18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1970–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson Cityred2 sentences2005The Williamson opinion does state that its "final decision" requirement is not necessarily the same as requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, although "the policies underlying the two concepts often overlap ...." Williamson, 478 U.S. at 192-98, 105 S.Ct. at 3119-20 . [The finality requirement is concerned with whether the initial decisionmaker *534 has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; the exhaustion requirement generally refers to administrative and judicial procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse d 2005Id. at 193 , 105 S.Ct. at 3120 . | 1 | 2 |
Cotton v. Stategreen2 sentences2015A nunc pro tunc order is “‘an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date.’ ” Cotton v. State, 658 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind.1995) (quoting Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind. 95, 101 , 31 N.E. 670, 672 (1892)) (emphasis in original). 2015A nunc pro tunc order is “‘an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date.’” Cotton v. State, 658 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind. 1995) (quoting Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind. 95, 101 , 31 N.E. 670, 672 (1892)) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Artusi v. City of Mishawakagreen2 sentences2015However, “ ‘where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance[,]- the finality principle controls.’ ” Id. (quoting Sama, 530 N.E.2d at 115 ). [26] “Trial Rule 60(A) merely provides a remedy to correct by nunc pro tunc entry clerical errors in judgments, orders, etc., or errors arising from oversight or omissionf,]” but the rule “does not constitute a license to make judicial changes in the actual law or ruling of a case.” Artusi v. City of Mishawaka, 519 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. 2015However, “‘where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance[,] the finality principle controls.’” Id. (quoting Sarna, 530 N.E.2d at 115 ). [26] “Trial Rule 60(A) merely provides a remedy to correct by nunc pro tunc entry clerical errors in judgments, orders, etc., or errors arising from oversight or omission[,]” but the rule “does not constitute a license to make judicial changes in the actual law or ruling of a case.” Artusi v. City of Mishawaka, 519 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Perkins v. Haywardgreen2 sentences2015A nunc pro tunc order is “‘an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date.’ ” Cotton v. State, 658 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind.1995) (quoting Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind. 95, 101 , 31 N.E. 670, 672 (1892)) (emphasis in original). 2015A nunc pro tunc order is “‘an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of the former date.’ ” Cotton v. State, 658 N.E.2d 898, 900 (Ind.1995) (quoting Perkins v. Hayward, 132 Ind. 95, 101 , 31 N.E. 670, 672 (1892)) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Marriage of Rosentrater v. Rosentratergreen1 sentence2014On the other hand, where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance the finality principle controls.” Rosentrater v. Rosentrater, 708 N.E.2d 628, 631 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting Sarna, 530 N.E.2d at 115 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
R. Anthony Marrese and Michael R. Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeonsgreen1 sentence2012Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 , 105 S.Ct. 1327 , 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985), and quoting Marrese for the proposition, “incur[ring] a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method, well established in case law, of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them”). | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensengreen2 sentences2011Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 195 Ind. 106, 121 , 143 N.E. 596, 600 (1924). 2011Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 195 Ind. 106, 121 , 143 N.E. 596, 600 (1924). | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensengreen2 sentences2011Despite the fact that the landowner’s suit involved the same defendant and the same pipeline, it was determined that the successive action was proper because “an action prosecuted to a finality will not bar another action ... when it is made to appear that the nuisance has not been *1023 abated and its continuance has resulted in further inquiry.” Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 94 Ind.App. 155 , 180 N.E. 30, 31 (1932). 2011Despite the fact that the landowner’s suit involved the same defendant and the same pipeline, it was determined that the successive action was proper because “an action prosecuted to a finality will not bar another action ... when it is made to appear that the nuisance has not been *1023 abated and its continuance has resulted in further inquiry.” Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 94 Ind.App. 155 , 180 N.E. 30, 31 (1932). | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensengreen2 sentences2011Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 188 Ind. 400, 403 , 123 N.E. 789, 790 (1919). 4 When the nuisance is a continuing abatable one, an action that is prosecuted to a finality will not bar another action to recover for harm sustained in succeeding years, when it is made to appear that the nuisance has not been abated and its continuance has resulted in further injury. 2011Ind. Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 188 Ind. 400, 403 , 123 N.E. 789, 790 (1919). 4 When the nuisance is a continuing abatable one, an action that is prosecuted to a finality will not bar another action to recover for harm sustained in succeeding years, when it is made to appear that the nuisance has not been abated and its continuance has resulted in further injury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., Trustee
green
2 sentences1988On the other hand, where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance the finality principle controls.” Drost, supra, citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1931), 202 Ind. 641 , 177 N.E. 454 ; 4 Harvey & Townsend, Indiana Practice § 60.3, p. 205. 1988On the other hand, where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance the finality principle controls.” Drost, supra, citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1931), 202 Ind. 641 , 177 N.E. 454 ; 4 Harvey & Townsend, Indiana Practice § 60.3, p. 205. | 3 | 1978–2016 |
Sarna v. Norcen Bank
green
2 sentences2015However, “ ‘where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance[,]- the finality principle controls.’ ” Id. (quoting Sama, 530 N.E.2d at 115 ). [26] “Trial Rule 60(A) merely provides a remedy to correct by nunc pro tunc entry clerical errors in judgments, orders, etc., or errors arising from oversight or omissionf,]” but the rule “does not constitute a license to make judicial changes in the actual law or ruling of a case.” Artusi v. City of Mishawaka, 519 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. 2015However, “ ‘where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance[,]- the finality principle controls.’ ” Id. (quoting Sama, 530 N.E.2d at 115 ). [26] “Trial Rule 60(A) merely provides a remedy to correct by nunc pro tunc entry clerical errors in judgments, orders, etc., or errors arising from oversight or omissionf,]” but the rule “does not constitute a license to make judicial changes in the actual law or ruling of a case.” Artusi v. City of Mishawaka, 519 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
