medical standard in New Jersey

2002Ctr. of Ocean County, 152 N.J. 563 , 706 A. 2d 721 (1998), held that the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), approved by the FDA, does not in itself establish a medical standard of care, in part because "[s]uch an approach ... would be inconsistent with the FDA's position that physicians are not bound by PDR recommendations." Id. at 581 , 706 A. 2d 721 .

2002Ctr. of Ocean County, 152 N.J. 563 , 706 A. 2d 721 (1998), held that the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR), approved by the FDA, does not in itself establish a medical standard of care, in part because "[s]uch an approach ... would be inconsistent with the FDA's position that physicians are not bound by PDR recommendations." Id. at 581 , 706 A. 2d 721 .

1999Id. at 460 , 537 A. 2d 700 .

1999Id. at 460 , 537 A. 2d 700 .

2022A "defendant, in response to an allegation that his negligence has caused injury, possesses the right of demonstrating by competent evidence that th at injury 'could' have been caused, wholly or partly, by an earlier accident or by a pre-existing condition." Davidson, 189 N.J. at 187 .

2019We also reject plaintiff's reliance on Parker, where the proofs did "not overwhelmingly favor one party or the other[,]" "[the defendant doctor's] credibility was central to the outcome of the case[,]" "the improper exclusion of defendant's contradictory deposition testimony could have been the deciding factor in his favor[,]" and "[t]he excluded deposition testimony bore directly on the issue of defendant's negligence." 440 N.J.

2013Id. at 48 , 942 A.2d 782 .

2013Id. at 48 , 942 A.2d 782 .

1998The first approach, adopted by this Court in Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 140 , 167 A.2d 625 (1961), “is that product packaging inserts do not establish a standard of care but are admissible to show what the physician knew or should have known about the drug.” 295 N.J.Super. at 120 , 684 A.2d 944 .

1998The first approach, adopted by this Court in Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 140 , 167 A.2d 625 (1961), “is that product packaging inserts do not establish a standard of care but are admissible to show what the physician knew or should have known about the drug.” 295 N.J.Super. at 120 , 684 A.2d 944 .

1998In affirming, the Appellate Division held that the trial court did not err by refusing to read verbatim that part of the two PDR warnings stating that Cipro should not be used by pregnant women and that the “[r]isk cannot be ruled out.” The Appellate Division identified three approaches concerning the use of the manufacturer’s insert and the parallel PDR warning to establish a medical standard of care. 295 N.J.Super. at 120-21 , 684 A.2d 944 .

1998In affirming, the Appellate Division held that the trial court did not err by refusing to read verbatim that part of the two PDR warnings stating that Cipro should not be used by pregnant women and that the “[r]isk cannot be ruled out.” The Appellate Division identified three approaches concerning the use of the manufacturer’s insert and the parallel PDR warning to establish a medical standard of care. 295 N.J.Super. at 120-21 , 684 A.2d 944 .

1997The question is whether proof that the failure to perform a diagnostic test was a deviation from standard medical practice and that the unperformed test might have yielded information resulting in the avoidance of harm from the preexistent condition is sufficient to demonstrate, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, that the defendant’s deviation increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, thereby satisfying the first prong of Scafidi The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Hamil, supra, considered the question of the degree of certainty required of expert medical testimony to establish

1996The package inserts, although not designed per se to establish a medical standard of care, can be given weight as "authoritative published compilation by a pharmaceutical manufacturer." Thompson, supra, 518 So. 2d at 613 .

1996The package inserts, although not designed per se to establish a medical standard of care, can be given weight as "authoritative published compilation by a pharmaceutical manufacturer." Thompson, supra, 518 So. 2d at 613 .

1995See also Georgia v. Ramautar, 180 A.D.2d 713 , 579 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App.Div.1992) (plaintiff was able to perform his job within 50 days of the accident); Grotzer v. Levy, 133 A.D.2d 67 , 518 N.Y.S.2d 629 (App.Div.), app. denied, 70 N.Y.2d 611 , 523 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 518 N.E.2d 6 (1987) (returning to work within one month fails to meet the verbal threshold).

1995See also Georgia v. Ramautar, 180 A.D.2d 713 , 579 N.Y.S.2d 743 (App.Div.1992) (plaintiff was able to perform his job within 50 days of the accident); Grotzer v. Levy, 133 A.D.2d 67 , 518 N.Y.S.2d 629 (App.Div.), app. denied, 70 N.Y.2d 611 , 523 N.Y.S.2d 495 , 518 N.E.2d 6 (1987) (returning to work within one month fails to meet the verbal threshold).

1989He asserted his conduct "was neither willful nor negligent, but constituted and [was] directly attributable to the direct and unanticipated consequences of severe and radical surgical trauma coupled with serious physical and/or emotional ailments which involuntarily disabled and prevented him from properly performing his judicial duties." 101 N.J. at 392 .

1988This is clarified by the language "mishap in question would not have occurred." Id. at 529 . *463 Expert testimony may be furnished by a person whose knowledge, training or experience are deemed qualified to express their opinions on medical subjects.

1968Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2 d 486, 154 P. 2 d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 ( Sup. Ct. 1944).

1968Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2 d 486, 154 P. 2 d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 ( Sup. Ct. 1944).

1960Prosser on Torts (2 d ed. 1955), § 43, p. 210, citing such situations as a sponge left inside a patient's abdomen (see Niebel v. Winslow, 88 N.J.L. 191 ( E. & A. 1915)), the removal or injury of an inappropriate part of the anatomy, dropping a tube down the windpipe, the inflicting of serious burns or, as in the Steinke case, above, removing the wrong tooth.

1950Lohndorf v. Peper Bros., etc., 134 N.J.L. 156 ( Sup. Ct. 1946); Franklin v. U.S. Bronze Powder Works, 6 N.J. *354 Super. 320 ( App. Div. 1950).