medical claim in Ohio

2026From this, they conclude the court properly barred untimely attempts to add an expert report, which justified summary judgment as a matter of law because a medical claim cannot legally proceed to trial without expert testimony. {¶69} In a medical claim case, “[t]he issue as to whether [the defendant] has proceeded in the treatment of a patient with the requisite standard of care and skill must ordinarily be determined from the testimony of medical experts.” Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 130 (1976) (the plaintiff must have evidence that the defendant was unskillful or negligent and his w

2024Bruni at 131-132 ; White v. Leimbach, 2011-Ohio-6238, ¶ 34 , citing Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 (1993), and Bruni at 130 (providing, “[i]n general, when a medical claim questions the professional skill and judgment of a physician, expert testimony is required to prove the relevant standard of conduct”).

2024Bruni at 131-132 ; White v. Leimbach, 2011-Ohio-6238, ¶ 34 , citing Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 (1993), and Bruni at 130 (providing, “[i]n general, when a medical claim questions the professional skill and judgment of a physician, expert testimony is required to prove the relevant standard of conduct”).

2012Plaintiff was referred to another physician by the name of Dr. Scott Van Aman, who performed a below the left knee amputation. {¶ 11} “In general, when a medical claim questions the professional skill and judgment of a physician, expert testimony is required to prove the relevant standard of conduct.” White v. Leimbach, 131 Ohio St.3d 21 , 2011-Ohio-6238, ¶ 38 ; citing Berdyck v. Shinde, 66 Ohio St.3d 573, 579 (1993); Bruni v. Tatsumi, 46 Ohio St.2d 127, 130 (1976). {¶ 12} Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Block breached the standard of care in his treatment of her left lower extremity when he misdia

2024Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2009-Ohio-1525, ¶ 19 (holding, “based on the plain meaning of the legislature’s enactment, * * * that for the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations, a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both (1) arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and (2) is asserted against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers”).

2024Estate of Stevic v. Bio-Medical of Ohio, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 488 , 2009-Ohio-1525, ¶ 19 (holding, “based on the plain meaning of the legislature’s enactment, * * * that for the purposes of the R.C. 2305.113(A) one-year statute of limitations, a medical claim under R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) is a claim that both (1) arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person and (2) is asserted against one or more of the statutorily enumerated medical providers”).

2022Id. at ¶ 33, discussing Ruther v. Kaiser, 143 Ohio St.3d 408 , 2012-Ohio-5686 ; Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483 , 2016-Ohio-7432 ; and Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020-Ohio-6827 . [Cite as Wood v. Lynch, 2022-Ohio-1381 .] {¶20} In addition, we examined Fletcher and Smith as well as the Fifth District’s decision in Mercer, infra. We found that Fletcher did not address the question of whether the medical malpractice statute of repose encompassed a cause of action for wrongful death that arises from a medical claim.

2022The medical claim statute of repose " 'exists to give medical providers certainty with respect to the time within which a claim can be brought and a time after which they may be free from fear of litigation.' " Id. at ¶ 16, quoting Ruther v. Kaiser, 134 Ohio St.3d 408 , 2012-Ohio-5686, at ¶ 19 . {¶ 10} Although not binding authority on this court, we agree with the reasoning expressed in Hanock v. GM LLC (In re GM LLC Ignition Switch Litig.), S.D.N.Y.

2023But the rule should not be “applied so narrowly that the right of redress in a medical claim collapses under an undue burden.” Crosswhite v. Desai, 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist.1989).

2023But the rule should not be “applied so narrowly that the right of redress in a medical claim collapses under an undue burden.” Crosswhite v. Desai, 64 Ohio App.3d 170, 177 , 580 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist.1989).

2008Compare Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115 , 11 O.O.3d 290 , 387 N.E.2d 231 (new statute defining qualifications of expert witnesses in a medical claim is procedural rather than substantive).

2008Compare Denicola v. Providence Hosp. (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 115 , 11 O.O.3d 290 , 387 N.E.2d 231 (new statute defining qualifications of expert witnesses in a medical claim is procedural rather than substantive).

2022However, the Ohio Supreme Court has specifically addressed this issue and held that a plaintiff cannot utilize R.C. 2305.19(A) to refile their medical claims after the expiration of the statue of repose and, “unless one of the stated exceptions applies, R.C. 2305.113(C) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the commencement of any action upon a medical claim more than four years after the act or omission upon which the claim is based.” Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020- Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448 . {¶78} Appellants contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) operates to toll the medical statute

2022However, the Ohio Supreme Court has specifically addressed this issue and held that a plaintiff cannot utilize R.C. 2305.19(A) to refile their medical claims after the expiration of the statue of repose and, “unless one of the stated exceptions applies, R.C. 2305.113(C) clearly and unambiguously prohibits the commencement of any action upon a medical claim more than four years after the act or omission upon which the claim is based.” Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020- Ohio-6827, 173 N.E.3d 448 . {¶78} Appellants contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (d) operates to toll the medical statute

2016But as noted by Justice Pfeifer in his dissent in Rome, “[a] claim sounding in negligence does not become a medical claim simply because the injury arises in a hospital.” Rome at 17 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); see Browning, 66 Ohio St.3d at 557 , 613 N.E.2d 993 (1993) (not all claims asserted against a hospital are “medical claims”). {¶ 43} Here, there was nothing in Glenn’s actions that constituted medical treatment or diagnosis, and the need to transport Christian from a private vehicle to a wheelchair did not arise out of any diagnostic testing, treatment, or care directed by a physician.

