medical standard in Texas

2025STANDARD OF CARE By their first issue, appellants argue that appellee failed to elicit expert testimony regarding Dr. Luttrell’s standard of care because appellee “called no expert witness on her own behalf,” and Dr. Luttrell and Dr. Boyle “never testified that Dr. Luttrell breached the standard of care.” “The medical standard of care is the threshold question in a medical malpractice case and must be established so that the fact finder can determine whether the doctor’s act or omission deviated from the standard of care to the degree that it constituted negligence or malpractice.” Benish v. G

2020The medical standard of care is an essential element of Jones’s medical negligence cause of action, establishing the standard against which the factfinder measures the healthcare provider’s conduct. 5 Coan v. Winters, 646 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (threshold question in a medical malpractice case is the standard of care).

2023John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1995) (observing that the “standard of care demanded in medical malpractice cases requires skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons” and “typically requires expert testimony to establish the medical standard of care” (citing Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 , 165–66 (Tex. 1977))).

2005John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.1995) (observing that the "standard of care demanded in medical malpractice cases requires skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons” and " 'typically requires expert testimony to establish the medical standard of care.’ ” (quoting Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex.1977))). .

2015Page 5 412 S.W.2d 299 , *; 1967 Tex. LEXIS 293 , **; 10 Tex. Sup. J. 187 They need not be discouraged from assuming this risk, but they certainly should be aware of it." Since this is a case in which the patient urges that the physician gave some significant warnings [**11] but failed to mention other risks, Dr. Wilson's agreement with Dr. Meltzer's general statement of the abstract rule did not establish a medical standard.

2015Page 5 412 S.W.2d 299 , *; 1967 Tex. LEXIS 293 , **; 10 Tex. Sup. J. 187 They need not be discouraged from assuming this risk, but they certainly should be aware of it." Since this is a case in which the patient urges that the physician gave some significant warnings [**11] but failed to mention other risks, Dr. Wilson's agreement with Dr. Meltzer's general statement of the abstract rule did not establish a medical standard.

2012Id.; Dale, 188 S.W.3d at 879 n.1; see also In re CHCA Conroe, L.P., No. 09-04-453-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 23, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care.

2009See Dale, 188 S.W.3d at 879 n.1; see also Estevis, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5098 , at **19-20; In re CHCA Conroe, L.P., No. 09-04-453-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10481 , at *3 (Tex. App.–Beaumont Nov. 23, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The conduct by the hospital on which the agency relationship depends is not measured by a medical standard of care.

2017See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 ; Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999 .

2015See id. at 2001 .

2023John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. 1995) (observing that the “standard of care demanded in medical malpractice cases requires skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons” and “typically requires expert testimony to establish the medical standard of care” (citing Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160 , 165–66 (Tex. 1977))).

2005John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex.1995) (observing that the "standard of care demanded in medical malpractice cases requires skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons” and " 'typically requires expert testimony to establish the medical standard of care.’ ” (quoting Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex.1977))). .

2015See Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., Likewise, appellants' argument that respondeat superior 274 S.W.3d 669 , 671–72 (Tex.2008).

2011See Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., 274 S.W.3d 669, 671-72 (Tex.2008).

2010See Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex.2006) (discussing employer’s duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace, including warning of hazards and providing appropriate safety equipment); LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke, 229 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating that employer’s duty of reasonable care to provide safe workplace includes warning, safety equipment, training, and supervision).

2010See Kroger Co. v. Elwood , 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (discussing employer’s duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace, including warning of hazards and providing appropriate safety equipment); LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke , 229 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating that employer’s duty of reasonable care to provide safe workplace includes warning, safety equipment, training, and supervision).

2010See Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex.2006) (discussing employer’s duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace, including warning of hazards and providing appropriate safety equipment); LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke, 229 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating that employer’s duty of reasonable care to provide safe workplace includes warning, safety equipment, training, and supervision).

2010See Kroger Co. v. Elwood , 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (discussing employer’s duty to use ordinary care to provide a safe workplace, including warning of hazards and providing appropriate safety equipment); LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke , 229 S.W.3d 469, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating that employer’s duty of reasonable care to provide safe workplace includes warning, safety equipment, training, and supervision).

2006See Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2006See Rodriguez v. Reeves, 730 S.W.2d 19, 21 (TexApp.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref d n.r.e.).

2004See Day v. Harkins & Munoz, 961 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ).

2004See Day, 961 S.W.2d at 280 .

2004Id . (citing Hart v. Van Zandt , 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965)).

1990Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex.1965).

2025STANDARD OF CARE By their first issue, appellants argue that appellee failed to elicit expert testimony regarding Dr. Luttrell’s standard of care because appellee “called no expert witness on her own behalf,” and Dr. Luttrell and Dr. Boyle “never testified that Dr. Luttrell breached the standard of care.” “The medical standard of care is the threshold question in a medical malpractice case and must be established so that the fact finder can determine whether the doctor’s act or omission deviated from the standard of care to the degree that it constituted negligence or malpractice.” Benish v. G

2018Instead, [t]he medical standard of care is an element of a plaintiff’s medical negligence cause of action . . . [while] . . . the standard of proof imposed by section 74.153 requires proof—that is, evidence at trial that will more than likely be circumstantial—that the physician or health care provider’s mental state or intent at the time of any deviation from the medical standard of care was wilful and wanton. 13 Id.

1996Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.], 1980) (citing Smith v. Guthrie, 557 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

1985Stanton v. Westbrook, 598 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ).

2025“The test for cause[-]in[-]fact is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred.” Williams v. Colthurst, 253 S.W.3d 353, 365 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.) (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003)).

2025“The test for cause[-]in[-]fact is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred.” Williams v. Colthurst, 253 S.W.3d 353, 365 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.) (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003)).

2023The same is true with respect to evidence of causation—“[i]n medical malpractice cases, expert testimony regarding causation is the norm: ‘The general rule has long been that expert testimony is necessary to establish causation as to medical conditions outside the 34 common knowledge and experience of jurors.’” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010).

2021See Dotson, 612 S.W.2d at 922–24 (assessing whether prescription 33 was “therapeutic” required expert testimony); see, e.g., Swate, 2017 WL 3902621 , at *9–11 (reviewing expert testimony in substantial-evidence review of violation of Administrative Code title 22, section 165.1(a)(1)(A) and (C)); Scally, 351 S.W.3d at 458 (noting, in substantial-evidence review of violation of same subsection (a) of Board rule, that “[b]oth Board experts testified that it is below the standard of care to fail to provide a diagnosis”); Rodriguez-Aguero, 2010 WL 1730023 , at *2, 4, 8–9 (noting, in substantial-evi

2021We “presume” that a child of a sufficient age “will have an implicit awareness that the doctor’s questions are designed to elicit accurate information and that Nutall v. State Page 5 veracity will serve their best interest.” Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 ; see Beheler v. State, 3 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (stating that there is no requirement that a witness expressly state that the hearsay declarant recognized the need to be truthful in her statements for the medical exception to apply, even if the declarant is a child); see also Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Te