25 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1961–2026 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bayberry Associates v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2026Although the appellate courts have held that this Court may suspend the finality requirement for good cause shown, “we will not suspend Rule 3 as a mere convenience or to work an end-run around Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, or Rules 9 and 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990); see also Barton v. Keller, No. W2024-00735-COA-R3-JV, 2025 WL 1091645 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2025). 2024See Bayberry Assocs., 783 S.W.2d at 559 (holding that the finality requirement of Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure could be waived under Tenn. R. | 11 | 11 |
United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.green2 sentences2023Schaefer, 356 U.S. at 232 (considering as part of the finality analysis whether the order on appeal “clearly evidences the judge’s intention that it shall be his final act in the case”); Kerr-McGee Chem. 2023Schaefer, 356 U.S. at 232 (considering as part of the finality analysis whether the order on appeal “clearly evidences the judge’s intention that it shall be his final act in the case”); Kerr-McGee Chem. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Osbornegreen2 sentences2023For example, in State v. Osborne, 712 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tenn. Crim. 2023For example, in State v. Osborne, 712 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co.green2 sentences2023Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 570 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that “[i]f the judge had overlooked [a particular] dispute . . . , then the decision would be final—for the district court would have completed everything it set out to accomplish—and we would remand so that the job could be finished”). 2023Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 570 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that “[i]f the judge had overlooked [a particular] dispute . . . , then the decision would be final—for the district court would have completed everything it set out to accomplish—and we would remand so that the job could be finished”). | 2 | 2 |
Richardson v. Tennessee Board of Dentistrygreen1 sentence2025As highlighted by EMCF in its briefing, this Court has previously stated that “[r]es judicata and collateral estoppel apply only if the prior judgment concludes the rights of the parties on the merits.” Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. Of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995) (citing A.L. | 1 | 1 |
Karen Johnson v. Beverly Nunis and Farmer's Insurance Exchangegreen1 sentence2024Rule 54.02 is “an exception to Rule 3 that permits the trial court, without permission from the appellate court, to certify an order as final and appealable, even if parts of the overall litigation remain pending in the trial court.” Johnson v. Nunis, 383 S.W.3d 122, 130 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Christopher J. White v. Lisa M. Johnson v. City of Memphis, Tennesseegreen1 sentence2021See White v. Johnson, 522 S.W.3d 417 , 421 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Bayberry Assocs. v. Jones, 783 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (“[W]e find no bar to the suspension of Rule 3(a).”)). | 1 | 1 |
Stacy Foster-Henderson v. Memphis Health Center, Inc.green1 sentence2021“Except where otherwise provided, this Court only has subject matter jurisdiction over final orders.” Foster-Henderson v. Memphis Health Center, Inc., 479 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Comergreen1 sentence2010See Comer, 278 S.W.3d at 761 ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-5-108 (a)(1). -2- This court has recently issued diverging opinions concerning whether it has jurisdiction in cases where, as here, the judgment of conviction does not provide the amount of, or set a schedule for, restitution payments. | 1 | 1 |
Clements v. Pearsongreen1 sentence1997Clements v. Pearson, 352 S.W.2d 236, 237 (Tenn. 1961) (quoting 21 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parker v. Lambert
green
2 sentences2021See also, e.g., Hopwood v. Hopwood, No. M2016-01752-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2964886 , at *3 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017) (suspending the finality requirements because of the “the grave nature of proceedings seeking to incarcerate litigants,” despite the fact that the trial court did not rule on a request for attorney’s fees); In Re Estate of Goza, No. W2013-00678-COA- R3-CV, 2014 WL 7235166 , at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014) (suspending the finality requirement after consideration of “the immense amount of resources already expended in this litigation” in which the parties had “already 2019See also, e.g., Hopwood v. Hopwood, No. M2016-01752-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2964886 , at *3 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 2017) (suspending the finality requirements because of the “the grave nature of proceedings seeking to incarcerate litigants,” despite the fact that the trial court did not rule on a request for attorney’s fees); In Re Estate of Goza, No. W2013-00678-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 7235166 , at *3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2014) (suspending the finality requirement after consideration of “the immense amount of resources already expended in this litigation” in which the parties had “already a | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Briley v. Chapman
green
1 sentence2016For example, in Briley v. Chapman, 182 S.W.3d 884 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005), we addressed a situation similar to the one before us here. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Wetzel
green
2 sentences2011Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 , 96 S.Ct. 1202 , 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976))). -4- On April 4, 2011, Tennessee Farmers responded to our March order with a motion to suspend the finality requirement of Rule 3. 2011Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 744 , 96 S.Ct. 1202 , 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976))). -4- On April 4, 2011, Tennessee Farmers responded to our March order with a motion to suspend the finality requirement of Rule 3. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
United States v. Denedo
green
1 sentence2010United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. at ___ , 129 S. Ct. at 2223 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Massey v. Taylor
green
1 sentence1961In Massey v. Taylor, 45 Tenn. 447 (1868) a store clerk having been acquitted of a criminal charge of embezzlement sued to recover on a quantum meruit the value of his services up to the time of his discharge; the plea of the defendant store owners that they owed him nothing because of his embezzlement was met by a replication setting up his acquittal in the criminal trial. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.