medical exception in Connecticut

2011Kanz also testified, pursuant to the medical exception to the hearsay rule, that the victim "had reported to her in a consistent manner that the [petitioner] had performed acts that involved penile oral penetration, penile vaginal penetration, digital vaginal penetration and penile anal penetration." Id.

2009In State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854 , 864 A.2d 35 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924 , 871 A.2d 1031 (2005), this court held that testimony from Kanz, a certified nurse practitioner, as to what a victim of sexual assault said to her during the course of a medical examination was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule.

2008The court overruled the objection, finding that State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1 , 792 A.2d 823 (2002), was controlling.

2008The court overruled the objection, finding that State v. Cruz, 260 Conn. 1 , 792 A.2d 823 (2002), was controlling.

2015I would concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, however, because the disputed evidence was merely duplicative of the testimony from the two vic- tims and the two social workers who conducted the forensic interviews. ‘‘It is well established that if errone- ously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence presented in the case, its admission does not constitute reversible error.’’ Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 155 , 575 A.2d 206 (1990); see also Kortner v. Martise, 312 Conn. 1 , 29, 91 A.3d 412 (2014) (citing Swenson v. Sawoska, supra, 148 ). 1 The availabilit

2015I would concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, however, because the disputed evidence was merely duplicative of the testimony from the two vic- tims and the two social workers who conducted the forensic interviews. ‘‘It is well established that if errone- ously admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence presented in the case, its admission does not constitute reversible error.’’ Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 155 , 575 A.2d 206 (1990); see also Kortner v. Martise, 312 Conn. 1 , 29, 91 A.3d 412 (2014) (citing Swenson v. Sawoska, supra, 148 ). 1 The availabilit

2014Conversely, the focus in an action for lack of informed consent is often a credibility issue between the physician and the patient regarding whether the patient had been, or should have been, apprised of certain risks prior to the medical procedure.” Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383, 389 , 15 A.3d 1042 (2011); see also Caron v. Adams, 33 Conn. App. 673, 687 , 638 A.2d 1073 (1994) (“the basis for claiming a lack of informed consent is a failure to make a sufficient disclosure of the risks of or alternatives to a certain medical procedure or treatment”). 27 “Our standard of disclosure for inf

2014Conversely, the focus in an action for lack of informed consent is often a credibility issue between the physician and the patient regarding whether the patient had been, or should have been, apprised of certain risks prior to the medical procedure.” Shortell v. Cavanagh, 300 Conn. 383, 389 , 15 A.3d 1042 (2011); see also Caron v. Adams, 33 Conn. App. 673, 687 , 638 A.2d 1073 (1994) (“the basis for claiming a lack of informed consent is a failure to make a sufficient disclosure of the risks of or alternatives to a certain medical procedure or treatment”). 27 “Our standard of disclosure for inf

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2014The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milton v. Robinson, 131 Conn. App. 760, 779 , 27 A.3d 480 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 906 , 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). 26 “[T]he focus of a medical malpractice case is often a dispute involving the correct medical standard of care and whether there has been a deviation therefrom.

2014The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milton v. Robinson, 131 Conn. App. 760, 779 , 27 A.3d 480 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 906 , 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). 26 “[T]he focus of a medical malpractice case is often a dispute involving the correct medical standard of care and whether there has been a deviation therefrom.

2014The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milton v. Robinson, 131 Conn. App. 760, 779 , 27 A.3d 480 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 906 , 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). 26 “[T]he focus of a medical malpractice case is often a dispute involving the correct medical standard of care and whether there has been a deviation therefrom.

2014The opposing party to a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milton v. Robinson, 131 Conn. App. 760, 779 , 27 A.3d 480 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 906 , 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). 26 “[T]he focus of a medical malpractice case is often a dispute involving the correct medical standard of care and whether there has been a deviation therefrom.

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2014It is likewise both consistent and logical to hold that if an expert is not required to establish the medical standard of care, an opinion letter is not required under § 52-190a.’’); Multari v. Yale New Haven Hospital, Inc., 145 Conn. App. 253 , 259–61, 75 A.3d 733 (2013) (examining allegations in complaint to determine whether plaintiff alleged ordinary negligence, not subject to opinion letter requirement, or medical malpractice, subject to opinion letter requirement); Nichols v. Milford Pediatric Group, P.C., 141 Conn. App. 707 , 711–16, 64 A.3d 770 (2013) (same); Votre v. County Obstetrics

2013We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 121 Conn. App. 775, 780 , 998 A.2d 170 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 902 , 3 A.3d 72 (2010). 5 In this case, the court identified the section of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that provides the medical exception to the hearsay rule and admitted the hearsay statements of the victim through the testimony of Murphy pursuant to it.

2013We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 121 Conn. App. 775, 780 , 998 A.2d 170 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 902 , 3 A.3d 72 (2010). 5 In this case, the court identified the section of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that provides the medical exception to the hearsay rule and admitted the hearsay statements of the victim through the testimony of Murphy pursuant to it.

2013We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 121 Conn. App. 775, 780 , 998 A.2d 170 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 902 , 3 A.3d 72 (2010). 5 In this case, the court identified the section of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that provides the medical exception to the hearsay rule and admitted the hearsay statements of the victim through the testimony of Murphy pursuant to it.

2013We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Miller, 121 Conn. App. 775, 780 , 998 A.2d 170 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 902 , 3 A.3d 72 (2010). 5 In this case, the court identified the section of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that provides the medical exception to the hearsay rule and admitted the hearsay statements of the victim through the testimony of Murphy pursuant to it.

