7 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2013The intermediate appellate court has also noted that Rule 4-246 “was intended to incorporate the constitutional due process standard for waiver of a fundamental right but no more.” See Robinson, 67 Md.App. at 454 , 508 A.2d at 163 (citations omitted). 2013The intermediate appellate court has also noted that Rule 4-246 “was intended to incorporate the constitutional due process standard for waiver of a fundamental right but no more.” See Robinson, 67 Md.App. at 454 , 508 A.2d at 163 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen2 sentences2013We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver must have been “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). 2013We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver must have been “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938). | 1 | 1 |
Michael E. Schneider v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2012As Kulbicki points out, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 595 (5th Cir.1977), where it made clear that, “[i]f the state through its law enforcement agents suborns perjury for use at the trial, a constitutional due process claim would not be defeated merely because the prosecuting attorney was not personally aware of this prosecutorial activity.” (Citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Reynolds v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Reynolds, 327 Md. at 503 , 610 A.2d at 786 (1992) (citing 1 McCormick on Evidence §§ 146-47, at 564-74 (4th ed.1992)). 1998See Reynolds, 327 Md. at 503 , 610 A.2d at 786 (1992) (citing 1 McCormick on Evidence §§ 146-47, at 564-74 (4th ed.1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Dortch v. Stategreen2 sentences1986See Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1307 . 1986See Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1307 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martinez v. State
green
2 sentences2014We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver 7 must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 2014We observed in Martinez, 309 Md. at 133 , 522 A.2d at 955 , that “[f]or a waiver to be valid, the court must be satisfied that the defendant’s election was made knowledgeably and voluntarily.” In other words, the waiver 7 must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences2015In 1986 in *108 Colorado v. Connelly, [ 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ], the Supreme Court ruled that, in order for a confession to be suppressed under the constitutional due process test of voluntariness, “coercive police activity is a predicate.” The Connelly Court concluded: “Even the most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.” Some form of police interrogation is similarly required to trigger the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment. 2015In 1986 in *108 Colorado v. Connelly, [ 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ], the Supreme Court ruled that, in order for a confession to be suppressed under the constitutional due process test of voluntariness, “coercive police activity is a predicate.” The Connelly Court concluded: “Even the most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.” Some form of police interrogation is similarly required to trigger the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Countess v. State
green
2 sentences1986See Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1307 . 1986See Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 235 , 428 A.2d 1220, 1223 (1981); Countess, 286 Md. at 455 , 408 A.2d at 1307 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.