722 A.2d 414 .

1999See, e.g., Orticelli v. Powers, 197 Conn. 9 , 495 A.2d 1023 (Conn.1985) (holding that limitation period in sovereign immunity waiver for tort claims was condition precedent to maintaining suit); Levine v. Dade County School Board, 442 So.2d 210 (Fla.1983) (same). *400 Appellee, having failed to bring an action within the time requirement of SG § 12-202, may not take advantage of the waiver of sovereign immunity of SG § 12-201.

1988We emphasized in Mass Transit, 292 Md. at 816 , 439 A.2d 1104 , that the general rule is based upon considerations of public policy rather than the waiver of sovereign immunity.

1988We emphasized in Mass Transit, 292 Md. at 816 , 439 A.2d 1104 , that the general rule is based upon considerations of public policy rather than the waiver of sovereign immunity.

1980Nor did the grant of authority to purchase insurance accomplish a waiver of sovereign immunity.” 44 Md.

1980App. at 316 , 408 A.2d at 1343 .

1979The Court of Appeals has said in Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590 , 287 A.2d 257 (1972) that the mere existence of liability insurance will not be sufficient to create tort liability unless the "legislative enactments creating the agency or corporation considered as a whole lead to the conclusion that it was the intention of the Legislature to impose such liability on the agency...." 264 Md. at 595 .

1979The Court of Appeals has said in Quecedo v. Montgomery County, 264 Md. 590 , 287 A.2d 257 (1972) that the mere existence of liability insurance will not be sufficient to create tort liability unless the "legislative enactments creating the agency or corporation considered as a whole lead to the conclusion that it was the intention of the Legislature to impose such liability on the agency...." 264 Md. at 595 .

1977While the APA, as noted above, constitutes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for purposes, of initial access to the Court in cases seeking judicial review of agency action, the APA ‘by itself, is not a waiver of sovereign immunity in suits seeking money damages against the United States.’ Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 172 U.S. App. D.C. 281 , 521 F.2d 941, 948 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 , 96 S.Ct. 1507 , 47 L.Ed.2d 761 (1976).

1977While the APA, as noted above, constitutes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for purposes, of initial access to the Court in cases seeking judicial review of agency action, the APA ‘by itself, is not a waiver of sovereign immunity in suits seeking money damages against the United States.’ Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 172 U.S. App. D.C. 281 , 521 F.2d 941, 948 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 , 96 S.Ct. 1507 , 47 L.Ed.2d 761 (1976).