20 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1946–2024 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mascaro v. Youth Study Centergreen2 sentences1988The court in Rippy held that a deer on the highway was not a dangerous condition upon which to predicate commonwealth liability, primarily due to the fact that this type of condition was not conceivably correctable, citing Mistecka, supra. 1 Important to note is that the Commonwealth Court, in a footnote to the Rippy case, questioned the validity of its own holding in Mistecka after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987) 2 Falling along the continuum between the easy question of dangerous conditions actually on the highways 1988The court in Rippy held that a deer on the highway was not a dangerous condition upon which to predicate commonwealth liability, primarily due to the fact that this type of condition was not conceivably correctable, citing Mistecka, supra. 1 Important to note is that the Commonwealth Court, in a footnote to the Rippy case, questioned the validity of its own holding in Mistecka after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351 , 523 A.2d 1118 (1987) 2 Falling along the continuum between the easy question of dangerous conditions actually on the highways | 2 | 3 |
Hall v. ACME MARKETS, INC.green2 sentences2020Finally, with respect to Inmate’s claims against the Commonwealth, as this Court has explained: The waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code applies only to claims against Commonwealth agencies and employees, and does not waive the immunity of the Commonwealth itself. 42 Pa. C.S. §§8501,[14] 8522; Tork-Hiss [v. Commonwealth, 735 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. 1999)]; Russo [v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113, 118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)]; Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). 2016The waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code applies only to claims against Commonwealth agencies and employees, and does not waive the immunity of the Commonwealth itself. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8501, 8522; Tork-Hiis, 735 7 A.2d at 1258; Russo, 125 A.3d at 118 ; Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). | 2 | 2 |
A.J. Russo v. Allegheny County, and the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, PA, Criminal Divisiongreen2 sentences2020Finally, with respect to Inmate’s claims against the Commonwealth, as this Court has explained: The waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code applies only to claims against Commonwealth agencies and employees, and does not waive the immunity of the Commonwealth itself. 42 Pa. C.S. §§8501,[14] 8522; Tork-Hiss [v. Commonwealth, 735 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. 1999)]; Russo [v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113, 118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)]; Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). 2016The waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code applies only to claims against Commonwealth agencies and employees, and does not waive the immunity of the Commonwealth itself. 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 8501, 8522; Tork-Hiis, 735 7 A.2d at 1258; Russo, 125 A.3d at 118 ; Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). | 1 | 2 |
Finn v. Rendellgreen1 sentence2024Finn v. Rendell, 990 A.2d 100, 105 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Talarico v. Bonhamgreen1 sentence2021(Appellees’ Brief at 10-11.) 7 elements: “(1) [Appellees’] duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between [Appellees’] conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Id. (citing Talarico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). | 1 | 1 |
Snyder v. Harmongreen2 sentences2021The Court also opined that the unambiguous language of the exception, specifically the “critical word …‘of,’” 8 Accordingly, we do not address the issue, or any associated arguments raised by the parties, regarding whether Wise has met the first requirement for a waiver of sovereign immunity, i.e., that the injury is recoverable under common law or statute against a party not having the defense of sovereign immunity available. [J-67-2020] - 11 indicated that the “dangerous condition must derive, originate from or have as its source the Commonwealth realty.” Id. at 311 & n.5. 2021We further held that immunity will be waived under the real estate exception “where it is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes an injury to occur.” Id. at 312 (relying upon Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 523 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Pa. 1984) (interpreting the real estate exception to local agency immunity under the PSTCA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3), to apply “only to those cases where it is alleged that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself causes injury, not merely when it facilitates injury by acts of others, whose acts are outside [the PSTCA’s] sco | 1 | 1 |
Tork-Hiis v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020Finally, with respect to Inmate’s claims against the Commonwealth, as this Court has explained: The waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 8522 of the Judicial Code applies only to claims against Commonwealth agencies and employees, and does not waive the immunity of the Commonwealth itself. 42 Pa. C.S. §§8501,[14] 8522; Tork-Hiss [v. Commonwealth, 735 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Pa. 1999)]; Russo [v. Allegheny County, 125 A.3d 113, 118 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)]; Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 532 A.2d 894, 897 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
Philadelphia Life Insurance v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1979Plaintiff has cited the case of Philadelphia Life Insurance Co. v. Com., 410 Pa. 571, 576 , 190 A. 2d 111, 114 (1963), however, as authority to take this case out of the sovereign immunity area. 1979Plaintiff has cited the case of Philadelphia Life Insurance Co. v. Com., 410 Pa. 571, 576 , 190 A. 2d 111, 114 (1963), however, as authority to take this case out of the sovereign immunity area. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County
green
2 sentences2024PLCB’s argument is analogous to the rationale we rejected in Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 2 A.3d 499 (Pa. 2010) (“Meyer I”), with regard to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”) (recodified as 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542). 2024PLCB’s argument is analogous to the rationale we rejected in Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 2 A.3d 499 (Pa. 2010) (“Meyer I”), with regard to the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“Tort Claims Act”) (recodified as 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Armenti v. Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education
green
1 sentence2023Armenti, 100 A.3d at 777 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Robertson
green
1 sentence2022The Department argues that in Scientific Games, 66 A.3d 740 , the Supreme Court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the language of the Procurement Code. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Page v. City of Philadelphia
neutral
1 sentence2021(Appellees’ Brief at 10-11.) 7 elements: “(1) [Appellees’] duty or obligation recognized by law; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between [Appellees’] conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Id. (citing Talarico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2018PTC insists the waiver of sovereign immunity must be " 'unequivocally expressed' " and " '[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity[.]' " Id. at 28, quoting F.A.A. v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 284 , 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441 , 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012). 2018PTC insists the waiver of sovereign immunity must be " 'unequivocally expressed' " and " '[a]ny ambiguities in the statutory language are to be construed in favor of immunity[.]' " Id. at 28, quoting F.A.A. v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 284 , 290, 132 S.Ct. 1441 , 182 L.Ed.2d 497 (2012). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dean v. Com., Dept. of Transp.
