finality rule in South Dakota

1998On the other hand, in Larsen, 509 N.W.2d at 709 , reopening was denied not only because the settlement agreement was deemed final, but also because the claimant sustained “no change of physical condition since settlement.” Likewise with Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 851 , recovery of additional benefits was precluded after an approved settlement agreement because the claimant failed to show a change in physical condition. [¶ 11.] South Dakota’s statutory exception to the finality rule is found in SDCL 62-7-33: Any payment, including medical payments under 62-4-1, made or to be made under this title m

1995Welch’s Memorandum (Form 111) does “not contain language which le[aves] open a pending issue.” Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 850 .

1936It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with- them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or- 'demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * ‘Where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of .action the inquiry must always toe as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might *276 have be

1905A. 493, and on a rehearing in 6 S. D. 180, 60 N. W. 803 , and in the latter case this court held: “A judgment, if rendered upon the merits, is a finality as to the claim or demand in con" troversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which is offered to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” And in the opinion this court quoted with approval from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 , in which the distincti

1998Under this statute, the Department has continuing jurisdiction to review “any payment” when there has been a physical change in the employee’s condition from that of the last award. 4 See Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944) which interpreted the predecessor statute: By the provisions of this statute the filing of the agreement conferred continuing jurisdiction upon the Industrial Commissioner for the determination of all questions of future liability due to the original injury and based on changes in the condition of the employee occurring subsequent to the origin

1998Under this statute, the Department has continuing jurisdiction to review “any payment” when there has been a physical change in the employee’s condition from that of the last award. 4 See Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944) which interpreted the predecessor statute: By the provisions of this statute the filing of the agreement conferred continuing jurisdiction upon the Industrial Commissioner for the determination of all questions of future liability due to the original injury and based on changes in the condition of the employee occurring subsequent to the origin

1989Keith, 64 S.D., at 275-6 , 266 N.W., at 257 (quoting, in part, Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195, 198 (1876)).

1989Keith, 64 S.D., at 275-6 , 266 N.W., at 257 (quoting, in part, Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195, 198 (1876)).

1941Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256 , 104 A.L.R. 1471 ; Davis v. Davis, 24 S. D. 474, 124 N. W. 715 ; Brown v. Hollister, 21 S. D. 272, 111 N. W. 564 ; Remilliard v. Authier, 20 S. D. 290, 105 N. W. 626 , 4 L.R.A., N.S., 295; Noyes v. Belding, 6 S. D. 629, 62 N. W. 953 ; Howard v. City of Huron, 6 S. D. 180, 60 N. W. 803 .

1908This court in the case of Howard v. City of Huron, 5 S. D. 539, 59 N. W. 833 , after quite a full review of the authorities, held ■that a judgment is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, qoncluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter that was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and that where a party has had his day in court, and an opportunity to make any defense that he may have to an action, and he makes such defense, and iit is dec

2020As it relates to SDCL 62-7-33, our 2011 decision in Stuckey v. Sturgis Pizza Ranch simply acknowledged, again, that the statute is the means by which a party in a workers’ compensation action can seek to modify a previous award of benefits. 2011 S.D. 1, ¶ 27 , 793 N.W.2d 378, 389 . [¶42.] Our subsequent decision in Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advertising, Inc. directly rejected an employer’s effort to use a compulsory IME to unilaterally terminate workers’ compensation benefits, but it did so under previously established legal principles, including SDCL 62-7-33. 2014 S.D. 64, ¶ 29 , 834

2020As it relates to SDCL 62-7-33, our 2011 decision in Stuckey v. Sturgis Pizza Ranch simply acknowledged, again, that the statute is the means by which a party in a workers’ compensation action can seek to modify a previous award of benefits. 2011 S.D. 1, ¶ 27 , 793 N.W.2d 378, 389 . [¶42.] Our subsequent decision in Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advertising, Inc. directly rejected an employer’s effort to use a compulsory IME to unilaterally terminate workers’ compensation benefits, but it did so under previously established legal principles, including SDCL 62-7-33. 2014 S.D. 64, ¶ 29 , 834

