constitutional due process requirement in Iowa

2021See City of Des Moines v. Ogden, 909 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Iowa 2018).

2018See City of Des Moines v. Ogden , 909 N.W.2d 417 , 422 (Iowa 2018).

2021“To the extent, however, [a defendant] raises a constitutional due process challenge, our review is de novo.” State v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1998).

2016See State v. Love, 589 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1998). 4 III.

2014The Elam court wrote, The defendant asserts that this instruction violates his constitutional right to due process by shifting the burden of proof as it “creates the possibility that a reasonable juror could believe that the instruction relieved the State of the burden of proving [he] acted with malice.” The defendant acknowledges that a similar instruction before this court has withstood a constitutional due process challenge in Henderson v. Scurr, 313 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1981), but he submits that the instruction in the present case “differs significantly” from the one given in Henderson,

1982The defendant asserts that this instruction violates his constitutional right to due process by shifting the burden of proof as it “creates the possibility that a reasonable juror could believe that the instruction relieved the State of the burden of proving [he] acted with malice.” The defendant acknowledges that a similar instruction before this court has withstood a constitutional due process challenge in Henderson v. Scurr, 313 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1981), but he submits that the instruction in the present case “differs significantly” from the one given in Henderson , arguing it does not c

2018While not addressing a constitutional due process claim, our supreme court has twice determined “[t]he legislature could reasonably have imposed such a ban because the effects of drugs, as contrasted to the effects of alcohol, can vary greatly among those who use them.” See State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 2005) (emphasis added); see also Childs, 898 N.W.2d at 183–87 (quoting with approval and affirming the Comried decision).6 “It is not absurd for the legislature to enact a per se, or zero-tolerance, ban on driving with [a controlled substance] in one’s body, given the absence of a

2018While not addressing a constitutional due process claim, our supreme court has twice determined “[t]he legislature could reasonably have imposed such a ban because the effects of drugs, as contrasted to the effects of alcohol, can vary greatly among those who use them.” See State v. Comried, 693 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 2005) (emphasis added); see also Childs, 898 N.W.2d at 183–87 (quoting with approval and affirming the Comried decision).6 “It is not absurd for the legislature to enact a per se, or zero-tolerance, ban on driving with [a controlled substance] in one’s body, given the absence of a

2018“We are not at liberty to overrule controlling supreme court precedent.” State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).

2002The plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that the United States Supreme Court held in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 496 , 45 S.Ct. 603, 607 , 69 L.Ed. 1058, 1065 (1925), that an invalid tax is a constitutional due process violation.

2002The plaintiff argues, nonetheless, that the United States Supreme Court held in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 496 , 45 S.Ct. 603, 607 , 69 L.Ed. 1058, 1065 (1925), that an invalid tax is a constitutional due process violation.

1998See State v. Yaw, 398 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Iowa 1987).

1977As recently as February 16, 1977, this court said, without dissent, that “Sisco’s requirements are in part mandated by the Constitution. * * * [citations] The constitutional due process clause precludes acceptance of a guilty plea where the record does not show defendant voluntarily waived those rights lost by the plea, including the right to trial by jury, the rights against self-incrimination and the right to confront witnesses.” State v. Barrett, 250 N.W.2d 31, 32-33 (Iowa 1977).

1977As recently as February 16, 1977, this court said, without dissent, that "Sisco's requirements are in part mandated by the Constitution. * * * [citations] The constitutional due process clause precludes acceptance of a guilty plea where the record does not show defendant voluntarily waived those rights lost by the plea, including the right to trial by jury, the rights against self-incrimination and the right to confront witnesses." State v. Barrett, 250 N.W.2d 31, 32-33 (Iowa 1977).

1976While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: “While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sen

1976While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: “While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sen

1976While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: “While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sen

1976While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: “While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sen

1976Two months later, in United States v. Velazguez, 482 F.2d 139, 142 (2 Cir. 1973) the court reiterated from Brown■ its “firm belief that a statement of reasons by the sentencing judge would be a most salutary practice” but declined to impose the rule as a constitutional due process requirement.

1976While the United States Supreme Court has invoked the constitutional due process requirement of stating reasons for actions in administrative proceedings, Wolff, supra; Morrissey, supra; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1022 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 301 (1970) and in juvenile court transfer proceedings, Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 , 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 95 (1966), our research is in accord with that of the third circuit court of appeals: “While there has been spirited debate on the proposition that a judge should enunciate his reasons for imposing sen