constitutional due process analysis in Texas

2017Under a constitutional due-process analysis, personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the non-resident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction complies with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2017Under a constitutional due-process analysis, personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the non-resident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction complies with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2017See PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly- Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 174 (Tex. 2007) (personal jurisdiction “involves due process considerations that may not be overridden by statutes or the common law”).6 6 We note that in Carlile Bancshares, Inc. v. Armstrong, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether direct-benefits estoppel and transaction-participant theories could be used to bind non-signatories and thereby gain personal jurisdiction over the non-signatories.

2008See id. at 175 .

2015Barfield v. State, No. 14-13-00518-CR, 2015 WL 1544790, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 2, 2015, pet. filed).

2015Barfield v. State, No. 14-13-00518-CR, 2015 WL 1544790, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] April 2, 2015, pet. filed).

2017Under a constitutional due-process analysis, personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the non-resident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction complies with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S. Ct. 154 , 90 L.

2015Moreover, ease of application should not overshadow the principal constitutional due-process inquiry, which is whether the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 583 (citations omitted).

2015Under a constitutional due-process analysis, a court has personal jurisdiction when “(1) the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction complies with ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’.” Retamco Operating, Inc. v Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. 2009).

2015Under a constitutional due-process analysis, personal jurisdiction is achieved when (1) the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and (2) the assertion of jurisdiction complies with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 338 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

2026See Vinmar Overseas Singapore PTE Ltd. v. PTT Int’l Trading PTE Ltd., 538 S.W.3d 126, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“Though contract or agency theories may be used by non-signatories to enforce forum-selection clauses in contracts, . . . such theories should not be used to bypass the constitutional due-process analysis required in personal jurisdiction cases.”). 13 Proof of corporate veil piercing can support a finding that the corporate structure is, in fact, the alter ego of a corporate shareholder, officer, or director.

2026NMRO Holdings, LLC. v. Williams, No 01-16-00816-CV, 2017 WL 4782793 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 24, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Nugent v. Est. of Ellickson, 543 S.W.3d 243, 264 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“The concept of alter ego, as typically applied in the corporate context, collapses the distinction between a corporation and its shareholder or shareholders by treating them as one and the same for liability purposes.”).

2025He argues that “due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope[.]” United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1977).

2025See In re D.K., 696 S.W.3d 787 , 793 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (“Although the father’s trial counsel requested a continuance, ‘it was not apparent -4- 04-25-00098-CV from the context that [the father] was attempting to raise a due process challenge.’”) (quoting In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 711 (Tex. 2003)).

2022See Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 272 ; Pierce, 212 S.W.3d at 758 . 3.

2022See In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (“The State’s preparation and administration of a service plan for the parent constitutes evidence that the State made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent.”).

2022That sort of constitutional violation would not be separate from the jury’s verdict on guilt and, so, could not be a “but for” cause of a rational jury’s failure to reject guilt.28 Applicant has failed to meet an exception to the bar against subsequent applications. 25 Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added). 26 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993) (emphasis in original). 27 Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Crim.

2022Id. (first citing Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim.

2022See In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003) (complaint based on constitutional error must be preserved in the trial court); see also In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79 , 90 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020 pet. denied) (concluding parent failed to preserve complaint that providing written service plan to parent in language parent does not understand constitutes a constitutional due process error). 11 11 Assuming the Department had a duty to take reasonable efforts to make it possible to return the child, but see Karl, 2004 WL 1573162 , at *5 (noting that Section 161.001 “does not require th

2022That sort of constitutional violation would not be separate from the jury’s verdict on guilt and, so, could not be a “but for” cause of a rational jury’s failure to reject guilt.28 Applicant has failed to meet an exception to the bar against subsequent applications. 25 Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added). 26 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993) (emphasis in original). 27 Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Crim.

2022That sort of constitutional violation would not be separate from the jury’s verdict on guilt and, so, could not be a “but for” cause of a rational jury’s failure to reject guilt.28 Applicant has failed to meet an exception to the bar against subsequent applications. 25 Brooks, 219 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added). 26 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993) (emphasis in original). 27 Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 473 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 345 ; Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2021See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 345 ; Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2020See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).

2020See Valle, 109 S.W.3d at 507 .

2018See Cole v. Huntsville Mem’l Hosp., 920 S.W.2d 364, 369-71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (holding that private hospital’s decision to revoke doctor’s privileges under bylaws is not state action required to support due process claim), overruled in part on other grounds, Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004).

2018See Cole v. Huntsville Mem’l Hosp., 920 S.W.2d 364, 369-71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (holding that private hospital’s decision to revoke doctor’s privileges under bylaws is not state action required to support due process claim), overruled in part on other grounds, Brown v. De La Cruz, 156 S.W.3d 560, 567 (Tex. 2004).

2017Though contract or agency theories may be used by non-signatories to enforce forum-selection clauses in contracts, see, e.g., In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. 2005) (noting six theories arising out of common principles of contract and agency law), such theories should not be used to bypass the constitutional due-process analysis required in personal jurisdiction cases.

2016Statement of the Facts ............................................................................................... 3 Summary of the Argument ...................................................................................... 40 Argument ............................................................................................................... 42 Argument on Issues I, II, III ......................................................................... 42 iii Argument on Issue IV ................................................................................... 68 Prayer ...............