2020As it relates to SDCL 62-7-33, our 2011 decision in Stuckey v. Sturgis Pizza Ranch simply acknowledged, again, that the statute is the means by which a party in a workers’ compensation action can seek to modify a previous award of benefits. 2011 S.D. 1, ¶ 27 , 793 N.W.2d 378, 389 . [¶42.] Our subsequent decision in Hayes v. Rosenbaum Signs & Outdoor Advertising, Inc. directly rejected an employer’s effort to use a compulsory IME to unilaterally terminate workers’ compensation benefits, but it did so under previously established legal principles, including SDCL 62-7-33. 2014 S.D. 64, ¶ 29 , 834

2006That statute provides in part: Any payment, including medical payments under § 62-4-1, and disability payments under § 62-4-3 if the earnings have substantially changed since the date of injury, made or to be made *455 under this title may be reviewed by the Department of Labor pursuant to § 62-7-12 at the written request of the employer or of the employee and on such review payments may-be ended, diminished, increased, or awarded subject to the maximum or minimum amounts provided for in this title, if the department finds that a change in the condition-of the employee warrants such action[] (

1993Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 850-52 citing Call, supra; Stender v. City of Miller, 82 S.D. 334 , 145 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944).

1993Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 850-52 citing Call, supra; Stender v. City of Miller, 82 S.D. 334 , 145 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944).

1993Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 850 -52 citing Call, supra ; Stender v. City of Miller, 82 S.D. 334 , 145 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944).

1993Whitney, 453 N.W.2d at 850-52 citing Call, supra; Stender v. City of Miller, 82 S.D. 334 , 145 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Middleton v. City of Watertown, 70 S.D. 158 , 16 N.W.2d 39 (1944).

1955Ramsey Township v. Lake County, 68 S.D. 67 , 298 N.W. 356 .

1955Ramsey Township v. Lake County, 68 S.D. 67 , 298 N.W. 356 .

1941Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256 , 104 A.L.R. 1471 ; Davis v. Davis, 24 S. D. 474, 124 N. W. 715 ; Brown v. Hollister, 21 S. D. 272, 111 N. W. 564 ; Remilliard v. Authier, 20 S. D. 290, 105 N. W. 626 , 4 L.R.A., N.S., 295; Noyes v. Belding, 6 S. D. 629, 62 N. W. 953 ; Howard v. City of Huron, 6 S. D. 180, 60 N. W. 803 .

1941Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256 , 104 A.L.R. 1471 ; Davis v. Davis, 24 S. D. 474, 124 N. W. 715 ; Brown v. Hollister, 21 S. D. 272, 111 N. W. 564 ; Remilliard v. Authier, 20 S. D. 290, 105 N. W. 626 , 4 L.R.A., N.S., 295; Noyes v. Belding, 6 S. D. 629, 62 N. W. 953 ; Howard v. City of Huron, 6 S. D. 180, 60 N. W. 803 .

1941Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256 , 104 A.L.R. 1471 ; Davis v. Davis, 24 S. D. 474, 124 N. W. 715 ; Brown v. Hollister, 21 S. D. 272, 111 N. W. 564 ; Remilliard v. Authier, 20 S. D. 290, 105 N. W. 626 , 4 L.R.A., N.S., 295; Noyes v. Belding, 6 S. D. 629, 62 N. W. 953 ; Howard v. City of Huron, 6 S. D. 180, 60 N. W. 803 .

1936It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with- them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or- 'demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * ‘Where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of .action the inquiry must always toe as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might *276 have be

1908This court in the case of Howard v. City of Huron, 5 S. D. 539, 59 N. W. 833 , after quite a full review of the authorities, held ■that a judgment is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, qoncluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter that was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and that where a party has had his day in court, and an opportunity to make any defense that he may have to an action, and he makes such defense, and iit is dec

1905Such demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground whatever.” As was stated by the Supreme Court of Nevada in the case above cited, and is often stated, at common law, a judgment in ejectment was not conclusive as an estoppel in a subsequent action, but the reason for that rule is thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Miles v. Caldwell, 2 Wall. 35 : “One reason why the verdict cannot be made conclusive in these cases is obviously due to the fictitious character of the action.