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9 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Paragon Properties Co. v. City of Novigreen2 sentences2010Paragon, 452 Mich at 576 ; see also Lake Angelo Assoc v White Lake Twp, 198 Mich App 65, 71 ; 498 NW2d 1 (1993) (“[W]hen our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not just to actions based on [42 USC] 1983.”). 2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens | 3 | 3 |
Warth v. Seldinred2 sentences2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens 2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens | 2 | 2 |
Kropf v. City of Sterling Heightsgreen2 sentences2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens 2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens | 2 | 2 |
Schwartz v. City of Flintgreen2 sentences2010Co. v. City of Novi, 452 Mich. 568, 576 [ 550 N.W.2d 772 ] (1996); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 508 n. 18, [ 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 ] (1975) ("[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project."); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township's previous denials of the plaintiffs' applications to rezone their property for less intensive uses excused the finality requirement under the futility doctrine; (3) whether the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief prohibiting the defendant township from interfering with the plaintiffs 2010Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and we granted leave and requested that the parties brief the following issues: (1) whether a rule of finality or ripeness applies to the plaintiffs’ exclusionary zoning claim, see Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich 568, 576 (1996); Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490 , 508 n 18 [ 95 S Ct 2197 ; 45 L Ed 2d 343 ] (1975) (“[U]sually the focus should be on a particular project.”); (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals majority properly held that the defendant township’s previous denials of the plaintiffs’ applications to rezone their property for less intens | 2 | 2 |
Conlin v. Scio Townshipgreen1 sentence2020But to obtain a final decision subject to judicial review, they also needed to seek alternative relief, which in this case included taking the “reasonable and necessary steps” of submitting a site plan containing all pertinent information to enable a final administrative decision regarding their proposed plans for the property.3 Cf. Conlin, 262 Mich App at 383 (concluding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the finality requirement when they failed to submit “a formal site plan,” apply for conditional land use approval, or seek a “dimensional variance”). | 1 | 1 |
Lake Angelo Associates v. Township of White Lakegreen2 sentences2010Paragon, 452 Mich at 576 ; see also Lake Angelo Assoc v White Lake Twp, 198 Mich App 65, 71 ; 498 NW2d 1 (1993) (“[W]hen our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not just to actions based on [42 USC] 1983.”). 2010Paragon, 452 Mich at 576 ; see also Lake Angelo Assoc v White Lake Twp, 198 Mich App 65, 71 ; 498 NW2d 1 (1993) (“[W]hen our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, not just to actions based on [42 USC] 1983.”). | 1 | 1 |
Long Grove Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Village of Long Grovegreen2 sentences1989In the instant case, the final-decision requirement is not implicated because Electro-Tech's due process claim ÔÇö that it was deprived of its right to improve its property by arbitrary and irrational government action ÔÇö does not in any way require Electro-Tech to prove that the admittedly illegitimate condition imposed by the city actually resulted in such a severe restriction on Electro-Tech's ability to use its property as to violate Electro-Tech's independent right not to have its property taken without just compensation. [8] For cases applying a similar analysis, see Long Island Lightin 1989In the instant case, the final-decision requirement is not implicated because ElectroTech’s due process claim — that it was deprived of its right to improve its property by arbitrary and irrational government action — does not in any way require Electro-Tech to prove that the admittedly illegitimate condition imposed by the city actually resulted in such a severe restriction on ElectroTech’s ability to use its property as to violate Electro-Tech’s independent right not to have its property taken without just compensation. 8 For cases applying a similar analysis, see Long Island Lighting Co v C | 1 | 1 |
Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomogreen2 sentences1989In the instant case, the final-decision requirement is not implicated because Electro-Tech's due process claim ÔÇö that it was deprived of its right to improve its property by arbitrary and irrational government action ÔÇö does not in any way require Electro-Tech to prove that the admittedly illegitimate condition imposed by the city actually resulted in such a severe restriction on Electro-Tech's ability to use its property as to violate Electro-Tech's independent right not to have its property taken without just compensation. [8] For cases applying a similar analysis, see Long Island Lightin 1989In the instant case, the final-decision requirement is not implicated because ElectroTech’s due process claim — that it was deprived of its right to improve its property by arbitrary and irrational government action — does not in any way require Electro-Tech to prove that the admittedly illegitimate condition imposed by the city actually resulted in such a severe restriction on ElectroTech’s ability to use its property as to violate Electro-Tech’s independent right not to have its property taken without just compensation. 8 For cases applying a similar analysis, see Long Island Lighting Co v C | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Electri-Tech, Inc. v. H F Campbell Co.