2009In response, the prosecutor argued that (1) the testimony came within the medical exception to the hearsay rule, (2) the availability of Bruno was immaterial and (3) the testimony did not implicate Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36 .

2009In State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854 , 864 A.2d 35 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924 , 871 A.2d 1031 (2005), this court held that testimony from Kanz, a certified nurse practitioner, as to what a victim of sexual assault said to her during the course of a medical examination was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule.

2009In State v. Anderson, 86 Conn. App. 854 , 864 A.2d 35 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 924 , 871 A.2d 1031 (2005), this court held that testimony from Kanz, a certified nurse practitioner, as to what a victim of sexual assault said to her during the course of a medical examination was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule.

2008In contrast to other parts of the [act], the statutory language does not refer to qualified individuals with disabilities, but instead merely to ‘employees’.” Conroy v. Dept. of Correctional Services, supra, 333 F.3d 94 -95. 3 “In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. . . . [T]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Krondes v. O’Boy, 69 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 796 A.2d 625 (2002). 4 See “Har

2008In contrast to other parts of the [act], the statutory language does not refer to qualified individuals with disabilities, but instead merely to ‘employees’.” Conroy v. Dept. of Correctional Services, supra, 333 F.3d 94 -95. 3 “In general, we look to the federal courts for guidance in resolving issues of federal law. . . . [T]he decisions of the federal circuit in which a state court is located are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of a federal statute.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Krondes v. O’Boy, 69 Conn. App. 802, 808 , 796 A.2d 625 (2002). 4 See “Har

2005“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in rare circumstances where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashe, 74 Conn. App. 511, 526 , 812 A.2d 194 , cert, denied, 262 Conn. 949 , 817 A.2d 108 (2003).

2005“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in rare circumstances where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashe, 74 Conn. App. 511, 526 , 812 A.2d 194 , cert, denied, 262 Conn. 949 , 817 A.2d 108 (2003).

2005“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in rare circumstances where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashe, 74 Conn. App. 511, 526 , 812 A.2d 194 , cert, denied, 262 Conn. 949 , 817 A.2d 108 (2003).

2005“Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . . [0]ur supervisory powers are invoked only in rare circumstances where [the] traditional protections are inadequate to ensure the fair and just administration of the courts . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ashe, 74 Conn. App. 511, 526 , 812 A.2d 194 , cert, denied, 262 Conn. 949 , 817 A.2d 108 (2003).

2003The state also claimed that the statement was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule 7 pursuant to State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539-42 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2003The state’s response to the defendant’s argument was that the evidence was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule 6 because the victim’s mother took the child to her pediatrician on the basis of the child’s having told her that “daddy likes it when I touch his pee-pee.” The state relied on this court’s holding in State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368 , 374 & n.13, 536 A.2d 600 (Spanish-speaking security guard at hospital permitted to interpret for child victim of sexual assault), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808 , 541 A.2d 1239 (1988).

2003The state’s response to the defendant’s argument was that the evidence was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule 6 because the victim’s mother took the child to her pediatrician on the basis of the child’s having told her that “daddy likes it when I touch his pee-pee.” The state relied on this court’s holding in State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368 , 374 & n.13, 536 A.2d 600 (Spanish-speaking security guard at hospital permitted to interpret for child victim of sexual assault), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808 , 541 A.2d 1239 (1988).

2003The state also claimed that the statement was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule 7 pursuant to State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539-42 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2003The state’s response to the defendant’s argument was that the evidence was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule 6 because the victim’s mother took the child to her pediatrician on the basis of the child’s having told her that “daddy likes it when I touch his pee-pee.” The state relied on this court’s holding in State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368 , 374 & n.13, 536 A.2d 600 (Spanish-speaking security guard at hospital permitted to interpret for child victim of sexual assault), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808 , 541 A.2d 1239 (1988).

2003The state’s response to the defendant’s argument was that the evidence was admissible under the medical exception to the hearsay rule 6 because the victim’s mother took the child to her pediatrician on the basis of the child’s having told her that “daddy likes it when I touch his pee-pee.” The state relied on this court’s holding in State v. Maldonado, 13 Conn. App. 368 , 374 & n.13, 536 A.2d 600 (Spanish-speaking security guard at hospital permitted to interpret for child victim of sexual assault), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 808 , 541 A.2d 1239 (1988).

2003The state also claimed that the statement was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule 7 pursuant to State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539-42 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2003The state also claimed that the statement was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule 7 pursuant to State v. Dollinger, 20 Conn. App. 530, 539-42 , 568 A.2d 1058 , cert. denied, 215 Conn. 805 , 574 A.2d 220 (1990).

2003Compare State v. Gonzalez, 75 Conn. App. 364, 376-77 , 815 A.2d 1261 (2003) (statement not made for purposes of medical treatment); State v. Cruz, 56 Conn. App. 763, 770 , 746 A.2d 196 (2000) (victim thought she was talking to a physician), aff'd, 260 Conn. 1 , 792 A.2d 823 (2002).

2003Compare State v. Gonzalez, 75 Conn. App. 364, 376-77 , 815 A.2d 1261 (2003) (statement not made for purposes of medical treatment); State v. Cruz, 56 Conn. App. 763, 770 , 746 A.2d 196 (2000) (victim thought she was talking to a physician), aff'd, 260 Conn. 1 , 792 A.2d 823 (2002).