finality presumption in Florida

2020See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1243 (Fla. 2004) (citing McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 , 1391–92 (Fla. 1983) (Alderman, C.J. concurring) (holding that courts must limit successive postconviction cases and bar postconviction “attacks” on appellate courts “to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice.”) (emphasis added).

2008See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (incessant filings of frivolous motions impose costs both in time and paperwork, burdening the court's staff and delaying disposition of meritorious pleadings); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004) (a limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment, and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal justice system); Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (defendant's pro se filings were frivolous, an abuse of proces

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants); Henderson v. State, 903 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting “this court is not going to listen to this argument any longer,” in reference to same claim argued by defendant over more than two decades); Freeman v. State, 885 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (recognizi

2005See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice); Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752, 753-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“frequent filers” cause heavy burden; post-conviction caseload almost doubled in last ten years without any accompanying increase in central staff).

2020See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236, 1243 (Fla. 2004) (citing McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 , 1391–92 (Fla. 1983) (Alderman, C.J. concurring) (holding that courts must limit successive postconviction cases and bar postconviction “attacks” on appellate courts “to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice.”) (emphasis added).

2010The two-year statute of limitations was added “[i]n order to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice.” Id.; see also Fla. Bar re: Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 3.850), 460 So.2d 907 (Fla.1984); McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388, 1391-92 (Fla.1983) (Alderman, C.J., concurring in result only).

2005See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice); Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752, 753-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“frequent filers” cause heavy burden; post-conviction caseload almost doubled in last ten years without any accompanying increase in central staff).

2005See Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice); Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752, 753-54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“frequent filers” cause heavy burden; post-conviction caseload almost doubled in last 10 years without any accompanying increase in central staff).

2008See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (incessant filings of frivolous motions impose costs both in time and paperwork, burdening the court's staff and delaying disposition of meritorious pleadings); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004) (a limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment, and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal justice system); Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (defendant's pro se filings were frivolous, an abuse of proces

2008See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (finding that incessant filings of frivolous motions impose costs both in time and paperwork, burdening court's staff and delaying disposition of meritorious pleadings); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004) (explaining that a limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment, and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal justice system); Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (ruling defendant's pro se filings we

2008See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (incessant filings of frivolous motions impose costs both in time and paperwork, burdening the court's staff and delaying disposition of meritorious pleadings); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004) (a limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment, and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal justice system); Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (defendant's pro se filings were frivolous, an abuse of proces

2008See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 251 F.3d 594, 596 (7th Cir.2001) (finding that incessant filings of frivolous motions impose costs both in time and paperwork, burdening court's staff and delaying disposition of meritorious pleadings); Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Fla.2004) (explaining that a limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment, and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal justice system); Britt v. State, 931 So.2d 209, 210 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (ruling defendant's pro se filings we

2006This court is not going to listen to this argument any longer."); Freeman v. State, 885 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)(holding that there is a need to limit successive claims to give due weight to the finality and presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal system of justice).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants); Henderson v. State, 903 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting “this court is not going to listen to this argument any longer,” in reference to same claim argued by defendant over more than two decades); Freeman v. State, 885 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (recognizi

2004See, e.g., Gaffney v. State, 878 So.2d 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410-11 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal system of justice).

2004See, e.g., Gaffney v. State, 878 So.2d 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Proctor v. State, 869 So.2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); see also Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla.2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice).

2011See id. at 925 .

2002Third, the change in law must constitute a major constitutional change of fundamental significance "where unfairness [is] so fundamental in either process or substance that the doctrine of finality [has] to be set aside." Id. at 927 .

2019See Kiefer v. Sunset Beach Invs., LLC, 207 So. 3d 1008 , 1009–10 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).

2016Co., 484 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Fla.1986); see also Pino, 121 So.3d at 33-41 (identifying and rejecting other potential exceptions to the finality of a rule 1.420(a)(1) dismissal),- Because a trial court necessarily has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction, the filing of a rule 1.540(b) motion after a case has been voluntarily dismissed vests the trial court with the limited authority to determine whether the grounds asserted by the movant justify relief under the rule.

2016Miller, 484 So.2d at 1223-24 ; Lee & Sakahara Assocs., AIA, Inc. v. Boykin Mgmt.

2016Co., 484 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Fla.1986); see also Pino, 121 So.3d at 33-41 (identifying and rejecting other potential exceptions to the finality of a rule 1.420(a)(1) dismissal),- Because a trial court necessarily has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction, the filing of a rule 1.540(b) motion after a case has been voluntarily dismissed vests the trial court with the limited authority to determine whether the grounds asserted by the movant justify relief under the rule.

2015See Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1098 (Fed.Cir.2001) (stating “that a taking may occur by reason of ‘extraordinary delay in governmental decisionmaking,’” but that “delay in the permitting process may be attributable to the applicant as well as the government.” (citation omitted)).

2015Although “extraordinary delay” may obviate the finality requirement, see Grosscup v. Pantano, 725 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1379 (S.D.Fla,2010),.the record establishes the delay in this case can be attributed to Murray’s failure to provide the County with needed additional information regarding matters other than the contested development rights.