green
2 sentences2010As aptly stated in Justice BRICKLEY'S Electro-Tech dissent, "a principled decision to apply, or not to apply, the finality requirement requires us to look beyond the label attached to a constitutional land use claim to the policy underlying the requirement and to the nature of the governmental conduct under attack." Electro-Tech, 433 Mich. at 100 , 445 N.W.2d 61 . 2010As aptly stated in Justice BRICKLEY’s Electro-Tech dissent, “a principled decision to apply, or not to apply, the finality requirement requires us to look beyond the label attached to a constitutional land use claim to the policy underlying the requirement and to the nature of the governmental conduct under attack.” Electro-Tech, 433 Mich at 100 . | 2 | 1993–2010 |
Cook v. Hearthside, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2021Id. at 241-242 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Hendee v. Putnam Township
green
2 sentences2020As noted in Williamson,[1] factors affecting a property owner’s investment-backed expectations “simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.” Investment-backed expectations are distinguishable from mere financial speculation. [Paragon, 452 Mich at 578-579 (citations omitted).] In other words, “[w]ithout a final decision from the zoning authority, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the zoning ordinance or decision specifically injured the plaintiff. 2020As noted in Williamson,[1] factors affecting a property owner’s investment-backed expectations “simply cannot be evaluated until the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.” Investment-backed expectations are distinguishable from mere financial speculation. [Paragon, 452 Mich at 578-579 (citations omitted).] In other words, “[w]ithout a final decision from the zoning authority, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the zoning ordinance or decision specifically injured the plaintiff. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Susan R Bruley Trust v. City of Birmingham
green
2 sentences2020See Paragon Props Co v Novi, 452 Mich 568, 581 ; 550 NW2d 772 (1996); Bruley Trust v Birmingham, 259 Mich App 619, 628 ; 675 NW2d 910 (2003). 2020See Paragon Props Co v Novi, 452 Mich 568, 581 ; 550 NW2d 772 (1996); Bruley Trust v Birmingham, 259 Mich App 619, 628 ; 675 NW2d 910 (2003). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
green
1 sentence2010Village of Euclid , [272 US] at 387, 47 S.Ct. 114 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Herrera v. Collins
green
2 sentences1993Herrera v Collins, 506 US —; 113 S Ct 853 ; 122 L Ed 2d 203 (1993); MCR 6.508(D). 1993Herrera v Collins, 506 US —; 113 S Ct 853 ; 122 L Ed 2d 203 (1993); MCR 6.508(D). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County
green
2 sentences1993Williamson, supra; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, 477 US 340 ; 106 S Ct 2561 ; 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986).” (Post, p 94.) Because the City of Westland did not have the opportunity to make a final decision regarding Electro-Tech’s property, see section 11(C), *71 we hold that its claim was not ripe for judicial review. [Electro-Tech, supra at 79 .] Both Electro-Tech and Williamson specifically stated that this rule applies to all Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings. 1 Thus, when our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fift 1993Williamson, supra; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, 477 US 340 ; 106 S Ct 2561 ; 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986).” (Post, p 94.) Because the City of Westland did not have the opportunity to make a final decision regarding Electro-Tech’s property, see section 11(C), *71 we hold that its claim was not ripe for judicial review. [Electro-Tech, supra at 79 .] Both Electro-Tech and Williamson specifically stated that this rule applies to all Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings. 1 Thus, when our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fift | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Pennell v. City of San Jose
green
2 sentences1993In analyzing Williamson, however, courts in foreign and federal jurisdictions have focused on whether the claim is that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face or is merely unconstitutional "as applied” to a particular parcel. 3 In Pennell v San Jose, 485 US 1 ; 108 S Ct 849 ; 99 L Ed 2d 1 (1988), the Court held that while a claim that an ordinance is facially arbitrary and unreasonable is ripe for adjudication even in the absence of a final decision by the local governmental body, the bringing of *73 the claim in that case was premature because the plaintiffs had not identified any prop 1993In analyzing Williamson, however, courts in foreign and federal jurisdictions have focused on whether the claim is that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face or is merely unconstitutional "as applied” to a particular parcel. 3 In Pennell v San Jose, 485 US 1 ; 108 S Ct 849 ; 99 L Ed 2d 1 (1988), the Court held that while a claim that an ordinance is facially arbitrary and unreasonable is ripe for adjudication even in the absence of a final decision by the local governmental body, the bringing of *73 the claim in that case was premature because the plaintiffs had not identified any prop | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City
red
1 sentence1993Williamson, supra; MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v Yolo Co, 477 US 340 ; 106 S Ct 2561 ; 91 L Ed 2d 285 (1986).” (Post, p 94.) Because the City of Westland did not have the opportunity to make a final decision regarding Electro-Tech’s property, see section 11(C), *71 we hold that its claim was not ripe for judicial review. [Electro-Tech, supra at 79 .] Both Electro-Tech and Williamson specifically stated that this rule applies to all Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment takings. 1 Thus, when our Supreme Court followed Williamson, it logically adopted the finality requirement to claims based on the Fift | 1 | 1993–1993 |
MacKenzie v. Union Guardian Trust Co.
green
1 sentence1939It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * “But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.” See, also, MacKenzie | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Gunzberg v. Miller
green
1 sentence1933It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. * * * “Where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus l | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Bond v. Markstrum
green
1 sentence1933The general principles of former adjudication were again extensively considered in Bond v. Markstrum, 102 Mich. 11 , where the rule of Cromwell v. County of Sac and Jacobson v. Miller were again reaffirmed. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.