constitutional due process challenge in Kansas

2024State v. Wade, 284 Kan. 527, 534 , 161 P.3d 704 (2007).

2009Because “the gravamen” of Jones’ argument “is a constitutional due process challenge, ... we exercise unlimited review. [Citation omitted.]” Wade, 284 Kan. at 534 . *1161 “A jury instruction on the elements of a crime which is broader than the information charging the crime is erroneous.

2022App. 2d 233, 240 , 305 P.3d 729 (2013), we simply assumed a state administrative policy should have been adopted through the notice and hearing process for regulations because the issue was less than obvious and found the plaintiff had failed to prove a constitutional due process violation, a much easier determination, and denied relief on that basis.

2019Although not strictly analogous, because it involves fees for the cost of representation as opposed to fees for the cost of the court hearing itself, in State v. Casady , 289 Kan. 150 , 210 P.3d 113 (2009), this court considered a constitutional due process challenge to K.S.A. 22-4529, the statute mandating the imposition of the application fee for the Kansas Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS).

2019Although not strictly analogous, because it involves fees for the cost of representation as opposed to fees for the cost of the court hearing itself, in State v. Casady , 289 Kan. 150 , 210 P.3d 113 (2009), this court considered a constitutional due process challenge to K.S.A. 22-4529, the statute mandating the imposition of the application fee for the Kansas Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS).

2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice").

2019See State v. Hurd , 298 Kan. 555 , 570, 316 P.3d 696 (2013) ("Recusal is required under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause when the judge is actually biased or there is a constitutionally intolerable probability of actual bias."); State v. Sawyer , 297 Kan. 902 , 909, 305 P.3d 608 (2013) (test asks "whether the judge had a duty to recuse from the case because the judge was biased, prejudiced, or partial" and "whether the judge's failure to recuse resulted in actual bias or prejudice").

2010While Kansas prison regulations do provide that testimony be taken in the inmate’s presence, K.A.R. 44-13-403(l)(l), violation of procedural regulations does not by itself mean that there has been a constitutional due-process violation. 37 Kan.

2007Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 904 , 113 S.Ct. 297 , 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992); Ashe v. State of N.C., 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.1978).

2007Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 904 (1992); Ashe v. State of N.C., 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978).

2007Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 904 , 113 S.Ct. 297 , 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992); Ashe v. State of N.C., 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir.1978).

2006But, the court ruled that the constitutional due process test was not met where the defendants merely placed a product into the stream of commerce arid did not purposefully direct their products to serve the market in Kansas, citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 , 94 L.

2006But, the court ruled that the constitutional due process test was not met where the defendants merely placed a product into the stream of commerce arid did not purposefully direct their products to serve the market in Kansas, citing Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 , 94 L.

2002The court in Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 414 Mass. 218, 223 , 606 N.E.2d 1323 (1993), stated: “A State that elects to commit to its judiciary the responsibility of determining whether [an individual] will be tried as a juvenile or an adult . . . must observe only the constitutional due process requirement of essential fairness.” The determination of whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult is made by a court after considering the statutory factors in K.S.A. 38-1636(e).

2002The court in Commonwealth v. Wayne W., 414 Mass. 218, 223 , 606 N.E.2d 1323 (1993), stated: “A State that elects to commit to its judiciary the responsibility of determining whether [an individual] will be tried as a juvenile or an adult . . . must observe only the constitutional due process requirement of essential fairness.” The determination of whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult is made by a court after considering the statutory factors in K.S.A. 38-1636(e).

2000Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 , 84 L.

2000Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 , 84 L.

1982The city’s position is supported by Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99 , 453 P.2d 82 (1969), and Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589 , 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).

1982The city’s position is supported by Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99 , 453 P.2d 82 (1969), and Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589 , 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).

1982The city’s position is supported by Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99 , 453 P.2d 82 (1969), and Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589 , 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).

1982The city’s position is supported by Delight Wholesale Co. v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99 , 453 P.2d 82 (1969), and Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589 , 522 P.2d 1291 (1974).