2002Specifically, R.C. 2305.11 (B)(1) provides, in pertinent part that "* * * an action upon a medical * * * claim shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued * * *." "Medical claim" is defined in R.C. 2305.11 (D)(3), as follows: {¶ 14} "`Medical claim' means any claim that is asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, against any employee or agent of a physician, podiatrist, or hospital, or against a registered nurse or physical therapist, and that arises out of the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person. `Medical claim' includ

2025Meanwhile, "[a] statute of repose bars 'any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted . . . even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.'" Id., quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1637 (10th Ed.2014). {¶ 17} Ohio's statute of limitations requires a medical claim to be commenced within one year of the action vesting, unless tolled.

2022Id. at ¶ 33, discussing Ruther v. Kaiser, 143 Ohio St.3d 408 , 2012-Ohio-5686 ; Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 148 Ohio St.3d 483 , 2016-Ohio-7432 ; and Wilson v. Durrani, 164 Ohio St.3d 419 , 2020-Ohio-6827 . [Cite as Wood v. Lynch, 2022-Ohio-1381 .] {¶20} In addition, we examined Fletcher and Smith as well as the Fifth District’s decision in Mercer, infra. We found that Fletcher did not address the question of whether the medical malpractice statute of repose encompassed a cause of action for wrongful death that arises from a medical claim.

2016Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St.3d 54 , 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987).

2013Id. {¶20} The alleged misrepresentations and omissions in this case can only be “characterized as medical in nature.” Gaines, 33 Ohio St.3d at 56 , 514 N.E.2d 709 .

2016Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 33 Ohio St.3d 54 , 514 N.E.2d 709 (1987).

2013Id. {¶20} The alleged misrepresentations and omissions in this case can only be “characterized as medical in nature.” Gaines, 33 Ohio St.3d at 56 , 514 N.E.2d 709 .

2014Nickell v. Gonzalez, 17 Ohio St.3d 136, 139 (1985). {¶ 25} In addition, the Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that the tort of lack of informed consent is a medical claim, and therefore expert medical testimony is required to establish the first and second elements of the tort, i.e. (1) that the physician failed to disclose material risks and dangers inherently and potentially involved with a proposed therapy, and (2) that the undisclosed risk or danger actually materialized and proximately caused injury to the patient.

2012Case No. 2010-01123 -5- ENTRY {¶ 14} Defendant argues that plaintiffs’ medical claim is, in reality, a claim for lack of informed consent, and inasmuch as plaintiffs failed to plead lack of informed consent, they are not entitled to judgment in their favor. {¶ 15} A medical claim premised upon the lack of informed consent requires proof that: {¶ 16} “(a) The physician fails to disclose to the patient and discuss the material risks and dangers inherently and potentially involved with respect to the proposed therapy, if any; {¶ 17} “(b) the unrevealed risks and dangers which should have been dis

2023See Ward, 128 Ohio St.3d 212 , 2010-Ohio-6275 , 943 N.E.2d 514 , at ¶ 22 (“[T]he privilege does not apply when the patient gives express consent to the release of medical information or when the patient places his medical condition in issue by filing a medical claim or wrongful-death action.”). {¶ 29} The fact pattern, procedural posture, and party dynamics in the case at hand are quite distinct from typical privilege cases in which the plaintiff puts his or her medical condition at issue by filing the complaint.

2023See Ward, 128 Ohio St.3d 212 , 2010-Ohio-6275 , 943 N.E.2d 514 , at ¶ 22 (“[T]he privilege does not apply when the patient gives express consent to the release of medical information or when the patient places his medical condition in issue by filing a medical claim or wrongful-death action.”). {¶ 29} The fact pattern, procedural posture, and party dynamics in the case at hand are quite distinct from typical privilege cases in which the plaintiff puts his or her medical condition at issue by filing the complaint.

2014See McCoy v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio App.3d 356, 359 , 743 N.E.2d 974 (11th Dist.2000).

2014See McCoy v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio App.3d 356, 359 , 743 N.E.2d 974 (11th Dist.2000).

2026Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 97, 103-104 (1992) (requiring expert testimony as to a nurse's negligence because the claim involved matters outside the common knowledge and experience of jurors on a nurse's professional skill and judgment); R.C. 2305.113(E)(3) (medical claim includes various actions against a nursing home and its employees).3 {¶70} Without an expert, “any allegation of negligence remains unspecified . . . [and] [w]here the plaintiff fails to present expert testimony that a physician breached the applicable standard of care and that the breach constituted the direct and proximate cause of

2009Ohio Emergency Servs. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 97 , 592 N.E.2d 828 , for the proposition that expert testimony is required to prevail on a medical claim, even against a nurse.

2025We agree. {¶ 11} Citing Elliot v. Durrani, 2021-Ohio-3055, ¶ 53 (1st Dist.), the Court of Claims stated that the four-year period set forth in the statute of repose runs from the “last culpable act” of the defendant, and “[p]ost-surgical care does not constitute the ‘last culpable act’ where the alleged negligently-performed surgery forms the basis of the medical claim.” (Mar. 28, 2025 Entry of Dismissal at 9-10.) The Court of Claims then reasoned that, while Edwards asserted he underwent corrective surgeries in November 2020 to remove the foreign body left in his leg, and continued to receive

2024“The statute of repose measures liability from the date of ‘the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical claim’—i.e., the ‘last culpable act’ of the defendant.” Elliot, 2021-Ohio-3055 , 178 N.E.3d 977, at ¶ 53 .

2023(First amended complaint ¶ 2.) Smith nevertheless contends that his claim is not a medical claim as explained in O’Dell, 2022-Ohio-4156 , 200 N.E.3d 1208 .

2023(First amended complaint ¶ 2.) Smith nevertheless contends that his claim is not a medical claim as explained in O’Dell, 2022-Ohio-4156 , 200 N.E.3d 1208 .