finality requirement in Texas

2010See e.g., Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Eur. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 345 , 348 (7th Cir. 1994)(arbitral “interim order of security” found to be a final award because the order was necessary to prevent the final award from becoming meaningless); Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1991)(arbitral “interim final order” providing temporary equitable relief necessary to make potential final award meaningful found to be final and subject to confirmation).

2010See e.g., Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Eur. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 345 , 348 (7th Cir.1994) (arbitral “interim order of security” found to be a final award because the order was necessary to prevent the final award from becoming meaningless); Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1991) (arbitral “interim final order” providing temporary equitable relief necessary to make potential final award meaningful found to be final and subject to confirmation).

2010See e.g., Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Eur. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 345 , 348 (7th Cir. 1994)(arbitral “interim order of security” found to be a final award because the order was necessary to prevent the final award from becoming meaningless); Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1991)(arbitral “interim final order” providing temporary equitable relief necessary to make potential final award meaningful found to be final and subject to confirmation).

2010See e.g., Yasuda Fire & Marine Insurance Company of Eur. v. Cont'l Casualty Co., 37 F.3d 345 , 348 (7th Cir.1994) (arbitral “interim order of security” found to be a final award because the order was necessary to prevent the final award from becoming meaningless); Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Reinsurance Corp., 935 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1991) (arbitral “interim final order” providing temporary equitable relief necessary to make potential final award meaningful found to be final and subject to confirmation).

2010Id. (citing Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston, 243 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) and Madero Dev., 803 S.W.2d at 399 ).

2010Id. (citing Maguire Oil Co. v. City of Houston , 243 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) and Madero Dev. , 803 S.W.2d at 399 ).

2015REV. 953, 971 (2000) rule, 39 S.W.3d 191 , 2001 Tex. LEXIS 6, *23 , or (2) nu- ("Despite the appeal of the certainty provided by this merous other types of orders, when even the majority bright-line rule, the reality is that still, after seven years, acknowledges that "the ordinary expectation" supporting it continues to operate as a trap for unwary litigants, a finality presumption "simply does not exist when some bringing about arguably unjust and oftentimes draconian form of judgment is rendered without such a trial" be- results."); Swanda, Summary [**81] Judgment, cause "it is quite possib

2015REV. 953, 971 (2000) rule, 39 S.W.3d 191 , 2001 Tex. LEXIS 6, *23 , or (2) nu- ("Despite the appeal of the certainty provided by this merous other types of orders, when even the majority bright-line rule, the reality is that still, after seven years, acknowledges that "the ordinary expectation" supporting it continues to operate as a trap for unwary litigants, a finality presumption "simply does not exist when some bringing about arguably unjust and oftentimes draconian form of judgment is rendered without such a trial" be- results."); Swanda, Summary [**81] Judgment, cause "it is quite possib

2010Similarly, in John v. Marshall Health Services, Inc., 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex.2001) (per curiam), we held that even though a judgment failed to mention three defendants who had settled, the finality presumption applied to all parties.

2006The Texas Supreme Court therefore determined that the finality presumption was “entirely appropriate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc. , 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001) (holding that, although judgment did not expressly dispose of all parties, finality presumption nonetheless applied to all parties, including defendants not named in judgment, because plaintiff did not move for separate trials and instead proceeded to trial against certain defendants only).

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 , 102 S.Ct. 1486 , 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[wjhen a double-jeopardy violation has occur

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 , 102 S.Ct. 1486 , 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[wjhen a double-jeopardy violation has occur

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 , 102 S.Ct. 1486 , 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[wjhen a double-jeopardy violation has occur

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[w]hen a double-jeopardy violation has occurred, a writ of habeas corpus is a proper venue through which to chal

2014The finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decision maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that in- *104 fiicts an actual, concrete injury.” Id. at 579 (citations omitted). “ ‘There can be no ‘taking’ by eminent domain until this condition is complied with.’” Id. (quoting City of El Paso v. Madero Dev., 803 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied)).

2011The burden of establishing jurisdiction, of proving a justiciable controversy, clearly falls on the moving party.‖ City of El Paso v. Madero Dev., 803 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied). ―A ‗final decision‘ usually requires both a rejected development plan and the denial of a variance from the controlling regulations.‖ Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 929 (citing Williamson, 473 U.S. at 187–88). ―The same ‗final decision‘ requirement applies to determine the ripeness of as-applied due process and equal protection challenges to a land-use decision.‖ Id. at 930 .

