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6 Nebraska opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nebraska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sandel v. Packaging Co. of Americagreen2 sentences1996In Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 154-55 , 317 N.W.2d 910, 914 (1982), we observed: “The exertion ‘greater than nonemployment life’ test has been applied by this court only in cases involving heart attacks allegedly caused by the activities or stress of employment. . . . 1996In Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 154-55 , 317 N.W.2d 910, 914 (1982), we observed: “The exertion ‘greater than nonemployment life’ test has been applied by this court only in cases involving heart attacks allegedly caused by the activities or stress of employment. . . . | 1 | 1 |
Martineau v. Nelsongreen2 sentences1990Availability of contributory negligence as a defense in a malpractice action was examined by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 102-03 , 247 N.W.2d 409, 415-16 (1976): Both courts and text writers have emphasized, however, that the availability of a contributory negligence defense in a malpractice case is limited because of the disparity in medical knowledge between the patient and his doctor and because of the patient’s right to rely on the doctor’s knowledge and skill in the course of medical treatment. 1990Availability of contributory negligence as a defense in a malpractice action was examined by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 102-03 , 247 N.W.2d 409, 415-16 (1976): Both courts and text writers have emphasized, however, that the availability of a contributory negligence defense in a malpractice case is limited because of the disparity in medical knowledge between the patient and his doctor and because of the patient’s right to rely on the doctor’s knowledge and skill in the course of medical treatment. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morton v. Hunt Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences2014Through the separation of legal and medical causa- tion, it is possible to compensate those heart attack victims whose work placed a greater strain on their hearts than would ordinary nonemployment life.16 Under the legal test, the claimant must establish that the proximate cause of the heart attack was work related and thereby break any causal connection between the natural pro- gression of a preexisting condition or disease and the injury at the workplace.17 Otherwise, the fact that the heart injury occurred at work would be strictly fortuitous.18 Under the med- ical test, “the doctors must 2014Through the separation of legal and medical causa- tion, it is possible to compensate those heart attack victims whose work placed a greater strain on their hearts than would ordinary nonemployment life.16 Under the legal test, the claimant must establish that the proximate cause of the heart attack was work related and thereby break any causal connection between the natural pro- gression of a preexisting condition or disease and the injury at the workplace.17 Otherwise, the fact that the heart injury occurred at work would be strictly fortuitous.18 Under the med- ical test, “the doctors must | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slater v. Ichtertz
green
1 sentence2025ICHTERTZ Cite as 320 Neb. 159 He was asked: “What was the medical standard of care for a cubital tunnel release in central Nebraska in August 2017?” He replied, “The standard of care is to go in and carefully release the ulnar nerve.” Ichtertz agreed that one of the “most significant” things when performing a cubital tunnel release is to avoid damaging or harming the ulnar nerve. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Cheloha
green
1 sentence2018Accordingly, the trial court did - 414 - Nebraska Court of A ppeals A dvance Sheets 25 Nebraska A ppellate R eports STATE v. CHELOHA Cite as 25 Neb. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sellens v. Allen Products Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Through the separation of legal and medical causa- tion, it is possible to compensate those heart attack victims whose work placed a greater strain on their hearts than would ordinary nonemployment life.16 Under the legal test, the claimant must establish that the proximate cause of the heart attack was work related and thereby break any causal connection between the natural pro- gression of a preexisting condition or disease and the injury at the workplace.17 Otherwise, the fact that the heart injury occurred at work would be strictly fortuitous.18 Under the med- ical test, “the doctors must 2014Through the separation of legal and medical causa- tion, it is possible to compensate those heart attack victims whose work placed a greater strain on their hearts than would ordinary nonemployment life.16 Under the legal test, the claimant must establish that the proximate cause of the heart attack was work related and thereby break any causal connection between the natural pro- gression of a preexisting condition or disease and the injury at the workplace.17 Otherwise, the fact that the heart injury occurred at work would be strictly fortuitous.18 Under the med- ical test, “the doctors must | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital
green
2 sentences1997Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1 , 459 N.W.2d 178 (1990); Kaspar, supra. Generally, the defense of contributory negligence has been recognized in a medical malpractice action when the patient has (1) failed to follow a medical instruction, (2) refused or neglected prescribed treatment, or (3) intentionally given erroneous, incomplete, or misleading information which is the basis for medical care or treatment of the patient. 1997Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1 , 459 N.W.2d 178 (1990); Kaspar, supra. Generally, the defense of contributory negligence has been recognized in a medical malpractice action when the patient has (1) failed to follow a medical instruction, (2) refused or neglected prescribed treatment, or (3) intentionally given erroneous, incomplete, or misleading information which is the basis for medical care or treatment of the patient. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Leitz v. Roberts Dairy
green
2 sentences1996Leitz states at 237 Neb. at 241 , 465 N.W.2d at 605 , quoting Larson, supra: “ ‘Under the legal test, the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of “arising out of the employment.” Under the medical test, the doctors must say whether the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this [injury].’ ” See, also, Smith, supra. But see Morton v. Hunt Transp., 240 Neb. 63 , 480 N.W.2d 217 (1992) (disapproved split test in cases of carpal tunnel syndrome, as syndrome shares none of difficulties of etiology surrounding heart attacks). 1996Leitz states at 237 Neb. at 241 , 465 N.W.2d at 605 , quoting Larson, supra: “ ‘Under the legal test, the law must define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of “arising out of the employment.” Under the medical test, the doctors must say whether the exertion (having been held legally sufficient to support compensation) in fact caused this [injury].’ ” See, also, Smith, supra. But see Morton v. Hunt Transp., 240 Neb. 63 , 480 N.W.2d 217 (1992) (disapproved split test in cases of carpal tunnel syndrome, as syndrome shares none of difficulties of etiology surrounding heart attacks). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Skar v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska
green
1 sentence1990Generally, the defense of contributory negligence has been recognized in a medical malpractice action when the patient has (1) failed to follow a medical instruction, (2) refused or neglected prescribed treatment, or (3) intentionally given erroneous, incomplete, or misleading information which is the basis for medical care or treatment of the patient; for example, Kaspar v. Schack, supra (notwithstanding scheduled appointment, the patient failed to return for a physical examination which would have disclosed the patient’s treatable condition which resulted in death); Skar v. City of Lincoln, | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.