constitutional due process violation in Michigan

2021“This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011).

2021“This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011).

2019People v Blackmon, 280 Mich App 253, 270 ; 761 NW2d 172 (2008).

2019People v Blackmon, 280 Mich App 253, 270 ; 761 NW2d 172 (2008).

2018“This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 156 ; 854 NW2d 114 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018“This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 156 ; 854 NW2d 114 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018Under MCL 712A.4(3) and (4), the proceedings for waiving family court jurisdiction are ordinarily conducted in two phases, with phase I requiring a probable cause determination and phase II requiring “the family court to determine whether the best interests of the juvenile and the best interests of the public require a trial in the court of general jurisdiction rather than in the family court.” Williams, 245 Mich App at 432 ; see also MCR 3.950(D) (describing the procedure for conducting the two phases of the waiver hearing).

2018Under MCL 712A.4(3) and (4), the proceedings for waiving family court jurisdiction are ordinarily conducted in two phases, with phase I requiring a probable cause determination and phase II requiring “the family court to determine whether the best interests of the juvenile and the best interests of the public require a trial in the court of general jurisdiction rather than in the family court.” Williams, 245 Mich App at 432 ; see also MCR 3.950(D) (describing the procedure for conducting the two phases of the waiver hearing).

2026Thus, when the Tax Tribunal would otherwise lack jurisdiction under the applicable statute, the statutory requirement may “be waived 1 Our Supreme Court has “caution[ed] courts to exercise reasoned judgment before branding an exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies requirement jurisdictional.” Mich Farm Bureau, 515 Mich at 514 n 25. 2 “Although this Court is not bound by decisions of federal courts or courts of other states, we may consider them persuasive.” Bank of America, NA v Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins Co, 316 Mich App 480 , 496 n 2; 892 NW2d 467 (2016). -4- by the court if necessary to remedy

2025Parkview, 183 Mich App at 121 . 10 Instead, the protest requirement of MCL 205.735a(3) may only be waived by the court if necessary to remedy a constitutional due-process violation that deprived the taxpayer of their ability to invoke the right to protest.

2023People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 201 ; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

2023People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 201 ; 891 NW2d 255 (2016).

2021People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 176 ; 740 NW2d 534 (2007). -13- “A court cannot base its sentence even in part on a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt.” People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 314 ; 715 NW2d 377 (2006) (cleaned up).

2021People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 176 ; 740 NW2d 534 (2007). -13- “A court cannot base its sentence even in part on a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt.” People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 314 ; 715 NW2d 377 (2006) (cleaned up).

2017We review de novo the preliminary questions of law surrounding the admission of evidence, such as whether a rule of evidence bars admitting it. [People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (footnotes omitted).] “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), including whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant of the right to a fair trial, People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 588 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).

2017We review de novo the preliminary questions of law surrounding the admission of evidence, such as whether a rule of evidence bars admitting it. [People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (footnotes omitted).] “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), including whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant of the right to a fair trial, People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 588 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).

2017Carines, 460 Mich at 763-765 .

2017We review de novo the preliminary questions of law surrounding the admission of evidence, such as whether a rule of evidence bars admitting it. [People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (footnotes omitted).] “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), including whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant of the right to a fair trial, People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 588 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).

2017We review de novo the preliminary questions of law surrounding the admission of evidence, such as whether a rule of evidence bars admitting it. [People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51 ; 862 NW2d 446 (2014) (footnotes omitted).] “This Court reviews de novo a defendant’s claim of a constitutional due-process violation.” People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 590 ; 808 NW2d 541 (2011), including whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant of the right to a fair trial, People v Dunigan, 299 Mich App 579, 588 ; 831 NW2d 243 (2013).

2016People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 189 ; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). [T]he failure to assert a constitutional right ordinarily constitutes a forfeiture of that right.” Vaughn, 491 Mich at 654 .

2016People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 189 ; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). [T]he failure to assert a constitutional right ordinarily constitutes a forfeiture of that right.” Vaughn, 491 Mich at 654 .

2016People v Stokes, 312 Mich App 181, 189 ; 877 NW2d 752 (2015). [T]he failure to assert a constitutional right ordinarily constitutes a forfeiture of that right.” Vaughn, 491 Mich at 654 .

2014“Generally, the people are not required to disclose the identity of confidential informants.” People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 650 ; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 64-65 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

2014“Generally, the people are not required to disclose the identity of confidential informants.” People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 650 ; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 64-65 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

2014“Generally, the people are not required to disclose the identity of confidential informants.” People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 650 ; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 64-65 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

2014“Generally, the people are not required to disclose the identity of confidential informants.” People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 650 ; 516 NW2d 520 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 64-65 ; 594 NW2d 477 (1999).

2014However, the child’s welfare is primary in child protective proceedings.” Id. at 114-115 . “[T]he paramount purpose of the juvenile section of the Probate Code is to provide for the well-being of children.” In re Macomber, 436 Mich 28 Although the majority opinion addresses at length the parental interests involved in this case, it mentions in only the most peremptory way, in a footnote, that there is also the child’s interest, which is an indispensable part of the constitutional due process analysis in this case.

2000We have yet to address in a definitive manner the issue whether a constitutional due process violation can occur when a prosecutor fails to disclose inculpatory evidence. 4 However, in People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468 ; 406 NW2d 859 (1987), the Court of Appeals identified a test to use to determine the appropriate remedy to apply when a prosecutor fails to abide by a discovery order or agreement: The question ... is first, whether the party’s interest in preparing his own case or his opportunity to test the authenticity of his opponent’s evidence has been prejudiced by a noncompliance with a

2000We have yet to address in a definitive manner the issue whether a constitutional due process violation can occur when a prosecutor fails to disclose inculpatory evidence. 4 However, in People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468 ; 406 NW2d 859 (1987), the Court of Appeals identified a test to use to determine the appropriate remedy to apply when a prosecutor fails to abide by a discovery order or agreement: The question ... is first, whether the party’s interest in preparing his own case or his opportunity to test the authenticity of his opponent’s evidence has been prejudiced by a noncompliance with a

2000Because Ada Township challenges the constitutionality of 1996 PA 538 on due process grounds, 5 see Delta Co v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 118 Mich App 458, 464-465 ; 325 NW2d 455 (1982), the trial court properly concluded that Ada Township lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 1996 PA 538 .

2000Because Ada Township challenges the constitutionality of 1996 PA 538 on due process grounds, 5 see Delta Co v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 118 Mich App 458, 464-465 ; 325 NW2d 455 (1982), the trial court properly concluded that Ada Township lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of 1996 PA 538 .

1999Edmond, supra, p 392 .

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).

1987We note that there are several other decisions which speak of "fundamental fairness” in cases involving noncompliance with discovery orders, but which do not apply a constitutional due process standard, e.g., Harbor Springs v McNabb, 150 Mich App 583 ; 389 NW2d 135 (1986); People v Denning, 140 Mich App 331 ; 364 NW2d 325 (1985); In re Bay Prosecutor, 109 Mich App 476 ; 311 NW2d 399 (1981).