constitutional due process standard in Florida

2020Aros Marine had only sporadic and passing contact with cruise lines operating out of Florida prior to the formation of Pier Marine Florida, and post-Pier Marine Florida’s formation, Aros Marine did not generate business from a Florida contact in any sense that we could conclude that its affiliations with Florida are so “continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”7 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). 7 The constitutional due process standard for determining general jurisdiction changed significantly with the United States Supreme Court’s dec

2020Aros Marine had only sporadic and passing contact with cruise lines operating out of Florida prior to the formation of Pier Marine Florida, and post-Pier Marine Florida’s formation, Aros Marine did not generate business from a Florida contact in any sense that we could conclude that its affiliations with Florida are so “continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”7 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). 7 The constitutional due process standard for determining general jurisdiction changed significantly with the United States Supreme Court’s dec

2019The inquiry is no longer whether the corporation’s contacts with the state are “continuous and systematic” but whether they are “so continuous and systematic as to render [the corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138-39 (2014) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)); see also Banco de los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018).

2018Banco De Los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). 8 Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides a basis for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign corporations who are “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida].”8 Florida courts have interpreted this statutory language to require “continuous and systematic” business contacts that are “extensive and pervasive.” See, e.g., Banco De Los Trabajadores, 237 So. 3d at 1134 ; Aegis Defense Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); and Caiazzo v. Am.

2020Aros Marine had only sporadic and passing contact with cruise lines operating out of Florida prior to the formation of Pier Marine Florida, and post-Pier Marine Florida’s formation, Aros Marine did not generate business from a Florida contact in any sense that we could conclude that its affiliations with Florida are so “continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”7 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). 7 The constitutional due process standard for determining general jurisdiction changed significantly with the United States Supreme Court’s dec

2018The constitutional due process standard, however, for determining general jurisdiction changed significantly with the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).

2006In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the United States Supreme Court held that, in order to subject a nonresident defendant who is not present in the forum state to personal jurisdiction, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum "such that the maintenance *399 of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ( quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)); see also Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d

2000Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193 allows, among other things, a Florida court to acquire personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in Florida for that defendant's breach of a contract in Florida. *1130 See § 48.193(1)(g), Fla. Stat. [1] Although breaching a contract in Florida brings a non-resident defendant within reach of its courts, in Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla.1989), it was recognized that the "minimum contacts" requirement, for purposes of due process, are not embodied within Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute.

2018Banco De Los Trabajadores v. Cortez Moreno, 237 So. 3d 1127, 1134 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). 8 Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes, provides a basis for asserting general jurisdiction over foreign corporations who are “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida].”8 Florida courts have interpreted this statutory language to require “continuous and systematic” business contacts that are “extensive and pervasive.” See, e.g., Banco De Los Trabajadores, 237 So. 3d at 1134 ; Aegis Defense Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 656, 659 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017); and Caiazzo v. Am.

2018See, e.g., Dombroff v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 450 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Ranger Nationwide, Inc. v. Cook, 519 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); and Junction Bit & Tool Co. v. Institutional Mortg.

2011Zeigler argues that the judge’s remarks raise a presumption of vindictive sentencing and a constitutional due process violation of his right to trial. “[T]he law is clear that any judicially imposed penalty which needlessly discourages assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and deters the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial is patently unconstitutional.” Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 142, 150 (Fla.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010While consideration of “fair play and substantial justice” may “serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than *355 would otherwise be required,” Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir.1990), they do not do so here.

2005See State v. T.L.W., 457 So.2d 566 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); State v. Herrera, 365 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). [2] The crime date was December 25, 1974.

2000See also Marsh Supermarkets, Inc. v. Queen's Flowers Corp., 696 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (stating that "in determining whether [personal] jurisdiction lies over a [non-resident] defendant, courts must determine whether there has been compliance with both Florida's long-arm statute and the constitutional due process test of minimum contacts.").

1997As the court explained in Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 416, 420, 424 (3d Cir.1996), the Thunder Basin decision was not based upon the authority of the administrative agency to decide constitutional issues.

1985See e.g., Kane v. American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974, 975-976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411, 412-414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So.2d 1050, 1055-1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

1985See e.g., Kane v. American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974, 975-976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411, 412-414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So.2d 1050, 1055-1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

1985See e.g., Kane v. American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974, 975-976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411, 412-414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So.2d 1050, 1055-1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

1985See e.g., Kane v. American Bank of Merritt Island, 449 So.2d 974, 975-976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Scordilis v. Drobnicki, 443 So.2d 411, 412-414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Lacy v. Force V Corp., 403 So.2d 1050, 1055-1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Osborn v. University Society, Inc., 378 So.2d 873, 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).