finality requirement in Oregon

2019That would be a pointless act that would undermine the finality of claim clo- sure and the policy of the workers’ compensation system “to reduce litigation.” See ORS 656.012(2)(b); Murphy v. Nilsen, 19 Or App 292 , 300 n 3, 527 P2d 736 (1974) (the court should not presume that the legislature intended that a useless act should be done).

2019That would be a pointless act that would undermine the finality of claim clo- sure and the policy of the workers’ compensation system “to reduce litigation.” See ORS 656.012(2)(b); Murphy v. Nilsen, 19 Or App 292 , 300 n 3, 527 P2d 736 (1974) (the court should not presume that the legislature intended that a useless act should be done).

2010The Court stated: "While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 193 , 105 S.Ct. 3108 . [9] The district court's analysis is consistent with other fede

2010The Court stated: “While the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap, the finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and obtain a remedy if the decision is found to be unlawful or otherwise inappropriate.” Williamson, 473 US at 193 .

2005Plaintiffs also rely on Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6 , 725 P2d 886 (1986), but they appear to do so only to argue, in response to intervenors, that the agreement constituted an “order,” not to urge that it was a “final order.” Ellis in fact provides no guidance on the finality analysis, and only uncertain guidance on the question of what qualifies as an order at all for purposes of the APA.

2005Plaintiffs also rely on Ellis v. Roberts, 302 Or 6 , 725 P2d 886 (1986), but they appear to do so only to argue, in response to intervenors, that the agreement constituted an “order,” not to urge that it was a “final order.” Ellis in fact provides no guidance on the finality analysis, and only uncertain guidance on the question of what qualifies as an order at all for purposes of the APA.

1986These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1977), authorize appeals without Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of `an order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment,' Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphasis added) United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d [772] at 778; or (3) th

1986These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1977), authorize appeals without Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of `an order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment,' Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphasis added) United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d [772] at 778; or (3) th

1986These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1977), authorize appeals without Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of `an order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment,' Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphasis added) United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d [772] at 778; or (3) th

1986These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977), authorize appeals without Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of ‘an order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment,’ Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphasis added) United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d at 778; or (3) the rul

1986It has been specifically followed in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th and 11th Circuits and the States of Alabama and Hawaii. [7] In Ryan v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 577 F.2d 298, 301 , (5th Cir.1978), the 5th Circuit distinguished that case from Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, supra , in the following language: "In the absence of a Rule 54(b) certification and entry of judgment, we may not entertain appeals from partial dispositions or orders unless they fall within certain limited exceptions to the usual finality rule.

1963The workman has advanced most of the same arguments that were rejected in White v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 227 Or 306 , 362 P2d 302 (1961).

1963The workman has advanced most of the same arguments that were rejected in White v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 227 Or 306 , 362 P2d 302 (1961).

1958The decision followed the holding in Town of Beloit v. Morgan, supra, and held that the outcome of the first action barred the maintenance of the second action.

1958The decision followed the holding in Town of Beloit v. Morgan, supra, and held that the outcome of the first action barred the maintenance of the second action.

1954In response to the first question raised by defendant’s plea of former adjudication, we hold that the decree in the earlier suit between the parties was a decision on the merits, final in character and a bar to another suit upon the same cause. *705 The scope and inelnsiveness of such a judgment rendered on the merits is stated in Crow v. Abraham, 86 Or 99, 105 , 167 P 590 , in these words: “* * * When a judgment is rendered upon the merits in a former action, such determination operates as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution or defense of a subsequent action, and is a finality as to the

1954In response to the first question raised by defendant’s plea of former adjudication, we hold that the decree in the earlier suit between the parties was a decision on the merits, final in character and a bar to another suit upon the same cause. *705 The scope and inelnsiveness of such a judgment rendered on the merits is stated in Crow v. Abraham, 86 Or 99, 105 , 167 P 590 , in these words: “* * * When a judgment is rendered upon the merits in a former action, such determination operates as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution or defense of a subsequent action, and is a finality as to the