finality requirement in Massachusetts

2023See also Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 181 (1999) (noting tension between constantly evolving nature of science and doctrine of finality).

2018See also Commonwealth v. LeFave , 430 Mass. 169 , 181, 714 N.E.2d 805 (1999) (discussing "conflict between the constantly evolving nature of science and the doctrine of finality").

2005“Confining the right to get appellate review of discovery orders to cases where the party [or witness] against whom the order was directed cared enough to incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method ... of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them.” Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 529 (1984), quoting Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).

1992In all other cases, the appeal must await the outcome of the trial proceedings. 11 As to Price Waterhouse, we reiterate that “[c]onfining the right to get appellate review of discovery orders to cases where the party against whom the order was directed cared enough to incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method ... of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them.” Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984).

2005“Confining the right to get appellate review of discovery orders to cases where the party [or witness] against whom the order was directed cared enough to incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method ... of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them.” Cronin v. Strayer, 392 Mass. 525, 529 (1984), quoting Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).

1986In that case, we acknowledged the interlocutory nature of such an order, id. at 529-530 , and we adopted the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit expressed in Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1158 (7th Cir. 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985), that “[c]onfining the right to get appellate review of discovery orders to cases where the party [or witness] against whom the order was directed cared enough to incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method ... of identifying the most burdensome discov

2023See Edwards, petitioner, 464 Mass. 454, 460 (2013) (reaching question related to fee charged by expert in sexually dangerous person case).

2023See Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 874 (2013), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (2014). 7 We recognize that, on occasion, appellate courts have carved out exceptions to the finality rule set forth in the ICCL, thereby allowing a direct appeal of a fee decision to proceed.

2023See Commonwealth v. Carr, 464 Mass. 855, 874 (2013), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (2014). 7 We recognize that, on occasion, appellate courts have carved out exceptions to the finality rule set forth in the ICCL, thereby allowing a direct appeal of a fee decision to proceed.

2019See, e.g., Surland , 392 Md. at 24 -25 , 895 A.2d 1034 ("when a conviction is appealed, it loses finality until the appeal is resolved and should not be permitted to stand when the defendant's death prevents the appellate court from adjudicating [its] validity"); Brass v. State , 130 Nev. 318 , 322, 325 P.3d 1256 (2014) (alternative of "[o]utright dismissal could prevent a defendant's family *118 from potentially clearing a loved one's name"); Ekinici , 191 Misc. 2d at 517 , 743 N.Y.S.2d 651 ("rationale of abating the appeal and dismissing the indictment after the death of a defendant is that

2019See, e.g., Surland , 392 Md. at 24 -25 , 895 A.2d 1034 ("when a conviction is appealed, it loses finality until the appeal is resolved and should not be permitted to stand when the defendant's death prevents the appellate court from adjudicating [its] validity"); Brass v. State , 130 Nev. 318 , 322, 325 P.3d 1256 (2014) (alternative of "[o]utright dismissal could prevent a defendant's family *118 from potentially clearing a loved one's name"); Ekinici , 191 Misc. 2d at 517 , 743 N.Y.S.2d 651 ("rationale of abating the appeal and dismissing the indictment after the death of a defendant is that

2019See, e.g., Surland , 392 Md. at 24 -25 , 895 A.2d 1034 ("when a conviction is appealed, it loses finality until the appeal is resolved and should not be permitted to stand when the defendant's death prevents the appellate court from adjudicating [its] validity"); Brass v. State , 130 Nev. 318 , 322, 325 P.3d 1256 (2014) (alternative of "[o]utright dismissal could prevent a defendant's family *118 from potentially clearing a loved one's name"); Ekinici , 191 Misc. 2d at 517 , 743 N.Y.S.2d 651 ("rationale of abating the appeal and dismissing the indictment after the death of a defendant is that

2012In this regard, to merit a new trial and overcome the Commonwealth’s recognized “interest in finality”; id.; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 54-55 (1997) (community interest in finality, which insures integrity and predictability of judicial procedures); see generally Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. at 181 (doctrine of finality); the defendant must establish that the new evidence “casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. at 305 ; Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 181, 195 (2011).

2012In this regard, to merit a new trial and overcome the Commonwealth’s recognized “interest in finality”; id.; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 54-55 (1997) (community interest in finality, which insures integrity and predictability of judicial procedures); see generally Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. at 181 (doctrine of finality); the defendant must establish that the new evidence “casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction.” Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. at 305 ; Commonwealth v. Rosario, 460 Mass. 181, 195 (2011).

2001See Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 780-782 (1988); Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597-600 (1988).

2001See Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 780-782 (1988); Maddocks v. Ricker, 403 Mass. 592, 597-600 (1988).

1984See United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 623 F.2d 720, 724 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980) (“Well established doctrine regarding the appealability of interlocutory orders suggests that the burden of incurring a contempt citation is not an unreasonable one to impose on a party [or a witness] seeking review of a question that will otherwise become moot”).

1984See, e.g., Honig v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 404 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Fried, supra. But see Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 380 U.S. 964 (1965). 6 Moreover, “[c]onfining the right to get appellate review of discovery orders to cases where the party [or witness] against whom the order was directed cared enough to incur a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method ... of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them.” Marrese v. American Academy *530 of

1984See United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 623 F.2d 720, 724 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980) (“Well established doctrine regarding the appealability of interlocutory orders suggests that the burden of incurring a contempt citation is not an unreasonable one to impose on a party [or a witness] seeking review of a question that will otherwise become moot”).