green
2 sentences2018Cageys’ Brief at 5 (citing Dean, 751 A.2d at 1133 ). 2018Cageys' Brief at 5 (citing Dean , 751 A.2d at 1133 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Mognet
green
2 sentences2014This Court’s decision in Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Mognet, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 1 , 645 A.2d 1370 (1994), is instructive on the application of the exception in this case. 2014This Court’s decision in Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Mognet, 166 Pa.Cmwlth. 1 , 645 A.2d 1370 (1994), is instructive on the application of the exception in this case. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2009United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 , 61 S.Ct. 1011 , 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1941); United States v. Dansby, 509 F.Supp. 188 (N.D.Ohio 1981). *1275 Carney concedes that 38 U.S.C. § 3720 (a)(6) constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity from state and local taxation on property owned by the V.A. 2009United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 , 61 S.Ct. 1011 , 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1941); United States v. Dansby, 509 F.Supp. 188 (N.D.Ohio 1981). *1275 Carney concedes that 38 U.S.C. § 3720 (a)(6) constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity from state and local taxation on property owned by the V.A. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Dansby
green
1 sentence2009United States v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 274 , 61 S.Ct. 1011 , 85 L.Ed. 1327 (1941); United States v. Dansby, 509 F.Supp. 188 (N.D.Ohio 1981). *1275 Carney concedes that 38 U.S.C. § 3720 (a)(6) constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity from state and local taxation on property owned by the V.A. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways
green
2 sentences1979This legislation, which was a response to our Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978), expressly provided that a waiver of sovereign immunity would operate in eight enumerated categories. 1979This legislation, which was a response to our Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384 , 388 A.2d 709 (1978), expressly provided that a waiver of sovereign immunity would operate in eight enumerated categories. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Freach v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1977The Court in Freach, supra, held: *340 [Legislative authorization of suits against the Commonwealth is not to be inferred from language which less than clearly expresses an intent to subject the Commonwealth to suit. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
BROWN v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1973Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566 , 305 A. 2d 868 (1973), confirmed the Commonwealth’s immunity from vicarious liability in actions ex delicto, again holding that the immunity is founded in the Constitution and that the immunity does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and concludes: “Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be modified in this Commonwealth is a legislative question.” Accordingly, URA’s demurrer to the complaint must be sustained and the complaint, as to URA, must be dismissed. 1973Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566 , 305 A. 2d 868 (1973), confirmed the Commonwealth’s immunity from vicarious liability in actions ex delicto, again holding that the immunity is founded in the Constitution and that the immunity does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and concludes: “Whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be modified in this Commonwealth is a legislative question.” Accordingly, URA’s demurrer to the complaint must be sustained and the complaint, as to URA, must be dismissed. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission
green
1 sentence1973But Rader v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 407 Pa. 609 (1962), holds that the cited language “powers ... to sue and be sued” does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity from vicarious liability in ex delicto actions but “applies only to those actions necessary to carry out the ordinary business and functions of the Commission or Agency.” Page 615. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
United States v. Norwegian Barque Thekla
green
2 sentences1946Against the background of complete immunity we find no congressional action modifying the immunity rule in favor of cross-actions beyond the amount necessary as a set-off.” The court then proceeded to distinguish the ease of United States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328 , 69 L. 1946Against the background of complete immunity we find no congressional action modifying the immunity rule in favor of cross-actions beyond the amount necessary as a set-off.” The court then proceeded to distinguish the ease of United States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328 , 69 L. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.