green
2 sentences2012Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 , 105 S.Ct. 1327 , 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985), and quoting Marrese for the proposition, “incur[ring] a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method, well established in case law, of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them”). 2012Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir.1984), rev’d on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 , 105 S.Ct. 1327 , 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985), and quoting Marrese for the proposition, “incur[ring] a sanction for contempt is a crude but serviceable method, well established in case law, of identifying the most burdensome discovery orders and in effect waiving the finality requirement for them”). | 2 | 2006–2012 |
Berry v. Huffman
green
1 sentence2024The Court held that “Indiana Trial Rules 54(B) and 56(C) superseded the distinct and definite branch doctrine of finality Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-MI-1266 | November 6, 2024 Page 4 of 8 and that such appeals may now proceed only by leave of court.” 4 Id. at 328 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Stickdorn v. Zook
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 1022 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
ALAMO IRRIGATION COMPANY v. United States
green
1 sentence1999On the other hand, where the ‘mistake’ is one of substance the finality principle controls.” Id. (internal cites omitted). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hough v. State
green
2 sentences1993The majority opinion rejects the finality requirement of (1), above; the requirement of (2) above was rejected in Hough v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 511 ; and the requirement of (3) above is satisfied. 1993The majority opinion rejects the finality requirement of (1), above; the requirement of (2) above was rejected in Hough v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 511 ; and the requirement of (8) above is satisfied. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Inkoff v. Inkoff
neutral
2 sentences1987In reaching the holding in Hudson, the holding in Inkoff v. Inkoff (1974), 159 Ind.App. 239 , 306 N.E.2d 132 , that the trial court had jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees after an appeal involving the same parties had commenced, was rejected because it was improperly founded on two Indiana Supreme Court cases, State ex rel. 1987In reaching the holding in Hudson, the holding in Inkoff v. Inkoff (1974), 159 Ind.App. 239 , 306 N.E.2d 132 , that the trial court had jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees after an appeal involving the same parties had commenced, was rejected because it was improperly founded on two Indiana Supreme Court cases, State ex rel. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Downing v. Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences1987An important cornerstone of judicial review of administrative decisions is the finality requirement. "'Courts are relue-tant to review interim steps of an adminis *453 trative body which are not, or have not become final.'" Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane (1976) 2d Dist., 170 Ind.App. 586, 598 , 354 N.E.2d 259, 267 , quoting Downing v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Whitley County (1971) 149 Ind. App. 687, 690 , 274 N.E.2d 542, 545 . 1987An important cornerstone of judicial review of administrative decisions is the finality requirement. "'Courts are relue-tant to review interim steps of an adminis *453 trative body which are not, or have not become final.'" Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane (1976) 2d Dist., 170 Ind.App. 586, 598 , 354 N.E.2d 259, 267 , quoting Downing v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Whitley County (1971) 149 Ind. App. 687, 690 , 274 N.E.2d 542, 545 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane
green
2 sentences1987An important cornerstone of judicial review of administrative decisions is the finality requirement. "'Courts are relue-tant to review interim steps of an adminis *453 trative body which are not, or have not become final.'" Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane (1976) 2d Dist., 170 Ind.App. 586, 598 , 354 N.E.2d 259, 267 , quoting Downing v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Whitley County (1971) 149 Ind. App. 687, 690 , 274 N.E.2d 542, 545 . 1987An important cornerstone of judicial review of administrative decisions is the finality requirement. "'Courts are relue-tant to review interim steps of an adminis *453 trative body which are not, or have not become final.'" Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. McShane (1976) 2d Dist., 170 Ind.App. 586, 598 , 354 N.E.2d 259, 267 , quoting Downing v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Whitley County (1971) 149 Ind. App. 687, 690 , 274 N.E.2d 542, 545 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Hudson v. Hudson
green
2 sentences1987Yet it was acknowledged that "prompt and efficient consideration of the disputed matters militate in favor of some procedure which maintains the finality requirement for appealable issues but which does not require needless proliferation of appeals." Id. at 583 . 1987Yet it was ac knowledged that "prompt and efficient consideration of the disputed matters militate in favor of some procedure which maintains the finality requirement for appeal able issues but which does not require needless proliferation of appeals." Id. at 583 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
The Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company and the Dayton Power and Light Company v. Benjamin F. Shaw Company
green
1 sentence1986Therefore, the trial court judgment is a final judgment." The court in Cincinnati Gas & Electric noted that an order which both compels arbitration and stays proceedings pending arbitration, although not final in the strictest sense, fulfills the finality requirement for purposes of appeal. 706 F.2d at 158 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Williamson Co. v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division
green
2 sentences1970Appellants have cast their argument in a form designed to give the apearance that the factual conclusions reached by the board here come within five of the seven exceptions to the finality rule stated in Williamson Co. v. Review Board (1969), 145 Ind. App. 266 , 250 N. E. 2d 612, 616 , 18 Ind. Dec. 403 , 410. 8 They have succeeded only in creating some doubt that they understand those exceptions. 1970Appellants have cast their argument in a form designed to give the apearance that the factual conclusions reached by the board here come within five of the seven exceptions to the finality rule stated in Williamson Co. v. Review Board (1969), 145 Ind. App. 266 , 250 N. E. 2d 612, 616 , 18 Ind. Dec. 403 , 410. 8 They have succeeded only in creating some doubt that they understand those exceptions. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.