finality requirement in Maryland

2022“It is well-established that ‘[t]he salutary purpose of the finality requirement is to avoid piecemeal actions in the circuit court seeking fragmented advisory opinions with respect to partial or intermediate agency decisions.’” Hovnanian, 443 Md. at 222 (quoting Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation Administration, 348 Md. 389, 407 (1998)). 24 The parties agree that, for the Forest Conservation Plan to be an appealable agency action, it must be a “final decision” of the agency.

2022“It is well-established that ‘[t]he salutary purpose of the finality requirement is to avoid piecemeal actions in the circuit court seeking fragmented advisory opinions with respect to partial or intermediate agency decisions.’” Hovnanian, 443 Md. at 222 (quoting Driggs Corp. v. Maryland Aviation Administration, 348 Md. 389, 407 (1998)). 24 The parties agree that, for the Forest Conservation Plan to be an appealable agency action, it must be a “final decision” of the agency.

2009In Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390 , 554 A.2d 1197 (1989), this Court recognized a very limited exception to the finality requirement with respect to judicial review of an administrative agency order.

2009In Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390 , 554 A.2d 1197 (1989), this Court recognized a very limited exception to the finality requirement with respect to judicial review of an administrative agency order.

2022The doctrine of exhaustion is “related to and somewhat overlaps the finality principle[]” and requires that “administrative remedies must be exhausted before bringing an action in court.” Dorsey, 375 Md. at 76 , 825 A.2d at 397 .

2022The doctrine of exhaustion is “related to and somewhat overlaps the finality principle[]” and requires that “administrative remedies must be exhausted before bringing an action in court.” Dorsey, 375 Md. at 76 , 825 A.2d at 397 .

2019See, e.g. , Heron v. Strader , 361 Md. 258 , 265, 270, 761 A.2d 56 (2000) (holding that malicious prosecution claims, unlike claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, arise when the underlying criminal proceedings terminate because favorable termination is a required element).

2019See, e.g. , Heron v. Strader , 361 Md. 258 , 265, 270, 761 A.2d 56 (2000) (holding that malicious prosecution claims, unlike claims of false arrest and false imprisonment, arise when the underlying criminal proceedings terminate because favorable termination is a required element).

2015We addressed exceptions to the finality requirement more recently in Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 Md. 474 , 27 A.3d 143 (2011).

2015We addressed exceptions to the finality requirement more recently in Renaissance Centro Columbia, LLC v. Broida, 421 Md. 474 , 27 A.3d 143 (2011).

2011Church, supra, 375 Md. at 74-75 , 825 A.2d at 397 , we set forth the finality principle as follows: “[TJhis Court has consistently held that, in the absence of a statutory provision expressly authorizing judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions, and in the absence of an interlocutory administrative decision with immediate legal consequences causing irreparable harm, ‘the parties to the controversy must ordinarily await a final administrative decision before resorting to the courts.’ State v. State Board of Contract Appeals, 364 Md. 446, 457 , 773 A.2d 504, 510 (2001) (emphasis

2011Church, supra, 375 Md. at 74-75 , 825 A.2d at 397 , we set forth the finality principle as follows: “[TJhis Court has consistently held that, in the absence of a statutory provision expressly authorizing judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions, and in the absence of an interlocutory administrative decision with immediate legal consequences causing irreparable harm, ‘the parties to the controversy must ordinarily await a final administrative decision before resorting to the courts.’ State v. State Board of Contract Appeals, 364 Md. 446, 457 , 773 A.2d 504, 510 (2001) (emphasis

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2011See, e.g., Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534 , 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010) (“ ‘As a general rule, an action for judicial review of an administrative order will lie only if the administrative order is final,’ ” quoting Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County, 315 Md. 390, 395 , 554 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1989)); Laurel Racing v. Video Lottery, supra, 409 Md. at 460 , 975 A.2d at 903 (A “party must exhaust the administrative remedy and obtain a final administrative decision ... before resorting to the courts”); Arroyo v. Board of Education, 381 Md. 646, 667 , 851 A.2d 576, 589 (2004) (“LI]n cases whe

2010See also Digital Equipment v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 (“[T]he issue of appealability ... is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted ... by a prompt appellate court decision.”); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 2757 , 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (“[T]his Court has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement of sect. 1291 to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should

2010See also Digital Equipment v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 (“[T]he issue of appealability ... is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted ... by a prompt appellate court decision.”); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 2757 , 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (“[T]his Court has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement of sect. 1291 to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should

2010See also Digital Equipment v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 (“[T]he issue of appealability ... is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted ... by a prompt appellate court decision.”); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 2757 , 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (“[T]his Court has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement of sect. 1291 to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should

2010See also Digital Equipment v. Desktop Direct, 511 U.S. at 868 , 114 S.Ct. 1992 (“[T]he issue of appealability ... is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a ‘particular injustice’ averted ... by a prompt appellate court decision.”); Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 439 , 105 S.Ct. 2757 , 86 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985) (“[T]his Court has expressly rejected efforts to reduce the finality requirement of sect. 1291 to a case-by-case determination of whether a particular ruling should

2004The court in Ryan detailed the exceptions to the finality rule: These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1977), authorize appeals wilhout Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of "art order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment," Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphas

2004The court stated, absent a certification under Rule 54(b) and entry of judgment, “we may not entertain appeals from partial dispositions or orders unless they fall within limited exceptions to the usual finality rule.” 8 Id.

2004The court in Ryan detailed the exceptions to the finality rule: These exceptions, as set out in our recent opinion in Huckeby v. Frozen Food Express, 555 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.1977), authorize appeals wilhout Rule 54(b) certification only where (1) the order is made appealable by statute or is certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b); (2) the rulings of the Supreme Court or of this court permit appeal of "art order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment," Huckeby, 555 F.2d at 549 , quoting (emphas

2003See, e.g., Furnitureland v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 133 , 771 A.2d 1061, 1065 (2001) (“[W]here the Legislature has provided an administrative remedy for a particular matter or matters, there is a presumption that the Legislature intended such remedy to be primary and intended that the administrative remedy must be ... exhausted before resort to the courts”); Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, supra, 360 Md. at 461 , 758 A.2d at 1008 (“[T]he normal rule [is] that primary administrative ... remedies must be exhausted”); Josephson v. Annapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-678 , 728 A.2d 690, 693-695

2003See, e.g., Furnitureland v. Comptroller, 364 Md. 126, 133 , 771 A.2d 1061, 1065 (2001) (“[W]here the Legislature has provided an administrative remedy for a particular matter or matters, there is a presumption that the Legislature intended such remedy to be primary and intended that the administrative remedy must be ... exhausted before resort to the courts”); Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, supra, 360 Md. at 461 , 758 A.2d at 1008 (“[T]he normal rule [is] that primary administrative ... remedies must be exhausted”); Josephson v. Annapolis, 353 Md. 667, 674-678 , 728 A.2d 690, 693-695