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 , 109 S.Ct. 757 , 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 , 102 S.Ct. 1486 , 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[wjhen a double-jeopardy violation has occur

2013See also, United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 589 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (no legitimate interest in punishing defendants twice for the same conduct); Green v. Ohio, 455 U.S. 976, 979 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) (“The interests served by the finality requirement, though important, do not outweigh petitioner’s interest in receiving the full protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause and avoiding the irreparable injury of a second trial.”) We recently held that, “[w]hen a double-jeopardy violation has occurred, a writ of habeas corpus is a proper venue through which to chal

2023See id.

2023See id.

2016Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet. (citing Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.)).

2016Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet. (citing Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)).

2015Corp., No. 07–96–0369– because “it is quite possible, perhaps even probable these CV, 1998 WL 16033 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Jan. 12, 1998, days ... that any judgment rendered prior to a full-blown trial pet. denied) (not designated for publication) 1998 WL 16033 , is intended to dispose of only part of the case.” 39 S.W.3d at at *1; an agreed judgment, In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d at 315– 200. 16; a directed verdict, e.g., Polley v. Odom, 957 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tex.App.—Waco 1997, judgm't vacated); and a However, the Court's opinion here implicates finality of all severance order, Harris County Flood Cont

2015Corp., No. 07–96–0369– because “it is quite possible, perhaps even probable these CV, 1998 WL 16033 (Tex.App.—Amarillo Jan. 12, 1998, days ... that any judgment rendered prior to a full-blown trial pet. denied) (not designated for publication) 1998 WL 16033 , is intended to dispose of only part of the case.” 39 S.W.3d at at *1; an agreed judgment, In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d at 315– 200. 16; a directed verdict, e.g., Polley v. Odom, 957 S.W.2d 932, 943 (Tex.App.—Waco 1997, judgm't vacated); and a However, the Court's opinion here implicates finality of all severance order, Harris County Flood Cont

2014Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1988) (orig.proceeding); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2001).

2014Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).

2013Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715 , 718–19 (Tex. 2003)) (reaffirming the finality presumption for judgments rendered after a full trial on the merits); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. 2001) (“After a full trial on the merits, the statement in a judgment that all relief not requested is denied signifies finality; there is no expectation that the court tried only part of the case, absent an order for severance or separate trials.”)).

2011See Moritz v. Preiss , 121 S.W.3d 715 , 718–19 (Tex. 2003) (reaffirming the finality presumption for judgments rendered after a full trial on the merits); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. 2001) (“After a full trial on the merits, the statement in a judgment that all relief not requested is denied signifies finality; there is no expectation that the court tried only part of the case, absent an order for severance or separate trials.”).

1978As stated by the Supreme Court in Houston Terminal Land Co. v. Westergreen, 119 Tex. 204 , 27 S.W.2d 526, 527 (1930): “It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Collateral estoppel, often referred to as estoppel by judgment, also operates to prevent a question of law or an issue of fact which has once been litigated and adjudicated in a court

1978As stated by the Supreme Court in Houston Terminal Land Co. v. Westergreen, 119 Tex. 204 , 27 S.W.2d 526, 527 (1930): “It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” Collateral estoppel, often referred to as estoppel by judgment, also operates to prevent a question of law or an issue of fact which has once been litigated and adjudicated in a court

2006The Texas Supreme Court therefore determined that the finality presumption was “entirely appropriate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also John v. Marshall Health Servs., Inc. , 58 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex. 2001) (holding that, although judgment did not expressly dispose of all parties, finality presumption nonetheless applied to all parties, including defendants not named in judgment, because plaintiff did not move for separate trials and instead proceeded to trial against certain defendants only).

2003Moreover, we determined “there is nothing to indicate that the trial court did not intend the judgment to finally dispose of the entire case.” Id. at 740 ; see also Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 897-98 .

1955Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Tex. 132 , 27 S.W. 97, 99 . “ ‘ “It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” ’ ” Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebert, 130 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W.2d 242, 246 .

1955Freeman v. McAninch, 87 Tex. 132 , 27 S.W. 97, 99 . “ ‘ “It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.” ’ ” Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hebert, 130 Tex. 1 , 106 S.W.2d 242, 246 .

2019See Arbuckle v. State, 105 S.W.2d 219, 219 (Tex. Crim.

2016Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet. (citing Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.)).

2016Hernandez v. Seventh Day Adventist Corp., 54 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet. (citing Dear v. Russo, 973 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)).

2015See that, under the circumstances of this case, their planned Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 , 9–14, 108 S.Ct. 849 , development application and amended request for 3,600 units 856–59, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Village of Euclid v. Ambler were sufficient, and that any further applications would have Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 117–18, 71 L.Ed. been futile.

2015See that, under the circumstances of this case, their planned Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 , 9–14, 108 S.Ct. 849 , development application and amended request for 3,600 units 856–59, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Village of Euclid v. Ambler were sufficient, and that any further applications would have Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 , 47 S.Ct. 114 , 117–18, 71 L.Ed. been futile.