2014See Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir.2000) (“It is widely recognized that the finality requirement is less stringent for issue preclusion than for claim preclusion.”); see also Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos.

2014Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir.1979) (stating that an interlocutory decision “will be given preclusive effect if it is necessarily based upon a determination that constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the plaintiffs success on the merits”). “ ‘[F]or purposes of issue preclusion ..., “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.’ ” Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339 n. 47 (quoting Restatement (Sec ond) Judgments § 13 (1980)).

2014Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir.1979) (stating that an interlocutory decision “will be given preclusive effect if it is necessarily based upon a determination that constitutes an insuperable obstacle to the plaintiffs success on the merits”). “ ‘[F]or purposes of issue preclusion ..., “final judgment” includes any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect.’ ” Christo, 223 F.3d at 1339 n. 47 (quoting Restatement (Sec ond) Judgments § 13 (1980)).

2013See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 342-43, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 (concluding that the property owner, who alleged a “taking” claim, had not met the finality requirement, even though the planning commission denied the landowner’s sole subdivision proposal and the county board of supervisors affirmed because the tentative subdivision map was inconsistent with the general county plan and with specific zoning regulations; the record held open “the possibility that some development [would] be permitted”); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 190, 193-94 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 (concluding that the pla

2013See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 342-43, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 (concluding that the property owner, who alleged a “taking” claim, had not met the finality requirement, even though the planning commission denied the landowner’s sole subdivision proposal and the county board of supervisors affirmed because the tentative subdivision map was inconsistent with the general county plan and with specific zoning regulations; the record held open “the possibility that some development [would] be permitted”); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 190, 193-94 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 (concluding that the pla

2013See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 342-43, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 (concluding that the property owner, who alleged a “taking” claim, had not met the finality requirement, even though the planning commission denied the landowner’s sole subdivision proposal and the county board of supervisors affirmed because the tentative subdivision map was inconsistent with the general county plan and with specific zoning regulations; the record held open “the possibility that some development [would] be permitted”); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 190, 193-94 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 (concluding that the pla

2013See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U.S. at 342-43, 351-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2561 (concluding that the property owner, who alleged a “taking” claim, had not met the finality requirement, even though the planning commission denied the landowner’s sole subdivision proposal and the county board of supervisors affirmed because the tentative subdivision map was inconsistent with the general county plan and with specific zoning regulations; the record held open “the possibility that some development [would] be permitted”); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 190, 193-94 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 (concluding that the pla

2012See State v. Huerta, 38 So.3d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (rejecting defendant’s argument that state appeal from resentencing order was untimely; state not required to appeal from earlier order granting rule 3.800 motion because judicial labor was not complete until resen-tencing); State v. Rudolf, 821 So.2d 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (dismissing state appeal from order granting rule 3.800 motion because said motion “did not create a new, separate proceeding.

2010P. 3.850(b). 2 “After the time for filing 3.850 motions has passed, the State’s interests in finality are more compelling.” State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111, 118 (Fla. 2005); see also McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388, 1391 (Fla.1983) (Alderman, C.J., concurring specially) (calling for a time limit for filing postconviction motions “[i]n order to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public’s confidence in our criminal system of justice”).

2010In James v. State, 974 So.2d 365, 368 (Fla.2008), a decision in which I concurred, we were concerned that “a mere change of mind” not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for setting aside a previous waiver.

2010In James v. State, 974 So.2d 365, 368 (Fla.2008), a decision in which I concurred, we were concerned that "a mere change of mind" not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for setting aside a previous waiver.

2010In Johnson v. State, 536 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla.1988), the court explained the balance it had attempted to strike: The credibility of the criminal justice system depends upon both fairness and finality.

2010In Johnson v. State, 536 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Fla.1988), the court explained the balance it had attempted to strike: The credibility of the criminal justice system depends upon both fairness and finality.

2009As Justice Harding observed in his dissent in Leroux , easy entitlement to postconviction relief "damages the doctrine of finality." 689 So.2d at 238 (Harding, J., dissenting).

2009As Justice Harding observed in his dissent in Leroux , easy entitlement to post-conviction relief “damages the doctrine of finality.” 689 So.2d at 238 (Harding, J., dissenting).

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants); Henderson v. State, 903 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting “this court is not going to listen to this argument any longer,” in reference to same claim argued by defendant over more than two decades); Freeman v. State, 885 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (recognizi

2006See Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”); see also Glasco v. State, 914 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (recognizing frivolous collateral appeals clog the courts and hurt meritorious appeals by inviting sweeping rulings and by engendering judicial impatience with all defendants); Henderson v. State, 903 So.2d 999, 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting “this court is not going to listen to this argument any longer,” in reference to same claim argued by defendant over more than two decades); Freeman v. State, 885 So.2d 477, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (recognizi

2004See, e.g., Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 , 2004 WL 439879 (Fla. Mar.11, 2004) (limit on successive claims is necessary to give due weight to the finality and the presumption of legality of a final judgment and to restore the public's confidence in our criminal system of justice); Young v. State, 852 So.2d 368, 369 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("As it has for others, the number thirteen has proven to be unlucky for [defendant]."); Isley v. State, 652 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (re-raising arguments "heard, considered, and rejected ... is an abuse of process").