medical standard (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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medical standard in Indiana

9 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 2010–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Dee Ward v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2016 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2020
2 sentences

2020See Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 764 (Ind. 2016) (concluding that “identifying a domestic-violence victim’s attacker is integral to the medical standard of care for” domestic violence cases). [21] In Ward, our supreme court observed that “a forensic nurse's primary function is providing medical treatment, not gathering evidence.

2017Id. (emphasis in original). [13] Nothing in the particular circumstances of this case leads us away from our Supreme Court’s conclusion in Ward that identifying a domestic violence Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1606-CR-1269 | June 23, 2017 Page 6 of 8 victim’s attacker is integral to the medical standard of care for such cases.3 Here, the nurse testified that knowing the identity of the attacker “is helpful in providing resources for the patient” and ensuring their safety in the hospital by alerting security and making the patient’s chart private.

12
Gerald P. VanPatten v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2013 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017See VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 260 (the second prong satisfied by victim’s statements because “they assist medical providers in recommending potential treatment for sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy testing, psychological counseling, and discharge instructions”). [12] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Baer’s testimony regarding what M.B. told her about her injuries because the two prongs of the medical exception of the hearsay rule were satisfied.

2017See VanPatten, 986 N.E.2d at 260 (the second prong satisfied by victim’s statements because “they assist medical providers in recommending potential treatment for sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy testing, psychological counseling, and discharge instructions”). [12] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Baer’s testimony regarding what M.B. told her about her injuries because the two prongs of the medical exception of the hearsay rule were satisfied.

11
McClain v. Stategreen
ind · 1996 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017See McClain, 675 N.E.2d at 331 (“where a patient consults a physician, the declarant’s desire to seek and receive treatment may be inferred from the circumstances”). [11] Additionally, Baer explained a history of assault was necessary for treatment and diagnosis “[b]ecause if I would find any injuries based on the story she -- she is consistent with the story, I would obtain a swab of that area.” (Tr.

11
Kuhn v. Stategreen
ind · 1944 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See id.

11
Whyde v. Czarkowskigreen
indctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
1 sentence

2010The "appropriate standard of care" about which the medical review panel is obliged to express its expert opinion is a medical standard, and therefore does not encompass non-medical concerns such as retention of records: "The standard of care is the degree of care, skill, and proficiency exercised by reasonably careful, skillful, and prudent practitioners in the same class to which the physician belongs, acting under the same or similar cireamstances." Whyde v. Czarkowski, 659 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Winona Memorial Foundation of Indianapolis v. Lomax green
indctapp · 1984
2 sentences

2016The Harts court stated that “[w]hen ... the matters at issue are within the common knowledge and éxperience of the jury, expert testimony regarding the exercise of reasonable care is improper and should be excluded.” Harts, 553 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting Lomax, 465 N.E.2d at 740 ).

2016Instead, it is dispositive that Trevino was injured while performing an activity that he was instructed to do by his health-care provider, a health care provider who falls under the Medical Malpractice Act, while undergoing a medical test. [15] We therefore find unavailing Trevino’s citation to Winona Memorial Foundation of Indianapolis v. Lomax, 465 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).

32010–2016
Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund v. Butcher green
indctapp · 2007
1 sentence

2026The Butcher court approved Sanders holding because more than one actual victim had existed. 863 N.E.2d at 19 . [35] Brittney’s circumstances present the same two-patient, two-injury configuration: Lilee suffered death from untreated galactosemia; Brittney suffered a distinct injury – the specific trauma of having been made the unwitting physical instrument of her daughter’s death through ongoing compliance with the providers’ medical instruction – from her own providers’ breach of a duty owed directly to her.

12026–2026
Linda Martinez, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Roy Martinez v. Oaklawn Psychiatric Center green
indctapp · 2019
1 sentence

2023And, consequently, in the larger context of negligent- credentialing claims, expert testimony is required to establish the standard of 17 But cf. Martinez v. Oaklawn Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 128 N.E.3d 549 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), clarified on reh’g, 131 N.E.3d 777 , trans. denied, 140 N.E.3d 286 (Ind. 2020) (David, J., dissenting) (concluding, where residential assistant in group home caused injury to plaintiff’s leg that resulted in plaintiff’s death, “I believe a lay jury could assess whether [the residential assistant’s] actions were tortious or not without applying a medical standard of care.

12023–2023
Harts v. Caylor-Nickel Hospital, Inc. green
indctapp · 1990
1 sentence

2016The Harts court stated that “[w]hen ... the matters at issue are within the common knowledge and éxperience of the jury, expert testimony regarding the exercise of reasonable care is improper and should be excluded.” Harts, 553 N.E.2d at 879 (quoting Lomax, 465 N.E.2d at 740 ).

12016–2016

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3 (3) IN § Ind. Code § 34-18-2-13 (3) IN § Ind. Code § 34-18-2-22 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 182 (1976–2026) TX 80 (1967–2025) IL 54 (1970–2026) NY 33 (1949–2024) MN 32 (1956–2026) HI 30 (1970–2024) GA 28 (1975–2025) MS 24 (1982–2026) CA 24 (1973–2025) CT 20 (1996–2019) NJ 19 (1950–2025) PA 19 (1984–2023) FL 18 (1968–2025) IA 16 (1995–2026) TN 13 (1978–2024) LA 13 (1983–2025) KY 13 (1993–2026) MI 11 (1975–2024) WI 10 (1988–2023) AZ 10 (1968–2018) IN 9 (2010–2026) MO 9 (1983–2023) WA 8 (1973–2023) WY 7 (1998–2022) WV 7 (1983–2010) MT 7 (1976–2023) NC 6 (1993–2025) NE 6 (1990–2025) MD 6 (1993–2018) UT 6 (2002–2022) OR 5 (1970–2015) AL 5 (1984–2005) KS 4 (1980–2025) AR 4 (1980–2014) DC 4 (1979–2007) ID 3 (1975–1986) MA 3 (1995–2008) OK 3 (1929–2001) NH 2 (1986–2016) VA 2 (2009–2009) SD 2 (2000–2008) NM 2 (1963–2017)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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